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Abstract 
 
HOW MUCH DO CEOS MATTER IN KOREA? 
 
 
This paper investigates whether Korean CEOs play a critical role in 
impacting company performance in comparison with the roles of industry and firms.  
This paper also attempts to measure the degree of importance of CEOs in Korean 
firms before and after the financial crisis.  The empirical analysis based on a CEO-
firm matched panel data set of Korean listed companies using ANOVA and 
VARCOMP methodology shows that CEOs account for a significant amount of 
profitability variance (from 15 to 25 percent depending on the ROIC and Tobin’s q 
samples). The relative importance of CEO effects is found to be comparable to that of 
the firm and industry effects. CEO effects seem to be more pronounced after the 
financial crisis than in the pre-crisis period.   
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
 
 
 
 
This paper investigates whether Korean CEOs play a critical role in 
impacting company performance in comparison with the roles of industry and firms. 
In contrast to the extensive research on CEOs in other countries, research on CEOs in 
Korea is at an early stage. Although the significance of CEOs is gaining in importance, 
relatively few studies have analytically and empirically examined CEOs in Korea. This 
inspired the research topic of the present paper, “CEOs’ impact on firms’ performance 
in Korea.” 
Why do CEOs matter? First, CEOs are executives who have overall 
responsibility for the conduct and performance of an entire organization (Mintzberg 
1973) and are, first and foremost, careful and comprehensive deciders of major courses 
of action (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996). Top executives1 may orchestrate the 
formulation of company2 strategy, including the choice of which products and markets 
to emphasize, how to outdo competitors, how fast to grow, and so on (Ansoff 1965; 
Porter 1980). Galbraith and Kazanjian (1986) described CEOs as having a role in 
strategy implementation-allocating resources, establishing policies and programs, and 
developing an organization that is aligned with the strategic thrusts of the firm. In this 
context, it is clear that CEOs have an important influence on performance differences 
among firms.  
Second, as Thompson (1967) argued, top executives vary in their experiences, 
capabilities, values, and personalities. These differences in turn, cause executives to 
differ in their awareness and interpretation of strategic stimuli, their aspiration levels, 
their beliefs on causation and its meaning, what they are trying to accomplish, and the 
degree of urgency in their tasks. The Harvard model (Andrews 1971) emphasized the 
personal role of senior executives in shaping their firms. In this model, individuals at 
the top of the enterprise were seen as pivotal in understanding what happens to the 
enterprise as a whole. The “upper echelons” perspective, presented by Hambrick and 
Mason (1984), suggest that executives make strategic choices on the basis of their 
cognitions and values and that the organization becomes a reflection of its top 
managers. As this formalized theory drew more attention, a growing body of research 
                                            
1 This paper uses the terms “CEO” and “top executive” interchangeably. 
3 This paper uses the general and broad terms “company” and “firm” interchangeably, 
reflecting the combined structure of the business unit and corporation in Korea. 
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focused on the influence of top executives on firm performance (Gupta and 
Govindarajan, 1984; Snyder and Ickes, 1985; Hambrick and Brandon 1988).  
Another research stream is “resource-based theory” (Wernerfelt 1984), which 
proposes that firm idiosyncrasies in the accumulation of unique and inimitable 
resources create sustained competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; Rumelt, 1991). In 
contrast to the perspective of industrial organization (IO), which argues that industry 
profitability is the most significant predictor of firm performance (Montgomery and 
Porter, 1999), resource-based theory sheds light on firm-specific resources including 
efficiency, competitiveness, human resources, and management (Rumelt, 1991; 
Roquebert et al., 1996). The reasons for shifting theoretical orientations appear to have 
been the inability of IOs to explain intra-industry profitability differences, which are 
persistent and more distinctive. In concluding that firm-specific factors have a 
predominant influence over firm performance, CEOs should matter, in that they have 
overall responsibility for the conduct and performance of an entire organization. When 
firm-specific resources matter, CEOs are relevant considering their role and impact on 
management. This implies that the unit of analysis may be narrowed from market to 
firm, and finally to the level of CEO.  
The research questions addressed by this paper are as follows: First, do CEOs3 
matter in Korea? Second, if so, how important are they in comparison with industry 
and firm’s impacts on company performance, traditionally considered more critical 
factors? Third, have there been any changes in the importance of CEOs before and 
after the 1997 financial crisis? Fourth, which group has greater CEO effects between 
chaebol4 and non-chaebol companies, and between owner and professional CEOs? To 
answer these questions, this paper employs empirical methodology from prior studies 
and obtains data from Korea’s publicly listed companies.  
Considering the idiosyncratic characteristics of the Korean management 
system, CEOs are presumed to have a significant impact on performance differences 
among firms. The reasons are the following:  
First, owner CEOs have often served as chairmen on corporate boards (CEO 
and chairman duality)5. According to one study, it is widely accepted that a CEO who 
is also chairman of the board has more discretion than a CEO who does not hold both 
positions (Hambrick and Finkelstein 1995). Owing to the strong influence of family 
traditions, there is a tendency for Korean corporate leaders, especially founders, to 
manage on the basis of principles governing the family or clan system (Chen, 1995; 
Chang and Chang, 1994). In addition, it is very common for a founder’s son to succeed 
but rare for the daughter to take over. The concentration of authority results from the 
                                            
3 Identifying CEOs of Korean firms requires some complicated criteria and procedures. See 
Data and methodology in Chapter 3.   
4 This paper uses the terms “chaebol” and “business group” interchangeably. 
5 Owner CEOs account for 70 percent of the sample used in this paper.  
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fact that ownership and management are not separated in most Korean companies. In 
this context, the CEOs of Korean firms are expected to have a stronger impact on 
performance whether positive or negative.  
Second, because of the legacy of Confucianism, seniority-based decision-
making is still prevalent in Korean society, including the business sector. Such 
traditions have enabled Korean companies to develop their own management system, 
known by some as K-type management, which includes top-down decision making, 
paternalistic leadership, personal loyalty, and compensation based on a seniority and 
merit rating (Chen, 1995; Lee and Yoo, 1978). This kind of management system 
results in a higher dependency and stronger personal loyalty to CEOs. The CEO’s 
influence on the organization is therefore seen as significant. 
On the other hand, due to less advanced corporate governance in Korea, there 
may be a limitation in evaluating the effects of CEOs. For instance, despite the 
presence of professional CEOs in companies, there may be a tendency on the part of 
company owners with no formal position, to exert their control on the decision-making 
process. In this regard, CEOs are seen more as simply following the instructions of 
owners. However, due to the fact that owners usually participate actively in the 
management of most Korean companies, such a limitation will not critically affect the 
results of the study. Furthermore, since the financial crisis, there has been progress in 
improving corporate governance in Korean companies through government reform 
efforts. A good example is the commercial law amendment requiring major 
shareholders to register as board members if they wish to be involved in management. 
If this institutional change in management systems following the financial crisis has 
brought any changes to CEO effects, the difference is also an intriguing issue worth 
examining. 
The distinctive features of this paper are as follows: This is the first study to 
empirically measure the impact of CEOs performance among firms in Korea. This 
study enters the leadership-performance research stream initiated by Lieberson and 
O’Connor (1972) and Thomas (1988) with evidence from Korea. It also employs 
methodology that has been widely used in the “industry vs. management” debate 
between IO (industrial organization) and SM (strategic management) researchers. By 
integrating these two research streams in terms of a conceptual framework and 
methodology, and examining the effects that influence performance differentials 
among Korean companies, empirical study will be a cornerstone on the effects of 
CEOs in Korea.  
Second, this paper attempts to identify CEOs of publicly listed companies in 
Korea. Though awkward from a western perspective, identifying a CEO is very 
difficult due to less developed governance structures and business practices in Korea. 
Careful criteria and discretion are required in selecting a CEO who has overall 
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responsibility for the conduct and performance of an entire organization. Unlike U.S. 
companies, whose CEOs introduce their annual reports, Korean companies neither 
have only one CEO nor clarify their identity. Furthermore, there are a number of top 
executives who hold a representative position, such as representative chairman, 
representative vice chairman, representative president, and representative director. 
There is no distinction from one position to another in terms of legal accountability 
and job description. Hence, complicated selection criteria and procedures are required 
to identify CEOs of Korean companies among the representative directors. This paper 
attempts to establish “criteria” to select a CEO among CEO candidates holding the 
post of representative director. Even though the criteria and procedures may not 
completely solve the problems resulting from complicated corporate governance in 
Korea, the data of selected CEOs have their own significance.     
Third, this study analyzes nine-year demographic data of CEO characteristics 
including age and educational background, which are in addition to Kim and Lee’s 
study (2001). Kim and Lee’s study was the seminal work to determine the 
demographic characteristics of CEOs in Korea. This study provides a more extensive 
and descriptive analysis of Korean CEOs over a nine-year period, helping understand 
“Who are the CEOs in Korea?” and “What kind of changes have taken place since the 
financial crisis?” Furthermore, this paper tries to integrate these demographic 
characteristics into analysis of leadership impact on performance. 
The paper is organized as follows: The first section examines antecedent 
literature on CEOs related to leadership-performance studies, the ‘industry vs. 
management debate,’ a ‘CEO succession study,’ and several studies on CEOs in Korea. 
The second presents hypotheses to test, and the third explains methodology, a model to 
verify the hypotheses, the criteria for selecting a CEO, and issues of company 
performance data used in this paper. The fourth describes the demographic 
characteristics of CEOs based on age, educational background, and regional origin; 
and contains the average return of sub samples that are divided with certain criteria. 
The fifth section presents the results of descriptive as well as regression analysis on the 
relationship between CEOs characteristics and performances. The sixth section 
demonstrates the results of VARCOMP and ANOVA, and a comparison of the results 
of this paper with prior studies. The last section presents the conclusion, limitations, 
and future study directions. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Literature Review 
 
 
 
 
II-1. Leadership-performance debate 
   
In the leadership-performance debate, leaders took on various forms from 
church ministers (Smith, Carson, and Alexander, 1984), coaches of sports teams 
(Eitzen and Yetman, 1972; Allen, Panian, and Lotz, 1979), mayors of cities (Pfeffer 
and Salancik, 1977), and top company executives (Lieberson and O’Connor, 1972; 
Thomas, 1988). The conceptual framework and methodology of leadership studies has 
evolved from examining direct relationships between leadership and performance to 
measuring indirect relationships between leadership and strategic choice, and in turn, 
performance. Evaluating research on the impact of CEOs on firm performance should 
take Lieberson and O’Connor’s path-breaking study (1972) as its starting point.  
Before starting the review, let me briefly describe the theoretical background 
of the skeptical view of leadership impact. Some theorists have set forth arguments on 
the strict limits within which executives operate. And some empirical evidence has 
been presented which suggests that top executives have far less effect on organizations 
than other factors. Population ecologists have argued that organizations are largely 
inertial, hemmed in by environmental and organizational constraints (Hannan and 
Freeman, 1977). Institutional theorists have argued that legitimacy constraints on 
organizations are particularly confining. Under great pressure to appear “normal” and 
rational, organizations must adopt numerous conventions that pull them into 
conformity with external expectations. Moreover, in the face of uncertainty, managers 
may be compelled to conclude that the least risky course of action is to imitate the 
choices of their counterparts (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Spender 1989; Hambrick, 
Geletkanyca, and Fredrickson 1993). March and March (1977) argued that managers 
as a group are exceedingly homogeneous. There is therefore not much variance in the 
independent variable. Industrial economists treated industry or the market as the unit 
of analysis, arguing that differences among firms were assumed as transitory or 
unimportant. Porter6 (1980) also argued that average industry profitability is the most 
significant predictor of firm performance. That is, that industry analysis should play a 
vital role in strategy formation.    
                                            
6 The debate between IO researchers including Porter and SM researchers including Rumelt 
and Roquebert et al. shall be reviewed in more detail later.  
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Thus, for reasons of substantive constraint, institutional pressures from 
conformity, and predominant market structure effects, and the extreme homogeneity of 
the top executive population, some have argued that managers do not matter. The most 
commonly cited evidence of minimal executive effects is Lieberson and O’Connor’s 
(1972) study of top executives in large corporations. Based on sales, earnings, and 
profit margin data for 167 large corporations over twenty years (1946-1965), the 
authors compared the impact of leadership changes with yearly, industry, and company 
influences. Using the ANOVA procedure, they found that leadership explained only 
6.5 to 15.5 percent of variance in the three performance measures examined. They 
concluded that the options of leaders are restricted by both the organization’s internal 
structure and its social limits. However, the two- or three-year lag effects of leadership 
on profit margins accounted for around 32 percent.  
Additional work supporting Lieberson and O’Connor’s was Pfeffer and 
Salancik’s (1978) study of city mayors. Examining data on thirty U.S. cities over a 
seventeen-year period, the authors sought to measure the relative effects of year, city, 
and mayor on city expenditures in eight different budget categories. They found that 
the mayor accounted for 5 to 10 percent of variance in expenditure categories. 
However, mayoral effects explained 24 percent of variance after controlling the size of 
the cities.   
Although both empirical studies mentioned above have been cited as evidence 
of the minimal effects of leadership, they have also drawn criticism from studies by 
Thomas (1988); Day and Lord (1988); and Hambrick and Mason (1984). The most 
widely noted criticism of Lieberson and O’Connor deals with their choice of 
performance measures (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Day and Lord, 1988). Two of 
three performance data - sales and earnings - are primarily indicators of the firm’s size7. 
The problem of the order of entry of the independent variables having greatly 
influenced the results was criticized by succeeding studies.   
When Weiner and Mahoney (1981) replicated Lieberson and O’Connor’s 
study, they allowed the leadership variable to enter the analysis at the same stage as the 
other variables and found that leadership, or stewardship accounted for 44 percent of 
the variance in profitability of major firms. Day and Lord (1988) argued that 
leadership accounted for 20-45 percent of the performance differences after effectively 
controlling for size and order effects. In addition, they concluded that Lieberson and 
O’Connor’s study should be interpreted to support the substantial existence of a 
leadership effect contrary to the previous interpretation. Thomas (1988) replicated 
Lieberson and O’Connor’s methodology to measure the leadership effect of U.K. retail 
companies between 1965 and 1984, and found that the leadership effect accounted for 
                                            
7 The methodological problems with Lieberson and O’Connor’s study are reviewed in detail 
in the methodology section of Chapter III.  
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roughly 50 percent by correcting the methodological problems. Smith, Carson, & 
Alexander (1984) examined the relationship between leadership and organizational 
performance by using a sample of Methodist ministers and churches. The authors 
found that leaders who had been very effective in prior assignments tended to deliver 
higher performance in their current assignments (measured by church attendance and 
financial statistics) than leaders who had been previously less effective.  
Additionally, an increasing number of studies have examined and found 
significant associations between executive attributes or succession and organizational 
performance. Thus, the individualist’s perspective that emphasized the leadership 
effect has gained ground. Not all research on top executives has sought to examine the 
direct effects on organizational performance. Some studies have examined how top 
executive characteristics are associated with strategic choice and organizational 
structure. Some researchers have focused on the impact of CEO succession on 
strategic change and in turn, performance.  
 
 
II-2. Studies on CEOs 
 
The underlying theoretical background that contributed to the growing body 
of research on CEOs was the “upper echelons” theory (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). 
The theory, that top executives make strategic choices on the basis of their cognitions 
and values and that the organization becomes a reflection of its top managers, has 
gained wide recognition in the field of strategic management. As a result, CEO studies 
have increased with diverse methods and perspectives.  
There are two means to study the personal characteristics of a CEO as 
individuals. The first focuses on psychological qualities such as values, a cognitive 
model, and other elements of personality. These qualities provide a basis for which 
executives filter and interpret stimuli and are then geared towards certain choices 
(March and Simon, 1958; Weick, 1979; Hage and Dewar, 1973; Hambrick and 
Brandon, 1988).  
Weick (1979) holds that values affect selective perception in interpretation. 
The manager “sees what he wants to see, hears what she wants to hear.” This process 
is called “perceptual screening” (England, 1967). Hage and Dewar (1973) found that 
executives tend to select strategies in line with their values. Hambrick and Brandon 
(1988) believe that executives tend to affect the structure of the organizations they 
head in accordance with their values.  
Ever since March and Simon’s (1958) introduction of bounded rationality, 
scholars have been interested in cognitive limits and biases in strategic decision 
making. In the 1990s, interest in managerial cognition grew rapidly, resulting in 
extensive literature on theory and research. Researchers suggested the concept that 
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every manager is endowed with a cognitive model that determines whether and how 
new stimuli will be noticed, encoded, and acted on. These cognitive models have been 
variously referred to as “cognitive maps” (Axelrod, 1976; Weick and Bougon 1986), 
“world views” (Starbuck and Hedberg, 1977; Mason and Mitroff, 1981), and 
“mindscapes” (Maruyama, 1982). 
Reger and Huff (1993) examined how managers cognitively distinguished 
strategic groups in the Chicago banking market; Zahra and Chaples (1993) 
investigated how executives assess their competitors with their own cognition and 
persona experience. Evidence that executives’ cognitive structures would be reflected 
in their strategic choices has been observed in some studies, though not in abundance. 
Fiol (1989) used textual analysis of CEO’s letters to shareholders to investigate 
whether revealed beliefs about the strength of organizational boundaries were related 
to the company’s joint venture activity. Narayanan and Fahey (1990) used content 
analysis of annual reports and trade journal articles to extract the causal maps of 
executives.  
Although psychological constructs have the advantage of conceptual clarity 
and, perhaps are more important to provide a pointed causal link to executive behavior 
or choice, it also poses major limitations for researchers and senior executives 
(Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996). Top executives are often reluctant to undergo 
psychological testing. This is the reason most studies on the psychological 
characteristics of top executives are based on samples from small and medium-sized 
firms or nonprofit organizations. Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996) were critical in that 
some psychological constructs have the disadvantage of doubtful soundness when 
applied to senior executives. In particular, recent debates have focused on whether the 
conventional scales for gauging personality dimensions are too general and detached 
from executive issues to be useful for studying top managers.  
The second area of focus for studying personal characteristics is based on the 
observable variables of a person’s experiences. Such variables as functional 
background, company tenure, tenure as CEO, and formal education have been 
prominent in studies of senior executives. (Gabarro, 1987; Baumrin, 1990; Hambrick 
and Fukutomi, 1991). As Barbosa (1985) described, an executives’s tenure in a firm 
has a margin of error of zero; an executive’s primary functional background is open to 
little error and can be coded reliably. Among observable characteristics, three variables 
such as the CEO’s tenure, functional background, and education are extensively 
explored.  
Executive tenure has been explored in diverse ways: tenure in the position 
(Hambrick and Fukutomi, 1991; Miller, 1991); tenure in the organization (Thomas, 
Litschert, and Ramaswamy 1991); and tenure in the industry (Hambrick, Geletkanycz, 
and Fredrickson 1993).  
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Hambrick and Fukutomi (1991) argued that during an executive’s time in 
office, critical trends tend to occur on five fronts: 1) the executive’s commitment to 
their paradigms increases, 2) the longer an executive’s tenure, the narrower and fewer 
the sources of his or her information become, 3) the executive’s task interest decreases 
and diminishes, 4) the power of the executive increases. The study by Wiersema and 
Bantel (1992) showed that a top executive’s tenure was negatively associated with 
change in a company’s diversification strategy over a subsequent three-year period. 
Norbun and Birley (1988) found that executive tenures were positively associated with 
company performance in stable industries but negatively associated with performance 
in volatile industries. The study by Finkelstein and Hambrick (1990) illustrates that 
executive tenure is positively associated with strategic conformity to average industry 
tendencies.  
Barbosa (1985) found that business innovation is enhanced by certain 
functional capabilities among top executives. He found that the conversion of product 
innovation efforts (R&D spending and staffing levels) into actual product innovations 
(patents, sales from new products, and so on) was strongly related to the degree of 
marketing experience among the company’s top executives. He concluded that a 
marketing orientation among top executives confers more of a customer-based, 
creative, expansionist capability in the firm, which serves to enhance the yield from 
innovation efforts. Among the studies dealing with a strategy of diversification, Song 
(1982) found that firms diversifying primarily through acquisitions were likely to have 
CEOs with financial and legal backgrounds, while companies diversifying through 
internal, organic extensions were more likely to have CEOs with core functional 
experiences (operations, R&D, and marketing and sales).  
Researchers including Becker (1970), Kimberly and Evanisko (1981) found 
that the education level of top executives was positively associated with company 
growth. However, Hambrick and Mason (1984) cautioned that any observed 
associations between education and innovation may be due to an unobserved, spurious 
effect from executive age. They argued that there has been a marked and steady 
tendency towards increased education levels of executives over the past thirty or forty 
years, and young executives tend to be more highly educated than their older 
colleagues and predecessors.  
As with variables of personal characteristics, observable characteristics also 
have problems. Demographic indicators may contain more noise than purer 
psychological measures. For example, a person’s educational background may serve as 
a blurred indicator of their socioeconomic background, motivation, cognitive style, 
risk propensity, and other underlying traits. Beyond the demographic variables that 
have been the primary focus so far - executive tenure, functional background, and 
education - lies the need to examine other background characteristics that may have an 
 10
important bearing on organizational outcomes (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996). 
Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987) introduced the concept of “executive 
discretion” to reflect the variation of CEO effects firm-by-firm, or industry-by-industry. 
They argued that a CEO’s degree of discretion is derived from environmental, 
organizational, and individual managerial characteristics. Hambrick and Abrahamson 
(1995) listed 53 industries in rank of order of discretion, putting computer 
programming, perfumes, and motion picture production in a higher rank. Industries 
such as natural gas transmission, electrical services, and petroleum refining were rated 
as having very low discretion.  
In addition to environmental factors, the organization may have characteristics 
that enhance or, conversely, limit the chief executive’s discretion. These include 
inertial forces, such as organizational size, age, a vibrant corporate culture, and capital 
intensity, all of which limit executive latitude. The following are recognized as 
individual sources of discretion: aspiration level, tolerance of ambiguity, cognitive 
complexity, locus of control, power base, and political acumen (Hambrick and 
Finkelstein, 1987).     
 
 
II-3.CEO change and succession studies 
 
Succession studies that attempt to measure the impact of executive succession 
on organizational performance have mainly focused four topics; 1) determinants of top 
executive departure, 2) dynamics of the succession process, 3) characteristics of 
successors, and 4) the impact of characteristics of successors and the succession 
process (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996). 
Although some researchers might include the leadership-performance debate 
from Lieberson and O’Connor, Salancik and Pfeffer, and Day and Lord, this paper 
excludes the debate from succession studies. The leadership-performance debate was 
employed because changes initiated by CEOs are observable events that enabled a 
separate understanding of leadership versus firm effects. 
This paper confines concerns with the topic of the relationship between 
succession and organizational performance. Research on the performance implications 
of succession began with a series of studies on sports teams. This type of organization, 
while perhaps only marginally similar to other organizations, provides researchers with 
the important advantages of a well-controlled sampling procedure and, most 
importantly, undisputable performance measures (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996). 
 Grusky (1963) observed that the “rates of administrative succession of field 
managers and degree of organizational effectiveness are negatively correlated.” Some 
researchers found that the impact of CEO succession on organizational performance 
can be different depending on the context including the length of time in which the 
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organization has been operational. Carroll (1984) argued that the departure of the 
company’s first chief executive would be extremely disruptive; because of the fragility 
of relatively young organizations, the likelihood of company failure following the 
departure would increase. In a similar study of local telephone companies in the early 
twentieth century, Haveman (1993) found results in line with Carroll’s: executive 
departure increased an organization’s mortality. Literature on corporate turnarounds 
have consistently emphasized that new leadership is needed for a turnaround to be 
successful.  
Bibeault (1982) found that about three-fourths of 82 turnaround cases he 
studied involved new CEOs. Virany, Tushman, and Romanelli (1992) found in their 
study with a sample of companies in the mini-computer industry (1968-1980) that 
CEO succession, in general, was associated with improvements in profits. The authors 
also found that performance improved the most through a combination of changes in 
CEOs, the top management team, and strategy.  
Boeker (1997) suggested that the improvement of performance was positively 
associated with a new CEO from outside because new leaders were more likely to 
have more knowledge and competencies than insiders. This result was supported by 
several successive studies (Bantel and Jackson, 1989; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990; 
O’Reilly and Flatt, 1989). Zajac and Westphal (1996), however, were critical that the 
cause and effect of the relationship was not clear.  
Khurana and Nohria (2002) argued that the degree of organizational 
disruption created by a CEO’s departure (e.g. by force vs. natural turnover) and the 
potential for organizational change determined by the origin of the successor CEO (e.g. 
insider vs. outsider) are important factors affecting the firm’s subsequent performance. 
They found that natural turnover followed by an outsider leads to declining 
organizational performance. They also found that strategic changes introduced by new 
CEOs were insufficient in triggering an effect on performance.  
Bertrand and Schoar (2003) constructed a matching manager-firm panel data 
set that enabled them to track the top managers across different firms over time, and 
examined if and how individual managers affect corporate behavior and performance. 
They identified specific patterns in managerial decision-making that appear to indicate 
general differences in “style” across managers, and found that those with higher 
performance received higher compensation and are more likely to be found in better-
governed firms. They also showed that executives from earlier birth cohorts appear on 
average to be more conservative; on the other hand, managers who hold an MBA 
degree on average, seem to follow more aggressive strategies.  
The findings of Ahn et al. (2004) showed a contrast with the study by 
Bertrand and Schoar (2003), although they employed the same methodological and 
theoretical approach with Japanese data. They were unable to disentangle a shacho- 
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(CEO) fixed effect. However, they found a significantly positive response from capital 
markets on the day a shacho change was announced, particularly when the change was 
non-routine8. Their study, however, has limitations due to the lack of external mobility 
of Japanese CEOs - shachos - even in recent times. A more comprehensive discussion 
on the role of Japanese shachos as CEOs may be necessary to consider the 
idiosyncratic characteristics of the Japanese management system.  
 
 
II-4. Market vs. Management? 
 
Another research stream is the debate between an IO, which argued that the 
market is the most predominant predictor of performance differences, and an SM, 
which concluded that firm-specific resources account for the largest variance of profit. 
When the assumption of the largest effects of firm-specific resources could be 
accepted, CEOs should matter because they are presumed to have an overall 
responsibility for the firm’s strategy and structure, and in turn, performance. In this 
context, resource-based theory that emphasized firm-specific resources could be 
interpreted as the basis of the “CEO effects (Khurana and Nohria, 2002).”  
The reason researchers in this debate did not pay attention to prior leadership-
performance debates (Lieberson and O’Connor, Day and Lord) is because their 
concerns lie only in “market vs. firm effects.” Bowman and Helfat (2001), who 
reviewed both research streams; the leadership-performance debate and the debate 
between IO and SM, expressed surprise that none of the IO and SM researchers 
referred to the earlier leadership-performance debate.   
The debate between IO and SM researchers was ignited by the studies of 
Schmalensee (1985) and Rumelt (1991). Schmalensee (1985) attempted to decompose 
the locus of profit variances into three variables: industry, market share, and firm. He 
aimed to empirically test three traditions, namely the classical, revisionist, and 
managerial views, and supported the classical view that industry primarily determined 
a firm’s profitability. Using 1975 data from the Line of Business Program of the U.S. 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the brand-new methodology VARCOMP, the 
author found support neither for the existence of firm effects nor for the importance of 
market share effects. However, he found that industry effects apparently exist and are 
important. The unexplained variances accounted for 80 percent of the total variance.  
Rumelt (1991) partitioned the total variance in rates of return among FTC 
Line of Business reporting units into industry, time, corporate parent, and business-
specific factors. In contrast to Schmalensee’s study, he found negligible corporate 
                                            
8 The term “non-routine” here means that the retired shacho (CEO) leaves the firm immediately without 
staying on as chairman. It is considered routine that the retired shacho hold the post of chairman after 
retiring. 
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effects, small stable industry effects, and very large stable business-unit effects. The 
term  ‘firm effects’ that Schmalensee used was equivalent to the corporate effects of 
Rumelt’s study. Thus, Schmalensee’s conclusion, that “firm effects do not exist” refers 
to what Rumelt noted as “corporate effects.” He found that there were significant 
business-unit effects in U.S. manufacturing activities that strongly outweigh industry 
and corporate membership as predictors of profitability. Business-unit effects were 
reported to account for 46 percent of total variance. 
Roquebert et al. (1996) used COMPUSTAT data instead of FTC data 
employed by Schmalensee and Rumelt, extending the debate to longer and more recent 
time periods. The authors examined the proportion of the relative importance of time, 
industry, corporation, and business-unit effects in line with prior research in this stream. 
They found very large business-unit effects, and non-trivial corporate effects. They 
concluded that these findings provided additional evidence that strategic management 
theory has an important role to play, as even corporate managers in the general case 
may have a significant impact on business-unit profitability. 
The study of McGahan and Porter (1997), extending the scope of analysis to 
sectors other than manufacturing, examined the importance of year, industry, 
corporate-parent, and business-specific effects on the profitability of U.S. public 
corporations within specific 4-digit SIC categories. Finding that year, industry, 
corporate-parent, and business-specific effects account for 2 percent, 19 percent, 4 
percent, and 32 percent, respectively, of the aggregate variance in profitability, they 
also concluded that the importance of the effects differ substantially across broad 
economic sectors. Industry effects in particular, accounted for a smaller portion of 
profit variance in manufacturing but a larger portion in lodging/entertainment (64.3 
percent), services (47.37 percent), wholesale/retail trade (41.79 percent), and 
transportation (39.5 percent).  
Hawawini et al. (2003) supported the IO perspective with analysis that 
employed value-based measures of performance, a new data set and a different 
statistical approach. They found that only for a few dominant value creators (leaders) 
and destroyers (losers) do firm-specific assets seem to matter significantly more than 
industry factors. For most other firms, i.e., those that are not notable leaders or losers 
in their industry, the industry effect turns out to be more important for performance 
than firm-specific factors.  
All the studies of this stream, regardless of what they emphasized as sources 
of firm profit differences, confirmed the dominance of firm-specific effects. With such 
robust support, it would be safe to conclude that industry membership does not matter 
much for a firm’s performance (Hawawini, Subramanian and Verdin, 2003).   
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II-5. CEO studies in Korea 
 
The little research available on top executives in Korea presents a striking 
contrast with the increasing body of research in the U.S. and Japan. Kim and Lee’s 
study (2001), the seminal work building archival data on top executives in Korea, 
analyzed the demographic characteristics of CEOs of publicly listed companies 
between 1997 and 2000. The study of Kim and Park (2004), which analyzed the 
school- or regional-ties between owners and professional CEOs, found that preference 
for the same region and high school alumni influenced the selection of professional 
CEOs. In particular, the preference for the same regional-origin of Honam province is 
found to be stronger than other regions owing to the political and social context of the 
Honam-based government during the period (1997-2000).  
Kim and Kim (2003) tried to identify the demographic characteristics and 
tenure of CEOs in the SI (software integration) industry, while Kim (2004) analyzed 
the relationship between tenure and the organization’s performance. He suggested that 
performance tended to decline in the beginning stage of CEOs’ tenure, and rebound in 
the third year in the case of owner CEOs, and the fifth year in the case of professional 
CEOs. However, it was reported that performance tended to decline again from the 
twentieth year in the case of owner CEOs and the tenth year in the case of professional 
CEOs.    
Shin and Chang (2003a, b), and Park (1996) paid particular attention to the 
succession of CEOs. Park argued that the frequent change in CEOs in growing and 
declining industries is negatively associated with performance, with exception of 
matured industries. The study by Kang (1998) reported that a change of CEOs had a 
negative impact on performance for that year. Shin and Chang (2003b) found that the 
obvious improvement of performance occurred when the CEO was changed due to 
poor performance. It was argued that the proportion of ruling shareholders positively 
influenced the market value of the firm in changing CEOs with an unsatisfactory 
record. The proportion of institutional investors and foreign investors also positively 
influenced the possibility of changing CEOs with poor performance.  
Kim and Park (2000) explained that the growth of firms rather than profit was 
more likely to be influenced by the characteristics of CEOs. CEOs in a higher 
discretionary context were more likely to have an influence performance.  
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CHAPTER 3 
Hypotheses  
 
 
 
 
Hypothesis 1. CEOs have an impact on performance differences among firms in 
Korea.  
 
  “Do Korean CEOs matter?” As previously mentioned, studies on the 
relationship between leadership and a firms’ performance are divided into the 
“supportive view” and “doubtful view” on the impact of CEOs.  
Before detailing the supportive views, the doubtful views will be briefly 
reviewed. Doubtful views comprise several convincing theories such as population 
ecological theory, and institutional theory. Population ecologists have argued that 
organizations are largely inertial, hemmed in by environmental and organizational 
constraints (Hannan and Freeman, 1977). The options of organizational leaders are 
restricted by both the organization’s internal structure and its social milieu (Lieberson 
and O’Connor, 1972). Freedman et al. (1956) explained, “The influence which any 
single individual may have upon the development of groups is not so great as we 
frequently imagine.”   
Institutional theorists have argued that legitimacy constraints on organizations 
are particularly confining. Under great pressure to appear “normal” and rational, 
organizations must adopt numerous conventions that align them with external 
expectations. Moreover, in the face of uncertainty, managers may be compelled to 
conclude that the least risky course of action is to imitate the choices of their 
counterparts (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Spender 1989; Hambrick, Geletkanyca, and 
Fredrickson 1993).  
In fact, some studies found that institutional factors strongly influenced the 
behavior of Korean firms. Song (1998) argued that the formation of business groups 
through diversified expansion has been influenced by institutional factors such as 
institutional isomorphism and efficiency-oriented strategic considerations to exploit 
existing resources. He pointed that the top four chaebols’ entry into the semiconductor 
industry exemplifies herding behavior. 
Additionally, March and March (1977) argued that managers as a group are 
exceedingly homogeneous. In this instance, there is not much variance in the 
independent variable. This argument can be applied to the Korean case. Top executives 
are vastly homogeneous in terms of age and educational background in Korea. In this 
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context, CEOs could be assumed to have a minimal impact on a firm’s performance.  
Although the doubtful view seems reasonable and convincing in theory, the 
reality is not so simple. Research on the cross-sectional determinants of strategic 
choices including capital structure, investment portfolio, and acquisition policy shows 
that a large amount of variation remains unexplained after controlling for firm-level 
characteristics (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003). This paper requires further analysis to 
understand the large heterogeneity in business practices that is left unexplained by 
more standard models that rely on firm- and industry-level factors.   
 From the supportive view, CEOs are strongly assumed to have a significant 
impact on performance differences among firms. The most widely recognized theory 
behind this ‘individualist’ view is the “upper echelons theory.” Since Hambrick and 
Mason (1984) provided the theoretical framework, proposing that top executives 
make strategic choices on the basis of their cognitions and values and that the 
organization becomes a reflection of its top managers, a number of studies have 
focused on the CEO’s impact on organizational performance (Gupta and 
Govindarajan, 1984; Snyder and Ickes, 1985; Hambrick and Brandon 1988). 
 Another theoretical background supporting leadership impact is “resource-
based theory.” The study by Rumelt (1991) and Roquebert et al. (1996) reported on 
the largest impact of “firm-specific resources” including management, capabilities, 
and strategic choices. Considering the fact that the CEO has overall responsibility for 
the conduct and behavior of the firm (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1995), CEOs are 
presumed to have a significant impact on organizational performance.  
 Even though I admit to various limitations on the magnitude of the impact of 
CEOs, they are strongly expected to have a significant impact on performance 
differences in Korea. 
 
Hypothesis 2. CEOs have a substantial impact on performance differences compared 
to industry and firm effects. 
 
  “If CEOs matter, then, how much do CEOs matter in Korea?” In order to 
compare the magnitude of CEO effects with other major effects, this paper tries to 
partition the performance variances into major effects such as year, industry, firm, 
and CEO.  
 From the leadership-performance debate, the assumption that leadership 
accounts for the largest portion of total variance is supported by three separate 
research results: 44 percent (Weiner and Mahoney, 1981), 50 percent (Thomas, 
1988), and 20-45 percent (Day and Lord, 1988). After correcting the methodological 
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problems of previous studies by Lieberson and O’Connor (1972), Salancik and 
Pfeffer (1978) obtained the results. In this context, they are supportive of the view 
that the significance of CEO effects can be seen as ‘conclusive.’ 
 The ‘IO vs. SM debate’ provided this paper with supportive results that can 
be interpreted as a basis of significant CEO effects. A considerable amount of 
research found that ‘management’ explained the largest portion of profit variance of 
firms. Rumelt (1991) and Roquebert et al. (1996) found 44 percent and 55 percent of 
firm-specific effects, respectively. Even McGahan and Porter (1997), IO researchers 
who emphasized the effects of industry, found greater firm-specific effects (32 
percent) than industry effects (19 percent). The largest portion of firm-specific or 
management effects in these studies implicated the ‘significance of CEO effects.’  
Furthermore, Korean CEOs are expected to have a significant impact on the 
performance of firms due to the idiosyncratic characteristics of the Korean 
management system. Most owners have often served as CEO and a chairman of the 
board concurrently. It is widely accepted that a CEO who is also chairman of the board 
has more discretion than a CEO who does not hold both positions (Hambrick and 
Finkelstein 1995).  
Owing to the strong influence of family traditions, there is a tendency for 
Korean corporate leaders, especially founders, to manage on the basis of principles 
governing the family or clan system (Chen, 1995; Chang and Chang, 1994). The 
concentration of authority results partly from the fact that ownership and management 
are not separated in most Korean companies. In this context, CEOs of Korean firms 
are expected to have a stronger impact on performance be it in a positive or negative 
direction. 
Additionally, Korean companies have developed their own management 
system, which includes top-down decision making, paternalistic leadership, personal 
loyalty, and compensation based on seniority and merit rating (Lee and Yoo, 1978). 
This kind of management system results in a higher dependency and stronger personal 
loyalty to CEOs. The CEO’s influence on the organization can be seen as significant in 
Korea. 
 
Hypothesis 3. The CEO effects of the post-financial crisis period are likely to be 
greater than the pre-financial crisis period.  
 
  “Have there been any changes in the magnitude of CEO effects from before 
and after the 1997 financial crisis?” The crisis was an unprecedented event that had a 
deep impact on Korea, resulting in very extensive changes in economic as well as 
social structures.  
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 One of the most important changes for Korean companies was the 
‘integration’ of the Korean economy into the global market. The financial crisis 
triggered the Korean economy to quickly open its market and liberalize its economic 
system. Korean companies were expected to face fiercer competition following the 
crisis, presenting increasing profit differentials between them, in particular, between 
the winners and losers. The differences between the market value of the top 30 and 
the lowest 30 companies increased from 7 trillion won in 1995 to 32 trillion won in 
2000 (Korea Stock Exchange). Additionally, more than 50 percent of listed 
companies experienced a sharp one-tenth decrease in market value compared to the 
pre-crisis period. Increasing intra- rather than inter-industry differences can be 
interpreted as the result of firm specific resources and capabilities including 
management ability significantly affecting performance. Also worth considering is 
that CEOs made more of a difference following the crisis than in the pre-crisis period.   
 Corporate restructuring has been one of the key policy issues in Korea since 
the crisis (Kim, 2003). Weak corporate governance was widely accused as a main 
cause of the financial crisis (Park, 1998; Kim 2003). Thus, the focus of corporate 
restructuring lay in improving weak corporate governance including the disparity 
between control and ownership, and less developed legal rights or types of protection 
for minority shareholders. To enhance corporate transparency and accountability, the 
Korean government required disclosure of a firm’s information, increased auditor 
independence, and developed an electronic system for easy access to this information. 
Firms are now required to provide more substantial information, including semi-
annual financial statements, all capital losses, and combined financial statements 
(Joh, 1999). 
In this context, it is clear that corporate governance of Korean firms has been 
improving since the crisis. It is believed that better corporate governance is more 
likely to result in a more ‘suitable manager’ for the firm. A number of research 
reports have assumed that better corporate governance is positively associated with 
the ‘match between the CEO and firm’ and in turn, with performance (Bertrand and 
Schoar, 2003). The authors found that managers with higher performance fixed 
effects also receive higher salaries and total compensation and that these managers 
are more likely to be found in better-governed firms.  
In fact, Korean companies tend to have more professional CEOs after the crisis 
than before. This increase seems to reflect efforts to seek suitable managers who 
possess the wherewithal to deal effectively in very difficult circumstances. 
Furthermore, both domestic and foreign investors have been keen to evaluate firms 
based on more accurate information since the crisis. The market values of firms are 
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likely to be more sensitive to changes in CEOs following the crisis. Accordingly, 
Korean companies tend to be more aware of the market’s attention, and in turn, try to 
meet expectations in selecting CEOs. This tendency can be construed as ‘increasing 
CEO effects.’ 
 
Hypothesis 4. The CEO effects of non-chaebol firms are likely to be greater than 
those of chaebol affiliated firms. 
 
 The characteristics of the organization headed by CEOs may affect the 
amount of executive discretion (Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1987). The authors 
argued that an organization’s inertial force, such as size, age, a vibrant corporate 
culture, and capital intensity, all work to limit executive latitude. Large, mature 
organizations with very entrenched cultures are not easily changed. Their top 
executives operate under severe constraints. 
 The amount of resources available to the organization and internal 
conditions determined by the distribution of ownership, board composition, and 
internal power concentration also affect the CEOs’ discretion. McEachern (1975), 
and Hambrick and Finkelstein (1995) found that executives have far more discretion 
when ownership is widely dispersed than when one or a few owners own 
concentrated blocks of shares. 
 Considering the characteristics of chaebols or business groups, chaebol-
affiliated companies are more likely to be influenced by group-based strategy and 
culture. They share managerial as well as technical resources among affiliated 
companies. Group-wide advertising generates considerable economies of scale and 
scope (Chang and Hong, 2000). Chang and Hong (2002) found substantial business 
group-specific effects in Korea. In this context, CEOs of chaebol-affiliated 
companies use less discretion than CEOs of non-chaebol companies. 
 Miller, Kets de Vries, and Toulouse (1982) found that CEOs locus of control 
was strongly associated with organizational strategy and structure in small firms but 
not so in large firms. Reinganum (1985) found evidence that the stock market 
distinguishes between high- and low- discretionary situations. On the announcement 
of CEO succession, stock prices rise abnormally, but only for small companies and 
when the CEO is totally departing the firm.  These conditions set the stage in which 
a new CEO can have an enhanced effect. 
  From the perspective of executive discretion, CEOs leading relatively small, 
younger companies with weaker cultures are likely to have a stronger influence on 
performance. This is the case with non-chaebol firms, which tend to have more of a 
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concentrated ownership structure and a higher proportion of owner CEOs than 
chaebol affiliated firms. Thus, the CEO effects of non-chaebol firms are likely to be 
greater than those of chaebol firms. 
 
Hypothesis 5. Owner CEO effects are likely to be greater than professional CEO 
effects. 
 
 It is widely accepted that owners tend to wield absolute influence in 
controlling firms in Korea, even though professional CEOs are formally in charge of 
overall responsibility. Furthermore, owners have often served not only as CEO but 
also as chairmen on corporate boards in Korea (CEO and chairman duality)9 . 
According to one study, a CEO who is also chairman of the board was shown to have 
more discretion than a CEO who does not hold both positions (Hambrick and 
Finkelstein 1995).  
Owing to the strong influence of family traditions, there is a tendency for 
Korean corporate owners to manage on the basis of principles governing the family or 
clan system (Chen, 1995; Chang and Chang, 1994). In addition, it is very common for 
a founder’s son or daughter to succeed the founder. This kind of concentration of 
authority within a family results in an extreme disparity between an owner and a 
professional CEO. The predominant power of an owner relative to the minor influence 
of a professional CEO in a management team has long been an issue for both 
practitioners and researchers.  
In this context, owner-CEOs of Korean firms are expected to have more of an 
impact on performance whether positive or negative. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
9 Owner CEOs account for 70 percent of the sample used in this paper.  
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CHAPTER 4 
Methodology & Data Issues  
 
 
 
 
IV-1. Model and Methodology 
 
 
This paper aims to measure the relative importance of CEO effects on 
performance differences among firms compared to other major effects such as business 
cycle effects, industry effects, and firm-specific effects. The model that Rumelt (1991) 
introduced is as follows. (IV-1) 
 
rikt = µ + αi + βk + γt + δit + φ ik + εikt ……………………………………………(IV-1) 
 
 rikt refers to the rate of return reported in time period t by the business-unit 
owned by corporation k and active in industry i. µ refers to mean, α refers to industry 
effects (i = 1, . . , lα), β refers to corporate effects (k = 1, . . , lβ ), γ refers to business 
cycle or year effects (t = 1, . . , lγ), δit refers to industry-year interaction effects, φ ik 
refers to business-unit effects, and ε refers to residual effects.  
The current model that modified Rumelt’s is seen in IV-2. Reflecting the 
difficulty in distinguishing the business-unit from corporation in Korea, I drop 
corporate effects. Thus, firm effects are the combined ‘corporate and business-unit’ 
effects of Rumelt’s model while on the other hand, I added CEO effects in the model. 
Thus, the corporate effects and business-unit effects of Rumelt’s model are equivalent 
to the firm and CEO effects in the current model. 
 
rift = µ + γt + δit + αi + ϕf + λceo+ εift……………………………………………(IV-2) 
 
rift refers to performance such as ROIC and Tobin’s q of the firm in i industry, t 
year, γ refers to year effects (t = 1, …l γ), δ refers to interaction of year and industry 
effects ( l δ , distinct it combinations), α refers to industry effects (α = 1, …, l α), ϕ 
refers to firm-specific effects (ϕ = 1, …, l ϕ), λ refers to CEO effects (λ = 1, …, l λ ), 
and ε refers to random disturbances (one for each of N observations). Firm-specific 
effects in this model are equivalent to the ‘corporate effects and business-unit effects’ 
in Rumelt’s model. The chaebol variable is not included because of the negligible size 
of effects (almost zero). The most notable difference between the two models is the 
‘entry of CEO variable’ of the current model. The CEO effects are expected to be 
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drawn from the mainly firm-specific effects, and partly separated from the industry 
and year effects. 
The methodology that fits with this model is ANOVA (Analysis of variance) 
and VARCOMP (Variance decomposition), which contain continuous dependent 
variable and categorical independent variables. . I analyze this model in two ways, 
ANOVA (fixed-effects model) and VARCOMP (random-effects model). 
ANOVA and VARCOMP have been used for both streams: the leadership-
performance debate and the IO vs. SM debate. Bowman and Helfat (2001) have 
provided a comprehensive review of the relevant aspects of two major streams; 11 
extant empirical studies between IO and SM that used mainly VARCOMP, and 4 
empirical leadership-performance studies that used ANOVA. The most obvious 
criterion to choose a suitable methodology between ANOVA and VARCOMP is 
whether the independent variables are fixed effects or random effects (Searle, 1971). 
However, researchers used both to complement weaknesses of each method 
(Schmalensee, 1985; Rumelt, 1991; McGahan and Porter, 1997; Furman, 2004). To 
test the statistical significance of estimates, they used ANOVA by putting the nested 
variable last in the model (Rumelt, 1991). To compare the relative importance of 
estimates, they employed VARCOMP by assuming the independent variables are 
random (McGahan and Porter, 1997). 
In an analysis of variance, a researcher typically estimates a null regression 
model of no effects on the dependent variable other than a constant term, and then 
progressively adds variables that represent each effect in the model. After adding each 
set of variables, the researcher calculates the increment to the adjusted R2 of the 
regression, as an unbiased estimate of the fraction of variance ‘explained’ 
(Schmalensee, 1985). 
The leadership-performance debate, an earlier and separate set of studies used 
ANOVA to estimate top management effects on profitability. The studies of Lieberson 
and O’Connor (1972), Salancik and Pfeffer (1978), and Thomas (1988) employed 
ANOVA (sequential analysis of variance), entering year first, and then industry, and 
then firm effects, and finally CEO effects. These firm and industry effects are fixed (or 
‘stable’) effects that reflect differences between firms (or industries) in the average of 
each firm or industry’s annual returns over the study period. The firm effects in 
particular capture differences in average profitability between firms due to corporate-
level factors, and industry-level factors other than those associated with the primary 
industry. After estimating year, industry, and firm effects, the analysis then estimates 
the leadership effects. The latter reflects differences between CEOs in the average 
annual return per CEO during their term in office, once the mean effects of year, 
industry, and firm have been accounted for.  
As in all hierarchical regression, the entry order of the sets of dummy variables 
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can have a large impact on the results. For example, the business-level dummy 
variables are completely collinear with corporate-level dummy variables. As a result, if 
a regression that includes both sets of dummy variables enters the business-level 
variables first, these variables will capture all of the corporate effect. In recognition of 
this fact, analysis of variance models that include both business and corporate-level 
dummy variables enter the corporate dummy variables prior to the business-level 
dummy variables (Bowman and Helfat, 2001; Brush and Bromiley, 1997). Bowman 
and Helfat (2001) pointed out that the latter approach also creates an opposite problem 
in that the corporate dummy variables may pick up some of the variability associated 
with the business dummy variables. 
The alternative methodology of variance components estimation sometimes 
referred to as a ‘random model’ of variance analysis (Bowman and Fetter, 1967), 
utilizes statistical techniques for estimating random effects rather than fixed (or 
‘stable’) effects estimated in standard variance analysis. Estimating random effects 
incorporates the assumption that each effect represents a random sample of the true 
population effect, and that each effect (whether a main or an interaction effect) is 
independent of the other effects in the model. 
Since Schmalensee (1985) introduced this technique to decompose the 
variance of business profitability into separate classes of effects, a growing number of 
researchers have employed this technique (Rumelt, 1991; McGahan and Porter, 1997). 
They used both the ANOVA and VARCOMP techniques in their studies (Schmalensee, 
1985; Rumelt, 1991; McGahan and Porter, 1997). Rumelt (1991) explained that he 
includes the ANOVA estimation because it has independent merit as a method for 
estimating the importance of effects. 
 The technique of VARCOMP or VCA (Variance Component Analysis) makes 
it possible to assess the relative importance of each effect. For example, each firm 
effect ϕf is seen as having been independently generated by a random process with 
variance σϕ2, and having once been set, remaining fixed thereafter. In this study, I 
extend Rumelt’s argument to the CEO level from the business-unit level. The method 
is not without its problems. Rumelt (1991) explained that VARCOMP offers no causal 
or structural explanation for profitability differences across industries, years, 
corporations, or business units, it simply posits the existence of differences in return 
associated with these categories.  
Brush and Bromiley (1997) identified three such problems: interpretation, 
power, and model specification. Using a Monte Carlo simulation, they found that the 
estimated variance components appeared to vary with the square of what they called 
‘importance,’ or the relative size of simulated distributions of corporate and business 
unit effects, and so gave an unreasonably small estimate for smaller effects. If one 
effect were 0.2 and the other 0.8, squaring gives 0.04 and 0.64 making the first appear 
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unimportant. This problem in interpretation can be readily fixed by appropriate 
transformation of the results by examining the square roots of variance components 
rather than the variance components directly. 
Brush and Bromiley (1997) found that multiple runs of the same underlying 
model resulted in a wide variation in estimates, which means the method is not reliable 
in any single application. In particular, the method lacks the power to find smaller 
effects even when they exist by construction. By random sampling without 
replacement, Roquebert et al. (1996) divide their sample of 16,000 observations into 
10 samples with an average size of approximately 1,600. Their estimates of the 
corporate effect range from 9 to 28 percent. 
Finally, they questioned some of the structural assumptions of Rumelt’s model. 
For ordinary least-square regression to be applicable, one must assume the error term 
has a zero correlation with the independent variables in order to identify the variance 
of the error term. Furthermore, multiple components VARCOMP impose the 
assumption that the implicit dummy variable parameters will be uncorrelated across 
effects. For example, the business unit effects and corporate effects are assumed to 
have no correlation. As equation IV-3 shows, ‘VARCOMP’ methodology is 
performed on the basis of the “no correlation” among independent variables 
assumption.  
 
σr2 =σγ2+σδ2+σα2+ σϕ2 +σλ2+σε2………………………………………...……..(IV-3) 
 
The study uses SAS proc VARCOMP,10  being careful to address some 
possible problems. First, we use the mixed method for both fixed effects and random 
effects simultaneously, breaking out the likelihood function into two parts, one 
involving the fixed effects and the other consisting of random effects, and then 
estimating both. To correct the possible noise from the nested structure among 
independent variables like industry, firm, and CEO, a proper method is needed. There 
are several methods in VARCOMP for nested structure including type1, mivque0, 
maximum likelihood (ML), and restricted maximum likelihood (REML). REML is 
preferred for the current model that contains nested and un-nested variables together 
and an unbalanced data structure (Chang and Hong 2002; Searls, Casella, and 
McCulloch, 1992).   
Second, the SAS Proc Mixed Procedure calculates the F-statistic for the 
significance of each fixed effect, the value of the likelihood ratio of each model for the 
test of each random effect (Chang and Hong, 2002). To test the results of the random 
effect model, this paper employs the technique used by Chang and Hong (2002) in 
                                            
10 This paper relies on Searl’s (1971) treatment of the theory and practice of variance decomposition, 
following the study by Rumelt (1991). The procedure is explained in Appendix 1.  
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their study. For example, the hypothesis that industry effects are significantly from 
zero (Hα: σα2>0) can be tested against the null hypothesis that industry effects do not 
exist (H0: σα2=0). It is possible to test the value of the likelihood functions for the 
complete model under the alternative hypothesis and for the restricted model under the 
null hypothesis. Suppose the likelihood function of complete model L (µ σα2 σβ2 σγ2 
σϕ2 σλ2 σδ2 σε2) the asymptotic distribution of –2 log-likelihood ratio under H0: σα2=0 
is central chi-square with 1 degree of freedom:  
 
-2 log L (µ σβ2 σγ2 σϕ2 σλ2 σδ2 σε2)+  
2 log L (µ σα2 σβ2 σγ2 σϕ2 σλ2 σδ2 σε2)~ χ2(1) ………………………..(IV-4) 
 
The decision rule is to reject H0 if the –2 log-likelihood ratios are greater than 
χ2(1).  
Third, as Brush and Bromiley (1997) argued that comparing the square roots 
of the variance components rather than the variance components themselves might be 
a better gauge relative to another, this paper follows the square roots comparison to 
measure the relative importance. Chang and Hong (2002) used this method of 
interpretation in their study. 
 
 
IV-2. Variables  
 
Year effects; Year effects represent year-to-year fluctuations in 
macroeconomic conditions that equally influence all business-units (Rumelt, 1991). 
The effects reflect the impact on the business cycle from factors such as inflation and 
the exchange rate. The period of this study is from 1995 to 2003.  
This observation period witnessed most Korean companies suffering a 
serious financial contraction from the crisis, some even filed for bankruptcy. In this 
context, year effects vary during the period. To capture transient effects, the model 
includes ‘year and industry interaction effects.’ 
Industry effects; Industry effects represent all persistent industry-specific 
impacts on observed rates of return. Differences among industry effects reflect 
differing competitive behavior, entry conditions, growth rates, demand-capacity 
conditions, differing risk levels, differing asset utilization rates, differing accounting 
practices, and any other industry-specific impacts on performance (Rumelt, 1991).  
Contrary to prior empirical studies that largely used the 4-digit industry code, 
this study uses the 2-digit Korea Standard Industry Classification (KSIC) code as a 
definition of industry. The reason why this study defines the industry code more 
broadly is because the data set is not large enough to apply the 4-digit classification. 
The screened data set has around 300 firms per year. The Tobin’s q data set has fewer 
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than 300 firms per year. Table III-1 shows the industry classification and its 
observations.  
Additionally, due to incomparability of accounting data with other industries, 
the financial industry is excluded. Single firm industries  such as the tobacco 
industry are excluded. The industry code number was initially 37, decreased to 31 
(ROIC sample) and to 30 (Tobin’s q).  
Most studies of the ‘IO vs. SM’ debate defined an industry based on the 4-
digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes in the COMPUSTAT or FTC. 
Chang and Hong (2002) defined an industry based on the 4-digit KSIC due to the 
large sample that contains not only publicly listed companies but also statutory 
audited companies.  
Chang and Singh (1997) and Bowman and Helfat (2002) pointed out that 
when a variance decomposition study defines industries and business broadly, some 
cross-business influences that occur within a broadly defined business will be 
attributed to business rather than corporate effects. When it comes to this paper, the 
chaebol and industry effects are expected to hold less importance than expected.  
Firm effects: Firm effects represent persistent differences among firms’ 
returns other than those due to industry and corporate membership.  This is due to 
the presence of business-specific skills, resources, reputations, learning, patents, and 
other intangible contributions to stable differences among firms’ performances 
(Rumelt, 1991).   
Firm effects in the current model are equivalent to “corporate effects plus 
business-unit effects” in Rumelt’s model (1991) and Roquebert et al. (1996). The 
definition of firm effects is very similar to ‘affiliates effects’ in the Chang and Hong 
model (2002). The reason we cannot separate the business-unit from corporate 
effects is that Korean companies did not have to report an accounting performance 
on the basis of the business-unit.  
For example, Samsung Electronics operates a number of business-units in 
different industries such as semi-conductors, home appliances, mobile phones, and 
an IT business-unit. Samsung Electronics is a corporation in terms of the 
organizational structure and diversity in businesses. As the practice of reporting 
listed companies has made substantial progress since the financial crisis, a growing 
number of Korean firms started reporting the accounting data for business-units. 
Business-unit level analysis will be performed sometime in the future. However, 
limitations of business-unit level analysis remain. Thus, this paper defines “firm 
effects” broadly ranging from the single business firm to corporations with diverse 
business-units.  
From the previous research stream, it has been proven thatbusiness-unit or 
firm-specific effects are predominant determinants of a firm’s profitability. In other 
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words, the strategy and management capabilities at the business-unit level have the 
largest impact on business-unit performance. In the Korean case, Chang and Hong 
(2002) found that the effect of affiliates accounted for the largest portion ranging 
from 20-30 percent.   
CEO effects: CEO effects arise from differences in the quality of overall 
management and strategic choices of CEOs, and differences in the CEO’s ability to 
effectively allocate resources and capabilities. It is used in this literature to refer to 
the influence on profitability owing to CEO change during the period.  
All CEOs in the sample are coded with an identity number. When a CEO 
runs more than one company, he/she receives a single identity number. However, 
instances where CEOs manage more than one company are rare. In addition, a 
number of CEOs managed the company during all of the observed period (1934 
observations- ROIC data, 1833 observations- Tobin’s q data). It is not surprising that 
owners accounted for 93 percent of the “unchanged CEO group.” Those who 
managed the company during the complete period are excluded, because the CEO 
effects cannot be separated from the firm effects. 
Studies of the leadership-performance research stream attempted to measure 
the differences resulting from different CEOs during the period. Leadership, as 
defined by Lieberson and O’Connor, measures organizational performance that 
occurred during the term of each top executive, either a CEO or a chairman of a 
corporate board. Bertrand and Schoar (2003) defined a CEO who had experiences in 
other firms as CEO, CFO, and COO.  
Chaebol Effects: Chaebol effects represent differences among chaebols in 
the quality of monitoring and control, differences in resource sharing among affiliate 
companies, and differences in ‘group strategy’ and brand reputation of the chaebol 
group. Chaebols are identified by the list of top 30 business groups of the Korean 
Fair Trade Commission (KFTC). The KFTC defines ‘business group’ as ‘a group of 
companies, more than 30 percent of whose shares are owned by some individuals or 
by companies controlled by those individuals.’  
As Table III-2 shows, the list of top 30 business groups contains privatized 
public corporations such as KOGAS in 2002 and 2003. Because the purpose of this 
paper is to measure the chaebol effects on performance, privatized corporations are 
excluded. While some business groups including Samsung, LG, Hyundai, Hanjin, 
and Lotte are included in the top 30 groups list during the period, some groups are 
included only in a certain year. The latter are identified only in the specific year.  
Chaebol effects in the current model are similar to the corporate effects of 
Rumelt (1991) and Roquebert et al. (1996). In particular, the structure of having 
several firms (or business-units) across industries, are similar for both effects. 
Schmalensee (1985) found ‘negligible corporate effects’ without distinguishing the 
 28
corporation from the business unit. Rumelt (1991) concluded that the corporate 
effect accounted for between 11-17 percent. The studies of Roquebert et al. (1996) 
and Bowman and Helfat (2001) argued that significant corporate effects exist.  
Bowman and Helfat (2001), in particular, revisited previous studies in terms 
of data and methodology, and proved that the corporate effect could be larger than 
the results of prior empirical studies after correcting the flaws. They concluded that 
the influence on profitability of corporate strategy stems from corporate management. 
Bowman and Helfat (2001) explained that the average incremental (transitory) 
corporate effect in McGahan and Porter (1997) and the CEO effects in the 
leadership-performance studies capture aspects of variation through time in the 
corporate effect.  
McGahan and Porter show that a substantial fraction of corporate effects 
vary through time; the leadership studies show that transitory CEO effects comprise 
a non-negligible portion of the total variance of firm profitability. Taken together, 
this evidence suggests that transitory corporate effects matter, and that top 
management and thus corporate strategy contribute to these effects. Furthermore, 
given that the leadership studies provide evidence that CEOs matter, we can infer 
that stable corporate effects may also reflect the effects of CEOs and corporate 
strategy on average profitability over time.  
The previous study that attempted to measure exact ‘chaebol effects’ by 
reflecting on its unique structure and management system was the study by Chang 
and Hong (2001). The authors called “business-group effects” and found that the 
effects are non-negligible. On the contrary, the current study has limitations on 
measuring chaebol effects because of its small sample size. As the number of listed 
companies is limited, the number of affiliated companies is also relatively small. It is 
expected to have difficulties in fully capturing the chaebol effects. 
Financial crisis effects: The 1997 financial crisis had an unprecedented 
impact on the Korean economy in every aspect including the corporate sector. The 
economy experienced a drastic contraction of –8 percent. According to the IMF 
agreement, the Korean government made a great effort for a full-scale restructuring 
in the corporate and financial sector in addition to the labor and public sectors. In 
particular, as reckless investment and higher leverage were partly attributed to 
causing the financial crisis, corporate restructuring to enhance accountability, 
transparency and corporate governance were the key policies during the crisis (Park, 
1998; Kim, 2003).  
 Furthermore, the corporate sector was forced to reform business practices 
such as the mismatch between controlling power and the amount of ownership. For 
example, it was possible for owners to control their firms without having a formal 
seat on the corporate board.  However, owners who wished to engage in 
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management were forced to register as a director according to the amendment of the 
Commercial Law. It is believed that the financial crisis had an impact on the 
magnitude of CEO effects due to the progress in enhancing efficiency and 
transparency of corporate governance during the crisis.  
To measure the impact of the financial crisis, I divide the period into two 
sub-periods: before and after the financial crisis. Prior studies concerning the impact 
of the financial crisis take 1997 or 1998 as a benchmark to divide the period into 
before and after the crisis. Considering the fact that drastic reform in the corporate 
sector already started, this paper takes 1998 as the benchmark. Accordingly, let the 
period from 1995 to 1997 be defined as “before the crisis” and the period from 1999 
to 2003 defined as “after the crisis.” 
Owner effects: This paper classifies all CEOs as either owners or 
professionals. The information about owners is obtained from the website of the 
FSS’s DART system. The DART system contains updated information about the 
change in shareholders. The family owner actively participates in the management of 
most Korean companies, as family or clan members together dominate and wield 
managerial power. Many Koreans value blood relationships so highly that they have 
an extended clan, which provides broad-based security for family members (Chen, 
1995). Hence, whether or not CEOs are owners is likely to have an impact on 
performance.  
Interaction: This paper includes the interaction between industry and year 
into the current model to capture transient industry effects that vary from year to year 
(Bowman and Helfat, 2001). McGahan and Porter (1997) note that some industries 
may have greater opportunities for corporate influence (chaebol effects in this paper) 
than others. McGahan and Porter (1997) suggest that the negative co-variance 
indicates that corporations have a more positive influence in less profitable industries, 
and by implication, a less positive influence in more profitable industries. The 
corporate-year interaction captures variation in corporate influence over time and the 
co-variance effect between industry and corporation may reflect the corporate choice 
of industries (Bowman and Helfat, 2001). However, this study only includes the 
interaction of industry and year in the model as random effects due to the limitation 
of the sample. 
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<Table IV-1> Number of observations by industry classification 
 
Industry ROIC sample Tobin’s q sample 
Mining 50 50 
Food & Beverages 387 338 
Textiles 271 201 
Apparel 131 89 
Leather 54 51 
Wood products 33 29 
Pulp & paper 203 158 
Publishing & printing 25 21 
Refined petroleum 62 60 
Chemicals 885 806 
Rubber & plastics 152 134 
Non-metalic mineral products 215 185 
Basic metals 367 306 
Fabricated metal products 107 76 
Machinery 238 213 
Computers 73 49 
Electrical machinery 178 158 
Electronic components 467 379 
Precision & optical 69 59 
Motor vehicles 268 236 
Transport equipment 49 38 
Furniture 61 45 
Electricity, gas, & water 72 72 
Construction 398 349 
Retail trade 294 206 
Wholesale trade 76 67 
Transport 116 60 
Auxiliary transport 18 14 
Telecommunication 23 20 
Computers & related 14 . 
Technical services 18 18 
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<Table IV-2> The Top 30 Chaebols between 1995 and 2003 
 
No 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
1 Hyundai Hyundai Hyundai Hyundai Hyundai Hyundai Samsung Samsung Samsung 
2 Samsung Samsung Samsung Samsung Daewoo Samsung Hyundai LG LG 
3 LG LG Daewoo Daewoo Samsung LG LG SK SK 
4 Daewoo Daewoo LG LG LG SK SK HyundaiMotors HyundaiMotors 
5 SK SK SK SK SK Hanjin HyundaiMotors KT KT 
6 Ssangyong Ssangyong Hanjin Hanjin Hanjin Lotte Hanjin Hanjin Hanjin 
7 Hanjin Hanjin Ssangyong Ssangyong Ssangyong DaewooInt'l Posco Posco Lotte 
8 Kia Kia Hanwha Hanwha Hanwha Kumho Lotte Lotte Posco 
9 Hanwha Hanwha Kumho Kumho Kumho Hanwha Kumho HyundaiMotors Hanwha 
10 Lotte Lotte Dongahh Dongahh Lotte Ssangyong Hanwha Kumho HyundaiHeavy 
11 Kumho Kumho Lotte Lotte Dongahh Hansol Doosan HyundaiHeavy Hyundai 
12 Doosan Halla Halla Halla Hansol Doosan Ssangyong Hanwha Kumho 
13 Daelim Dongahh Daelim Daelim Doosan HyundaiOil HyundaiOil Doosan Doosan 
14 Hanbo Doosan Doosan Doosan Daelim Dongahh Hansol Dongbu Dongbu 
15 Dongahh Daelim Hansol Hansol Dongkuk Dongkuk Dongbu HyundaiOil Hyosung 
16 Halla Hansol Hyosung Hyosung Dongbu Hyosung Daelim Hyosung Shinsegae 
17 Hyosung Hyosung Kohap Kohap Halla Daelim Dongyang Daelim Daelim 
18 Dongkuk Dongkuk Kolon Kolon Kohap S-oil Hyosung Kolon CJ 
19 Jinro Jinro Dongkuk Dongkuk Hyosung Dongbu CJ CJ Dongyang 
20 Kolon Kolon Dongbu Dongbu Kolon Kolon Kolon Dongkuk Kolon 
21 Dongyang Kohap Anam Anam Dongyang Dongyang Dongkuk Hanaro Telecom Hanaro Telecom 
22 Hansol Dongbu Jinro Jinro Jinro Kohap HyundaiDevelopment Hansol Dongkuk 
23 Dongbu Dongyang Dongyang Dongyang Anam CJ Hanaro Telecom Shinsegae HDS 
24 Kohap Haitai Haitai Haitai Haitai DaewooElectronic Shinsegae Dongyang Hansol 
25 Haitai Newcore Shinho Shinho Saehan HyundaiDevelopment Youngpoong HDS DaewooShipbuilding
26 Sammi Anam Daisang Daisang Gangwon Anam HDS HyundaiDevelopment DaewooMotors 
27 Hanil Hanil Newcore Newcore Daisang Saehan DongyangChemical Youngpoong HyundaiDevelopment
28 Kukdong Geopyung Geopyung Geopyung CJ Jinro DaewooElectronic Daisang Youngpoong 
29 Newcore Miwon Gangwon Gangwon Shinho Shinsegae Taekwang Dongwon KCC 
30 Byuksan Shinho Saehan Saehan Samyang Youngpoong Kohap Taekwang Daihan 
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IV-3. CEO Data 
 
This data comes from the “Business Directory” produced by the Korea Listed 
Companies Association (KLCA) from 1995 to 2003. The “Business Directory” 
contains demographic characteristics of top management teams such as the chairman, 
president, representative director, executive director, managing director, auditor, and 
outside director of Korean listed firms. It is extended from the data constructed by 
Kim and Lee (2001). This data contains the demographic characteristics of executives 
including date and location of birth, and educational background. Incomplete or 
missing information of executives in the “Business Directory” can be found in the 
“who’s who database” of media companies such as the Yonhap News Agency and 
Joongang Daily. Firm-matched panel data totalling 58,090 were recorded in the eight-
year period.  
To identify only one or two CEOs of each firm, executives who hold the 
position of “representative director” are first selected as the primary pool of data for 
this study. This is because in the case of Korean companies, there are several top 
executives who hold the position of representative director while U.S. companies 
clearly state their CEOs in corporate annual reports. Thus, it may be reasonable that in 
the case of Korea, the first criterion for selecting candidates suitable for CEO is based 
on the ‘commercial law,’ which specifies that members of the board of a company 
designate one or more representative directors among them. This member represents 
the company and delegates managerial duties related to corporate administration and 
operations (clause 389). A representative director is necessary as a standing/permanent 
and independent element within a corporation while officially representing the 
company and executing managerial duties (Kim, 1988).  
Since there are no specific qualifications to become a representative director 
in the Commercial law, any member of the corporate board could be appointed as 
representative director regardless of their position. In other words, it is possible that 
anyone from chairman to vice-president to managing director could be a representative 
director (Cho, 1997). However, a common practice in Korea is to designate the 
president as a representative director. The post of president is widely believed to have 
“control” and “responsibility” for overall management although there are exceptions 
where individuals in positions either higher or lower than president are designated as 
representative director. 
Other than the post of representative director, ownership is the other criterion 
to select a candidate as CEO. When there are major shareholders, founders, owners 
and their family members who participate in the business of their companies but are 
not representative directors, they are also considered candidates because they have 
enough power to influence high level managerial decisions. 
 33
Based on the first criterion mentioned above, CEO candidates whose positions 
are reported as representative directors are included in the data pool: candidates such 
as representative president, representative chairman, representative vice-president, and 
chairman are mostly seen on the representative director list . Representative managing 
director is also sometimes included. And in the case of people who are selected on the 
basis of the second criterion, only those who are “full-time” directors rather than “part-
timers” are counted, which refer to those who are actively involved in the company’s 
management. Therefore, the CEO-candidate pool contains 14,356 firm-manager 
matched observations and includes one or two CEO candidates per firm.  
 
 
IV-4. How to choose the CEO  
 
Careful and even discretionary criteria are necessary to identify the CEO of a 
firm out of several representative directors. Due to complicated corporate governance 
in Korea, it is not surprising that little research to identify a CEO has been made and 
hence there has only been a small portion of literature that deals with such matters: one 
is Kim and Lee (2001)’s attempt to develop five measurements to identify the CEO in 
order of importance; (1) representative directors who hold their positions either equal 
to or higher than that of president; (2) court-appointed managers in firms that go under 
court receivership; (3) bank president; (4) representative directors whose positions are 
lower than president if criterion (1) is not met;(5) one who holds the highest position in 
the case where firms have an absence of representative directors. They constructed a 
CEOs list that contains an average of 1.44 CEOs per firm between 1997 and 2000. 
However, they did not try to select only one CEO per firm due to the complexity and 
ambiguity of the procedure. A second attempt was made by Shin and Chang in 2003. 
They identified the CEO in line with the ‘Business directory.’ In other words, the CEO 
is selected if they are reported in the first rank of the “Business directory.”   
Thus, this paper is the first attempt to identify the CEO of listed firms and 
elaborate several criteria to cope with complicated and ambiguous corporate 
governance in Korea. However, it was difficult to completely solve the problems. 
Those that are raised in the selection procedure are as follows: 
 
1) Knowing that owners in Korea have strong influence on the 
management of their company regardless of whether or not they hold a 
formal position, is it accurate to conclude that they do not affect the 
management of their company simply because they are not officially 
involved in it? 
2) When an owner and professional executive are involved in 
management together, and the professional executive has a higher position 
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than the owner, is it reasonable to consider the professional executive as 
the CEO?  
3) When the founder or owner of a business group or chaebol holds the 
position of representative chairman in several affiliated companies 
concurrently, is it correct to say that he is in charge of all these companies 
as a CEO? How many firms is it possible for a sole CEO to manage at the 
same time? 
4) When an owner’s family members, the father and son/daughter in 
particular, are involved in the management team together, how can we 
judge when they succeed their father and begin exerting more power? It is 
obvious that when both an owner and his child/children run their company 
together, they are in a succession process in regards to authority of 
ownership and management, but what is unclear is pinpointing the 
moment of succession; 
5) When two owners or professionals hold the highest posts concurrently, 
who and how are we to select the CEO between them? 
 
If able to thoroughly investigate the unique governance practices of each firm, is it 
possible to settle all of the problems raised above? The answer is “no.” Most of all, it 
is too challenging to comprehend the idiosyncratic characteristics of corporate 
governance and the decision-making process of all listed firms. Considering the fact 
that accessibility to the “internal power structure” and “decision-making process” is 
strictly limited, it can hardly be a solution. Furthermore, it may lead to 
misinterpretation by considering each firm differently based on incomplete 
information. Thus, the criteria taken here is to emphasize the formal positions, the role 
and authority of owners, and common sense of the Korean management system. 
Information about the ownership structure is collected on the DART (data analysis, 
retrieval and transfer system) system of the Financial Supervisory Service)11 website. 
The selection criteria to identify a CEO is the following: 
 
1. The owners on the corporate board except the “non-standing” director are 
included in the “CEO candidate pool” regardless of their formal positions. 
This reflects the fact that owners in Korea have a strong influence on the 
management of their company regardless of whether they hold a formal 
position or not. In the case of non-standing directors, it is presumed that they 
are unwilling to meet the minimum legal requirement for managing the firm;   
2. The professional executives are included in the pool only when they hold the 
                                            
11 See the website of the Financial Supervisory Service data analysis, retrieval and transfer system.  
(http://dart.fss.or.kr/) 
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position of representative directors: most of them are Representative 
Presidents. But, other positions such as representative chairman, representative 
vice chairman, representative vice-president, and representative managing 
director are also included in the pool;   
3. When there is either only one owner CEO or only one top professional 
executive who is singled out as a CEO candidate, that person is considered the 
CEO of the company; For example, when an owner of a firm holds the 
position of representative chairman or representative president and the firm 
does not have any professional executives whose position is higher than that of 
the owner, the owner should naturally be the CEO; when a firm has one 
professional top executive who holds one of the positions as representative 
director, and does not have any standing owner on the corporate board, the 
professional executive should be the CEO. The latter case mainly occurs in 
privatized corporations and foreign invested companies where foreign 
investors are not involved in management; 
4. When the owner and professional CEOs are included together in the CEO 
candidate pool,  
A. If the owner has a higher position than the professional executive, the 
owner is selected as CEO 
B. If the professional executive has a higher position than the owner, the 
professional is selected as CEO (e.g. owner executive as representative 
vice-president vs. professional executive as representative president) 
C. However, if the owner has the position of representative president in a 
firm, the owner is selected as the CEO no matter what position the 
professional top executive holds: in this case, it is believed that unlike the 
owner vice-president or owner managing director, the owner 
representative president has a substantial responsibility and rights over the 
firm and can play a more critical role in directing management than the 
professional representative who has an even higher position such as 
chairman or vice-chairman; 
5. When a firm has more than one owner, the CEO is selected according to the 
following order; the representative director; the person occupying a higher 
post; the person who is most senior in age. The last criterion stems from a 
seniority-based culture in Korea. Therefore, seniority is a minor standard in the 
condition of ceteris paribus.  This criterion is also applied to a firm that has 
more than one professional executive; 
6. When a firm has two professional CEOs in the exactly the same position, it is 
rare that they hold the same position for more than two years. In most cases, 
one of them is a newcomer for the first year while the other resigns in the 
 36
following year. This is considered  “a process of CEO change.” In this 
context, the incumbent professional CEO is selected as the CEO in the first 
year, and the newcomer is selected from the next year;    
7. In the case of a company where ownership succession from father to son is in 
progress, at first, the father holds the position of chairman and designates his 
son as president. As the son becomes more involved in management and 
exercises more influence in decision-making, the father gradually prepares to 
retire by moving from chairman to honorary chairman and also leaves the 
board after a certain period of time to give his son full authority. When the 
father becomes honorary chairman, the son becomes CEO of the company. 
Otherwise, the father has to be selected as CEO considering his substantial 
influence as the company’s founder; 
A. In the case of father-son succession, it is sometimes the case where a 
professional top executive holds a higher position than the successor-son. 
A transitory period is considered necessary for the successor to be fully 
trained to succeed to the authority and ownership of his father. In this 
context, when the professional top executive has the higher position than 
the successor for more than one year, the professional top executive is 
selected as the CEO. However, the professional does not stay for more 
than one year, and he is excluded from the pool. This is regarded as a “just 
complimentary position”; 
B. In the case of father-son succession, even though the father still has not 
resigned from the position of chairman, the son who has the position of 
representative chairman, the highest position, is selected as the CEO. (e.g. 
Hite Brewery Co. which has two chairmen serving concurrently).    
8. When a firm has a representative director and a court-appointed manager at the 
same time, the representative director is selected as CEO. When a firm has 
only a court-appointed manager, he/she is selected as CEO.  
9. When a firm has more than one court-appointed manager, the one who has the 
post of representative director, who has seniority, in order of importance, is 
selected as the CEO.  
 
Although the above selection criteria are applied, the ambiguity and 
complexity of corporate governance in Korea remains. For example, when the founder 
or the owner of a business group holds the position of representative chairman in 
several affiliated companies at the same time, the question “is it correct to say that he 
is in charge of all these companies as CEO?” remains unanswered. How many firms is 
it possible for a sole CEO to manage at the same time? For example, the Chairman of 
Hanjin Group, Cho Choong-Hoon was a representative chairman of all seven affiliated 
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companies of the group during the period but 2002 and 2003. Cho resigned in 2002, 
and was succeeded by his sons. In this context, Cho was an extreme case among 
chairmen of chaebol groups. The chairmen of a chaebol group who has the positions of 
a representative chairman of more than one affiliated company for more than three 
years are Lee Kun-Hee (Samsung, two companies), Koo Bon-Moo (LG, two 
companies), Chung Mong-Ku (Hyundai Motors, three companies), Park Yong-Oh 
(Doosan, three companies), Kim Seung-yeon (HanWha, four companies) and Kim Jun 
Ki (Dongbu, three companies). Since I cannot find suitable ways to compromise, this 
data includes these individuals regardless of the number of firms they manage.   
The 8,818 firm-CEO matched panel data includes a large amount of detail. 
Companies that have an easily identified CEO are banks, privatized companies, and 
companies that have owner CEOs. However, the data contains the firms that have two 
CEO candidates. The number of firms that have two CEO candidates is 1,445. The 
final data on CEO per firm from the candidates includes 6,373 firm-CEO matched 
observations. The data still includes members of the banking and financial industry. 
However, the financial industry is excluded due to incomparability of accounting data 
with those of other industries. Firms that dropped reporting their financial statements 
are excluded. Industries that have only one firm are excluded.  
The screened data set matched with ROIC includes 5,374 observations. After 
screening the firms that have only one CEO during the period, the data comprise 3,440 
observations. The data set is divided into two groups: the first is “pooled data” or “full 
data” with all observations; the second is “changed data” with firms that experienced 
CEO change. TableIV-1 shows the description of the data set by screening step.  
 
<Table IV-3> Description of data set by screening stage 
 
 N Criteria 
STEP 1 14,356 - Owners who are registered as directors 
- Professionals who have the position of representative 
director 
STEP 2 8,818 - When a firm has only the owners or the professionals 
who can be identified as a “CEO,” the owner or the 
professional is selected as CEO.  
- When a firm has the owners and the professionals who 
can be identified as a CEO, the two top positions are 
included in the pool  
STEP 3 6,373 - Using the selection criteria, only one CEO is finally 
selected  
ROIC 5,438 - Firm-manager matched panel data with ROIC 
performance (Financial industry excluded) 
STEP4 
Tobin’s q 4,686 - Firm-manager matched panel data with Tobin’s q 
(Financial industry excluded) 
ROIC  5,374 - Industries that have only 1 firm are excluded STEP 5 
Tobin’s q 4,572 - Industries that have only 1 firm are excluded 
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IV-5. Performance Issues 
 
 Measuring the performance of organizations is another important issue. The 
most common way to measure profitability is to note the accounting data such as the 
rate of return in the financial statement. Tobin’s Q, which reflects the market value of 
the firm, is sometimes used for measuring the comprehensive value of the firm. This 
paper aims to use both accounting profit and Tobin’s q as performance data.  
There is various performance data in the financial statement, such as the rate 
of return on sales (ROS) and rate of return on total assets (ROA). Among them, the 
rate of net income on total assets (ROA) is the final result after tax and interest 
payments. Thus, ROA is commonly used to measure accounting profitability. However, 
this paper uses the rate of return on invested capital (ROIC), which is defined as the 
sum of net income before tax plus interest payments, deflated by total assets. This 
measure of performance indicates operating efficiency without being biased by the 
relatively high debt/equity ratios common in Korea (Chang and Hong, 2002).   
In fact, the ROA of Korean companies seriously fluctuated due to the 
excessive investment and higher debt/equity ratios during the financial crisis. For 
example, the ROA of financially distressed companies such as Candy Global Media 
and Korea Data System were 2357 percent, and 779 percent, respectively. Considering 
the fact that there were a considerable amount of companies that had financial 
contractions due to their highly leveraged financial structure, ROA has some bias 
problems to employ as performance data. In this context, the ROIC is expected to 
better reflect the efficiency of management, whether it improved or worsened as a 
result of the CEOs, in particular the newly selected CEOs following the financial crisis.  
In spite of ROIC’s merit, it also has certain limitations. In the case of highly 
leveraged firms, the ROIC may be seriously overestimated compared to the true 
performance of firms. To comprehend the firms’ performance by both criteria, I 
include ROA in the data set for reference.   
Tobin’s q is defined as the ratio of the market value to the replacement cost 
of the firm. Tobin’s intent was to examine a causal relationship between q and 
investment. However, Tobin’s q has been sought as an indicator to measure the rent 
of a certain industry or firm. Additionally, it has been considered as comprehensive 
value of the firm rather than accounting data. This paper employs Tobin’s q 
considering the fact that q reflects the expectation or disappointment of the market 
for the new CEO without a time lag. Additionally, q is assumed to valuate the 
comprehensive capabilities of the CEO rather than accounting profit such as ROA or 
ROIC.  
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Recent studies that used Tobin’s q as performance data in Korea are Chang 
(2003), and Lee, Lee, and Hong (2003). They employed the procedure used by Hoshi 
and Kashyap (1990). The procedure is similar with that of Kim, Kim, Park, and 
Chang (1996), of which this paper also follows their calculating procedure. 
The market value is the sum of the market value of stocks and the market 
value of debts. To calculate the firm’s market value, the value of securities should be 
considered. The firm’s securities fall into three broad groups: (1) common stock, (2) 
preferred stock, and (3) debt. The recorded market values of year-end common stock 
and preferred stock are assumed to represent the true market values (Lindenberg and 
Ross, 1981).  
For the market value of debts, this paper distinguishes between long-term 
liabilities and current liabilities with maturities of less than one year. Furthermore, 
current liabilities are divided into two groups, one for interest paying liabilities and 
the other for non-interest paying liabilities. For non-interest paying current 
liabilities, the book value is regarded as the market value (Hoshi and Kashyap, 
1990).  
For interest paying liabilities, on the other hand, the market value depends 
on the maturity distribution of the firm’s bond rate, their coupon rates and the current 
yield to maturity. However, it is not possible to know the exact interest rate of each 
company, because the interest and bond rates are not reported. In order to estimate 
the interest rate distribution of the firm’s debt, the proportion of short-term debt, 
long-term domestic debt, and long-term foreign debt deflates the sum of interest 
payment for a year and the discounted amount. Thus, the market value of short-term 
debt is calculated by the sum of estimated interest payments and discounted present 
value. The market value of long-term debt is calculated in the same way. This paper 
uses the CD rate12 for short-term debt, the lending interest rate of the bank for long-
term domestic debt, euribor (libor) +1.5% for foreign debt, and the bond rate for 
bonds13.    
The measurement of the replacement cost is a more difficult matter because 
of the lack, in most cases, of active markets for old capital goods (Lindenberg and 
Ross, 1981). By definition, the replacement cost is the amount needed to purchase 
the current productive capacity of the firm at minimum cost and with the most 
modern technologies available. Replacement-cost estimates were required in the 
categories of (1) liquid assets (cash and securities), (2) intangible fixed assets, (3) 
                                            
12 Ibid (http://www.bok.or.kr).   
13 The formula to calculate the market value of debt is available upon the request. 
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invested assets, (4) inventories, (5) plants and buildings, (6) other tangible fixed 
assets, and (7) land.  
The categories of assets, liquid assets, intangible fixed assets, and invested 
assets are assumed to have replacement value approximately equal to book value. 
The replacement value of inventories is calculated by using the producer’s price14 
and differences between the book value of t year and that of the basis year (in this 
case the first year of the observed period, 1995). The replacement value of the plant 
and building is calculated by using the average of the depreciation rate and book 
value of plants and buildings. The replacement value of other tangible fixed assets, 
machinery, is calculated by using the “capital goods producer’s price.” The 
replacement value of land15 is calculated with the same formula by using the change 
rate of land price.16  
Tobin’s q of Korea’s listed companies, however, includes some strange 
numbers such as larger than 10, and lower than 0. These numbers are mainly the 
result of financially distressed companies from the financial crisis. When a firm 
dropped reporting annual reports due to the financial distraction, Tobin’s q of the 
firm tended to fluctuate, in particular, in the first year reporting resumed. Thus, 
firms that could not report their accounting results are excluded for the year and the 
first year reporting resumed. Firms that went bankrupt are also excluded. This 
screening procedure shows the gap between the number of ‘ROIC sample’ and 
‘Tobin’s q sample.’  
Tobin’s q calculated in this paper has several characteristics compared to 
prior studies. First, most previous studies attempted to measure Tobin’s q of the 
manufacturing industry. This paper, however, excludes only the financial industry, 
and includes the service, construction and transportation industries. Second, this 
paper uses financial statements from KLCA, while previous studies mainly used the 
data set of the Korea Investors Service.  
Although data sets of the two institutions are constructed based on annual 
reports of companies, there are differences between the two data sets in terms of 
missing data, and the number of financial results. These problems should be solved 
to improve data credibility. Tobin’s q constructed in this paper tends to be slightly 
lower than that of Lee, Lee, and Hong (2003), but shows very similar patterns. Slight 
                                            
14 The price index including the producer’s price comes from the website of the National 
Statistics Office (http://www. nso.go.kr) 
15 The change rates of land prices come from the Ministry of Construction and Transportation. 
(http://www.moct.go.kr) 
16 For further information, see the article of Kim, Kim, Park, and Chang (1996). 
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differences can be explained by the gap between two data sets.  
 When employing both accounting performance data and market value of the 
firm, some concerns arise from the difference between the two. Financial price data 
provide a viewing window into the firm through the market’s valuation of the 
securities issued by the firm and the changes in these values over time. Accounting 
data, on the other hand, provide information on the resources used by the firms 
(Lindenberg and Ross, 1981). 
 A number of studies, both domestic and international, affirmed that 
accounting data such as ROA and ROIC have significant power as a predictor of the 
security rate of return. However, predictive power is limited because the rate of 
security return is determined by various sources of information including accounting 
profitability.  
 The values of Tobin’s q that are calculated by “market value of the firm and 
its replacement cost” reflect the evaluation of the market on the firm’s future 
profitability. Tobin’s q, naturally, is a performance indicator that is more sensitive to 
the firm’s “non-accounting information” including CEO change.  
 Furthermore, market value is determined by reflecting the firm’s information 
without time lag. For example, CEO change of the firm can be reflected immediately 
unlike accounting data. Ahn et al. (2004) found that the stock market significantly 
responded to CEO change, while they did not find any significant relationship CEO 
effects and performance in Japan.  
Kato, Kim, and Lee (2004) found that the compensation of Korean 
executives is statistically and significantly related to stock market performance. 
Moreover, accounting performance and sales are found to play a less important role 
in the determination of Korean executive compensation. With this in mind, a careful 
interpretation of the results of both performance data may be needed.  
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  CHAPTER 5 
Results  
 
 
 
V-1. Results of ANOVA  
 
Schmalensee (1985) suggested that ANOVA results establish whether each set 
of effects is significant, and that VARCOMP results are preferable for evaluating the 
relative importance of each type of effect. Following this suggestion, ANOVA is run 
for estimating the importance of CEO effects. This paper employs ‘ANOVA GLM 
nested’ which is preferred for unbalanced data with a nested structure.  
As Rumelt (1991) explained in his paper, it is important to note that with a 
fixed-effects estimation, strict tests for the presence of effects are possible only for the 
last effects fitted. Thus, the CEO variables enter the model last. Since the model 
contains variables with ‘nested structure,’ nest variables such as industry and firm 
effects cannot be the last put in the model. When the nest variables are last after the 
CEO effects, the estimates cannot be calculated.   
In the pooled sample, the year, industry, firm and CEO effects are seen as 0.4 
percent, 4.5 percent, 36.8 percent, and 19.8 percent, respectively. However, the 
changed sample obtains 5.4 percent of industry effects, 32.8 percent of firm effects, 
and 25.4 percent of CEO effects. The CEO effects increase from 9.9percent before the 
financial crisis to 20.9 percent after the crisis, while firm effects decrease from 61 
percent to 43.7 percent. In case of the chaebol affiliated companies sample, the firm 
effects are 37 percent, presenting a similar size with non-chaebol companies. The CEO 
effects of both samples are 22.7 percent and 24.4 percent.  
The industry, firm, and CEO effects in the owner CEO sample are 5.5 percent, 
37.1 percent, and 11.8 percent, respectively. The unexplained variance accounts for 
44.5 percent. On the other hand, the industry, firm, and CEO effects in the professional 
CEO sample are 9.5 percent, 43.7 percent, and 19.6 percent, respectively. To compare 
the size of impact of variables on performance, I put the variables in the model last. 
Then, all the variables except firm effects do not have significant amount of impact on 
performance. Even firm effects do not seem to have reasonable amount of estimate. 
Table V-1 shows the figures.   
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<Table V-1> Analysis of variance of ROIC of firms (nested model, GLM) 
 
  Owner Chaebol Year Industry Firm CEO Error Firm* 
N of 
Observ
. 
R2 0.4 1.1 1.7*** 6.2*** 42.9*** 62.9*** 100 0.023 
Pooled  
(%) 0.4 0.7 0.6 4.5 36.7 20 37.1 0.03 
5373 
R2 0.2 1.4 2.3*** 7.7*** 40.5*** 66*** 100 0.02 
Changed  
(%) 0.2 1.2 0.9 5.4 32.8 25.5 34 0.03 
3439 
R2 0 0.9 1.6*** 9.8*** 70.8*** 80.7*** 100 0.017 
Be-IMF  
(%) 0 0.9 0.7 8.2 61 9.9 19.3 0.02 
1150 
R2 0.3 1.5 1.7*** 8.4*** 52.1*** 73.1*** 100 0.019 
Af-IMF  
(%) 0.3 1.2 0.2 6.7 43.7 21 26.9 0.025 
1900 
R2 0 - 2.8*** 13.4*** 50.5*** 73.7*** 100 0.067 
Chaebol  
(%) 0 - 2.8 10.6 37.1 23.2 26.3 0.09 
930 
R2 0.7 - 1.7*** 8.2*** 41.1*** 65.5*** 100 0.008 
N-chaebol  
(%) 0.7 - 1.0 6.5 32.9 24.4 34.5 0.012 
2509 
R2 - 0.3 1.1 6.6*** 43.7*** 55.5*** 100 0.015 
Owner  
(%) - 0.3 0.8 5.5 37.1 11.8 44.5 0.027 
1929 
R2 - 2.4 4.1*** 13.6*** 57.3*** 76.9*** 100 0.0145 
Professional  
(%) - 2.4 1.7 9.5 43.7 19.6 23.1 0.019 
1510 
* Increment R2 when firm variable is included last. Other variables do not have R2 when putting in the 
model last.  
*** p<0.0001 
 
The results of ANOVA of Tobin’s q and the ROIC matched sample have much 
in common. For example, the CEO effects are quite significant, showing 21.54 percent 
of total variance in terms of incremental R2. Like the ANOVA of ROIC sample, the 
CEO effects increase from 7.8 percent before the financial crisis to 16.6 percent after 
the crisis. Differences between the amount of CEO effects of the two groups, chaebol 
affiliated and non-chaebol companies are insignificant.  
Differences of the magnitude of CEO effects between the owner and 
professional CEO group become more obvious. In the owner CEO sample, the CEO 
effects make up only 8.3 percent, while those of the professional CEO group is 21.7 
percent. From the results of ANOVA of ROIC and Tobin’s q data, hypothesis 1, that 
CEOs have a significant impact on performance differences in Korea, is supported. 
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<Table V-2> Analysis of variance of Tobin’s q of firms (nested model, GLM) 
* Increment R2 when firm variable is included last. Other variables do not have R2 when putting in the 
model last.  
*** p<0.0001 
 
 
V-2. ROIC Sample VARCOMP Analysis 
 
The next step is to assess the importance of nested CEO effects compared to 
firm and industry effects. Table V-3 summarizes the results of Variance Decomposition 
of the ROIC data. This data contains ‘pooled data’ and sub-samples of ‘changed data,’ 
Pooled data includes all observations regardless of existence of CEO change during 
the observed period. On the contrary, changed data includes the firms that experience 
CEO change during the period. In other words, changed data excludes the companies 
with only one CEO during the period. This is because I need to separate the CEO 
effects from the firm effects.  
Using pooled data, the estimates are: year 1 percent, industry (industry plus 
interaction of industry and year) 6.13 percent, firm 24.5 percent and CEO effects 21.1 
percent. Among fixed effects, the family dummy variable, which is defined by the 
criterion of owner or professional CEO, is statistically significant. The financial crisis 
dummy variable, “imf” also has a significant impact on performance differences. 
However, the chaebol group does not seem to have a significant impact on 
  Owner Chaebol Year Industry Firm CEO Error 
 
Firm* 
N of 
Obs
erv.
R2 2.4 3.8 15.65*** 22.34*** 63*** 76.28*** 100 0.023 
Pooled 
(%) 2.4 1.4 11.85 6.69 40.66 13.28 23.72 0.03 
4533
R2 1.6 2.95 11.9*** 21.83*** 57.8*** 79.34*** 100 0.018 
Changed 
(%) 2.4 1.35 8.95 9.93 35.97 21.54 20.66 0.23 
2719
R2 1.91 2.36 7*** 21.24*** 75.09*** 82.89*** 100 0.0132 
Be-IMF 
(%) 1.91 0.45 4.64 14.24 53.85 7.8 17.11 0.016 
946
R2 1.86 3.7 7.94*** 19.25*** 66.86*** 83.46*** 100 0.012 
Af-IMF 
(%) 1.86 1.84 4.24 11.31 47.61 16.6 16.54 0.014 
1773
R2 0 - 6.5*** 28.3*** 60.2*** 80.3*** 100 0.049 
Chaebol 
(%) 0 - 6.5 21.8 31.9 20.1 19.7 0.06 
829
R2 1.5 - 12.6*** 22.8*** 58.9*** 80.2*** 100 0.0123 
N-chaebol 
(%) 1.5 - 11.1 10.2 36.1 21.3 19.8 0.015 
1890
R2 - 2.7 14.8*** 27*** 65.3*** 73.6*** 100 0.027 
Owner 
(%) - 2.7 12.1 12.2 38.3 8.3 26.4 0.04 
1605
R2 - 0.5 7.1*** 18.7*** 63.5*** 85.2*** 100 0.008 Professio
nal (%) - 0.5 6.6 11.6 44.8 21.7 14.8 0.01 
1114
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performance. Between characteristics of CEOs, age turns out to be significant, while 
level of education does not.        
Using “changed data,” the estimates of major effects are 1.4 percent (year), 
7.1 percent (industry), 25.5 percent (firm), and 14.7 percent (CEO effects). As with 
“pooled data,” the ‘imf’ dummy and age dummy significantly affects performance 
differences.  
In the ROIC matched data, hypothesis 2, the assumption that CEO effects are 
likely to have a significant impact on performance differences is supported. 
By sub-samples, the estimates of major effects are quite different. Considering 
the impact of the financial crisis, differences were expected between the two periods of 
pre- and post-crisis. In the “pre-crisis” sample, industry, firm and CEO effects are 4.7 
percent, 46.7 percent and 7.9 percent, respectively. The relative importance of CEO to 
firm effects is 0.41. On the other hand, in the “post-crisis” sample, firm effects 
decrease from 46.7 percent to 38.3 percent, and CEO effects increase from 7.9 percent 
to 20 percent. The relative importance increases to 0.68 compared to firm effects. 
Industry effects increase to 6.9 percent from 4.7 percent.  
In the ROIC matched data, hypothesis 3, the assumption that CEO effects of 
the post- crisis period are likely to be greater than those of the pre-crisis period is 
supported.   
The sample of top 30 chaebol-affiliated companies contains only 930 
observations. The VARCOMP chaebol data obtains year, industry, firm and CEO 
effects of 1.7 percent, 5.1 percent, 32.4 percent, and 19.1 percent, respectively. In the 
sample of non-chaebol companies, the year, industry, firm and CEO effects are 1.6 
percent, 6 percent, 23.6 percent, and 15.1 percent. Even though the magnitude of CEO 
effects for the two groups are different, the differences in relative importance of CEO 
to firm effects are not apparent. The relative importance of CEO in the chaebol-
affiliated sample is lower than that of the non-chaebol sample, because the firm effects 
decrease from 32.4 percent to 23.6 percent. In terms of fixed effects, the non-chaebol 
sample indicates that the age of CEOs have a significant impact on performance 
differences.  
In the ROIC data, hypothesis 4, the assumption that CEO effects of non-
chaebol firms are likely to be greater than those of chaebol affiliated firms is 
supported. 
In the sample of owner CEOs, the year, industry, firm, and CEO effects are 
1.3 percent, 3.9 percent, 23.7 percent, and 10.5 percent, respectively. In the sample of 
professional CEOs, the year, industry, firm, and CEO effects are 0.7 percent, 10.2 
percent, 39.2 percent, and 12.3 percent. Although the magnitude of CEO effects of 
both samples appears comparable, the relative importance of CEO of 0.67 in the owner 
CEO sample is higher than that of professional CEO of 0.56. In the owner CEO 
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sample, the IMF dummy has a significant impact. The greater size of interaction of 
industry and year in the professional CEO sample indicates that they experienced a 
more serious fluctuation of industry by year. On the other hand, age dummy variables 
turn out to be significant in the professional CEO sample.   
In hypothesis 5, the owner CEO effects are likely to be greater than 
professional CEO effects, is supported. In summary, the hypotheses that build up in 
chapter III are all supported in the ROIC sample.  
 
 
V-3. Tobin’s q sample VARCOMP Analysis  
 
Table V-4 presents the results of VARCOMP for the Tobin’s q sample. Tobin’s 
q is another performance indicator, reflecting the market’s expectation and 
disappointment on the firm’s future value. Market value is basically determined by 
accounting information and other important factors (Park and Kim, 1999). Prior 
studies supported the assumption that “accounting information plays a role as a 
predictor of security returns” (Ball and Brown, 1968). However, the consensus is that 
the accounting information is one of the important factors that determine stock returns. 
In other words, accounting numbers significantly influence stock returns with other 
important factors. It partly explains market values.  
In this context, the results of VARCOMP of Tobin’s q data are likely to be 
different from those of the ROIC sample. At first glance, all but firm effects tend to be 
greater than those of the ROIC samples. Most results by sub-samples tend to be similar 
in terms of relative importance with the exception of owner sub-samples and 
professional samples.   
 In the pooled sample, the year, industry, firm and CEO effects are 12 percent, 
8 percent, 25.4 percent and 25.5 percent. Among fixed effects, the owner, the 
financial crisis, and age of the CEOs dummy have a significant impact on 
performance differences. In particular, the owner dummy is significantly affected at 
the 0.0001 level.  
 In the “changed sample,” the year, industry, firm and CEO effects are 8.8 
percent, 8.4 percent, 26.8 percent and 25 percent, respectively. The owner dummy is 
also significantly important in this sample. The CEO effects, 25 percent of Tobin’s q 
sample, are greater than those of the ROIC sample. The relative importance of CEO 
effects compared to firm effects is 0.97, contrasting with 0.76 of the ROIC sample. 
 Therefore, hypothesis 2 is also strongly supported in the Tobin’s q sample. 
Before the financial crisis, the year, industry, firm and CEO effects were 7.6 
percent, 15.3 percent, 34.9 percent, and 12.3 percent, respectively. This can be 
interpreted as industry having had a relatively larger impact on market value than 
accounting data before the crisis. It reflects that market values of firms tend to be 
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more strongly influenced by industry factors before the crisis. The CEO effects 
explain only 12.3 percent, less than industry effects. Owner, education, and age 
dummy variables of CEOs turn out to be insignificant.   
 Following the financial crisis, the results are quite different from those of the 
pre-crisis period. The year, industry, firm and CEO effects are 4.9 percent, 8.8 
percent, 39 percent and 27.3 percent, respectively. The CEO effects increased 
substantially compared to the pre-crisis period. The relative importance of CEO 
effects to firm effects increased from 0.59 to 0.83 after the crisis. Among fixed 
effects, the owner dummy has a significant impact unlike in the previous period.  
In hypothesis 3, the assumption that CEO effects of the post-financial crisis 
period are likely to be greater than that of the pre-financial crisis period, is also 
supported in Tobin’s q sample. 
 In the chaebol affiliated companies’ sample, the interaction of year and 
industry accounts for 5.7 percent and the industry accounts for 16.1 percent, 
recording the highest among sub-samples. The larger size of interaction of industry 
and year in the chaebol affiliated companies can be seen as a result of having 
experienced a more serious fluctuation of industry by year. Firm effects and CEO 
effects in the sample are 21.7 percent, and 27.4 percent.  
 In the sample of non-chaebol companies, year, industry, firm, and CEO effects 
are 10 percent, 7.1 percent, 25.3 percent, and 28.4 percent, respectively. Although the 
size of CEO effects seems to be comparable, the relative importance of the ‘non-
chaebol sample’ is smaller than that of chaebol affiliated companies’ sample. However, 
the difference of the relative importance between the two samples is not definitive. 
 In hypothesis 4, the assumption that CEO effects of non-chaebol firms are 
likely to be greater than those of chaebol-affiliated firms is not supported. 
 The results of both owner CEO and professional CEO samples are different 
from those of ROIC samples as well. In the owner CEO sample, year, industry, firm 
and CEO effects are 13.7 percent, 11.6 percent, 28.4 percent, and 12.6 percent. The 
relative importance of the owner CEO is 0.67, much smaller that that of a professional 
CEO.  
On the contrary, year, industry, firm, and CEO effects in the professional CEO 
sample are 7.6 percent, 5.4 percent, 28.7 percent, and 30.3 percent, respectively. An 
obvious increase is seen in the amount of CEO effects. The relative importance of 
CEO to firm effects is 1.03. In hypothesis 5, the assumption of owner CEO effects 
likely to be greater than professional CEO effects is not supported. 
In summary, the hypotheses 4~5 are rejected while hypotheses 1~3 are 
supported in the Tobin’s q sample.  
 Why are the results of Tobin’s q sample different from those of the ROIC 
sample? Considering the fact that hypothesis 5, in particular, seems too obvious to test, 
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the rejection of the hypothesis in the Tobin’s q sample is surprising. How are 
professional CEO effects greater than owner CEO effects?  
There are several possible explanations. First, determinants of the values of 
Tobin’s q should be considered. As Tobin’s q reflects not only accounting data but also 
non-accounting information including CEO change of the firm, the values tend to be 
more sensitive than accounting data. If CEO change occurs in a firm, markets respond 
to the change without a time lag in any direction.  
Second, the variance of Tobin’s q tends to be associated more with 
professional CEOs than owner CEOs. A change of owner CEOs has less of an impact 
on market value than a professional CEO change. This may be as a result of an owner 
CEO change occurring by ‘blood succession.’ In other words, the market does not 
seem to expect that blood succession will make much difference. On the contrary, 
professional CEO changes are accepted as having a closer association with 
performance.  
Third, market tends to be more responsive to the change of CEOs of chaebol-
affiliated companies than that of non-chaebol companies. As chaebol affiliated 
companies have been more heavily forced to enhance transparency and accountability 
since the financial crisis, they should open and report more information on their 
management. Thus, markets tend to pay more attention on CEO changes of chaebol-
affiliated companies than non-chaebol companies. Those are why the values of Tobin’s 
q are more responsive to the CEO change of ‘chaebol affiliated companies’ and 
‘professional CEOs’ than accounting data.   
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<Table V-3> Variance decomposition of ROIC of firms 
 
Random effect Fixed effect 
 
Year Year*indus Industry Firm CEO Error 
Total 
random 
effect Owner IMF Chaebol Education Age 
N of 
observati
on 
Relative 
importance 
of CEO to 
firm 
Relative 
importance 
of CEO to 
industry 
Random model variance 
component 0.87 2.91
*** 2.3*** 20.83*** 17.93*** 40.16 85      5374   
% 1.02 3.42 2.71 24.51 21.09 47.25 100.00       0.93 1.85 
Mixed model variance 
component 0 2.87
*** 2.35*** 19.91*** 18.15*** 40.14 83.42 8.06 (0.0045)
24.2 
(<.0001)
1.55 
(0.2133)
0.8 
(0.492)
3.63 
(<.0001) 4759   
P
o
o
l
e
d
 
% 0.00 3.44 2.82 23.87 21.76 48.12 100.00       0.95 1.86 
Random variance 
component 1.37 4.07
*** 3.01*** 25.48*** 14.74*** 51.35 100.02      3440   
% 1.37 4.07 3.01 25.47 14.74 51.34 100.00       0.76 1.44 
Mixed model variance 
component 0 4.03
*** 2.91*** 24.27*** 15.2*** 51.26 97.67 3.44 (0.0638)
15.14 
(<.0001)
3.32 
(0.0687)
2.21 
(0.086)
3.31 
(<.0001) 3031   C
h
a
n
g
e
d
 
% 0.00 4.13 2.98 24.85 15.56 52.48 100.00       0.79 1.48 
Random variance 
component 0.27 1.07 0.81 18.67 3.16 16 39.98      1150   
% 0.68 2.68 2.03 46.70 7.90 40.02 100.00       0.41 1.3 
Mixed model variance 
component 0.29 1.08 0.83 18.38 2.95 16.08 39.61 
0.78 
(0.379)  
1.73 
(0.1888)
1.51 
(0.212)
1.87 
(0.0006) 1141   
B
e
-
I
M
F
 
% 0.73 2.73 2.10 46.40 7.45 40.60 100.00       0.40 1.24 
Random variance 
component 0.03 1.62 6.96 47.53 24.76 43.11 124.01      1901   
% 0.02 1.3 5.61 38.33 19.97 34.77 100.00       0.68 1.42 
Mixed model variance 
component 0.02 1.56 6.66 46.03 25.27 43.19 122.73 
0.69 
(0.4074)  
2.0 
(0.1576)
1.3 
(0.272)
2.83 
(0.0001) 1890   
A
f
-
I
M
F
 
% 0.02 1.27 5.43 37.5 20.59 35.19 100.00       0.70 1.46 
Random variance 
component 0.76 1.97 0.38 14.81 8.74 19.12 45.78      930   
% 1.66 4.30 0.83 32.35 19.09 41.76 100.00       0.77 1.93 
Mixed model variance 
component 0.18 1.8 0.51 15.19 8.99 19.06 45.73 
1.33 
(0.2496)
2.57 
(0.1101)  
0.06 
(0.978)
1.3 
(0.121) 795   
C
h
a
e
b
o
l
 
% 0.39 3.94 1.12 33.22 19.66 41.68 100.00       0.77 1.97 
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Random effect Fixed effect 
 
Year Year*indus Industry Firm CEO Error 
Total 
random 
effect Owner IMF Chaebol Education Age 
N of 
observati
on 
Relative 
importance 
of CEO to 
firm 
Relative 
importance 
of CEO to 
industry 
Random variance 
component 1.9 3.46 3.59 27.73 17.74 63.26 117.68      2510   
% 1.61 2.94 3.05 23.56 15.07 53.76 100.00       0.8 1.59 
Mixed model variance 
component 0.19 3.35 3.74 26.96 18.02 63.19 115.45 
5.65 
(0.0176)
11.39 
(0.0008)  
2.57 
(0.1101)
2.77 
(<.0001) 2236   N
-
c
h
a
e
b
o
l
 
% 0.16 2.90 3.24 23.35 15.61 54.73 100.00       0.82 1.59 
Random variance 
component 1.11 1.65
*** 1.8 20.98*** 9.28*** 53.75 88.57      1929   
% 1.25 1.86 2.03 23.69 10.48 60.69 100.00       0.67 1.64 
Mixed model variance 
component 0 1.77
** 1.77** 20.98*** 9.65*** 53.48 87.65  17.65 (<.0001)
0.00 
(0.9923)
1.22 
(0.301)
1.22 
(0.1293) 1673   
O
w
n
e
r
 
% 0.00 2.02 2.02 23.94 11.01 61.02 100.00       0.68 1.65 
Random variance 
component 0.85 8.04
*** 3.9** 46.04*** 14.43*** 44.27 117.53      1511   
% 0.72 6.84 3.32 39.17 12.28 37.67 100.00       0.56 1.1 
Mixed model variance 
component 0.17 7.88
*** 3.93*** 41.93*** 14.8*** 44.57 113.28  2.28 (0.1316)
7.36 
(0.0069)
3.51 
(0.015)
5.68 
(<.0001) 1358   
P
r
o
f
e
s
s
i
o
n
a
l
 
% 0.15 6.96 3.47 37.01 13.06 39.34 100.00       0.59 1.12 
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<Table V-4> Variance decomposition of Tobin’s q of firms 
 
Random effect Fixed effect 
 
Year Year*indus Industry Firm CEO Error 
Total random 
effect 
Owner IMF Chaebol Education Age 
N of 
observation
Relative 
importance 
of CEO to 
firm 
Relative 
importance 
of CEO to 
industry 
Random model variance 
component 0.014 0.0014 0.0079 0.0296 0.0297 0.034 0.1166      4533   
% 12.01 1.20 6.78 25.39 25.47 29.16 100.00       1.00 1.79 
Mixed model variance 
component 0.007 0.0013 0.0059 0.0275 0.0287 0.034 0.1044 
44.47 
(<.0001)
11.5
(0.0007)
0.53 
(0.4656)
0.31 
(0.8213)
1.55 
(0.0044) 4036   
P
o
o
l
e
d
 
% 6.70 1.25 5.65 26.34 27.49 32.57 100.00       1.02 2.00 
Random variance component 0.0098 0.0013 0.0081 0.03 0.028 0.034 0.112      2719   
% 8.75 1.16 7.23 26.79 25.00 30.36 100.00       0.97 1.73 
Mixed model variance 
component 
0.0058 0.0014 0.0069 0.029 0.028 0.034 0.1051 28.29 
(<.0001)
7.72
(0.0055)
0.46 
(0.4997)
1.08 
(0.357) 
 
1.4 
(0.0259)
2719   
C
h
a
n
g
e
d
 
% 5.52 1.33 6.57 27.59 26.64 32.35 100.00       0.98 1.84 
Random variance component 0.0057 0.0016 0.0098 0.026 0.0092 0.0223 0.0746      946   
% 7.64 2.14 13.14 34.85 12.33 29.89 100.00       0.59 0.90 
Mixed model variance 
component 
0.0058 0.0017 0.0073 0.0256 0.0086 0.0221 0.0711 7.74 
(0.0057)
 0.34 
(0.5597)
0.1 
(0.9617)
0.93 
(0.6112)
937 
  
B
e
-
I
M
F
 
 8.16 2.39 10.27 36.01 12.10 31.08 100.00       0.58 0.98 
Random variance component 0.0067 0.0011 0.011 0.0538 0.0377 0.0277 0.138      1481   
% 4.86 0.8 7.97 38.99 27.32 20.1 100.00       0.83 1.63 
Mixed model variance 
component 
0.0069 0.0011 0.0092 0.0496 0.0381 0.0277 0.1326 14.21 
(0.0002)
 3.11 
(0.0781)
0.77 
(0.5117)
1.17 
(0.1849)
1472   
A
f
-
I
M
F
 
% 5.2 0.8 6.94 37.41 28.73 20.89 100.00       0.83 1.63 
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Random effect Fixed effect 
 
Year Year*indus Industry Firm CEO Error 
Total random 
effect 
Owner IMF Chaebol Education Age 
N of 
observation
Relative 
importance 
of CEO to 
firm 
Relative 
importance 
of CEO to 
industry 
Random variance component 0.0045 0.0044 0.009 0.017 0.0215 0.022 0.0784      829   
% 5.74 5.61 11.48 21.68 27.42 28.06 100.00       1.12 1.27 
Mixed model variance 
component 0.0029 0.0044 0.0087 0.017 0.02156 0.0216 0.07616 
5.41 
(0.0208)
0.14
(0.7126)  
0.78 
(0.5084)
1.18 
(0.2312) 716   C
h
a
e
b
o
l
 
% 3.81 5.78 11.42 22.32 28.31 28.36 100.00       1.13 1.28 
Random variance component 0.0126 0.0008 0.0082 0.032 0.036 0.037 0.1266      1890   
% 9.95 0.63 6.48 25.28 28.44 29.23 100.00       1.06 2.00 
Mixed model variance 
component 0.0078 0.0009 0.0074 0.03 0.0344 0.037 0.1175 
29.74 
(<.0001)
7.39
(0.0067)  
1.16 
(0.3255)
1.26 
(0.0977) 1693   
N
-
c
h
a
e
b
o
l
 
% 6.64 0.77 6.30 25.53 29.28 31.49 100.00       1.07 2.04 
Random variance component 0.013 0.002 0.009 0.027 0.012 0.032 0.095      1605   
% 13.68 2.11 9.47 28.42 12.63 33.68 100.00       0.67 1.04 
Mixed model variance 
component 0.006 0.001 0.008 0.025 0.012 0.032 0.084  
9.7 
(0.0019)
6.1 
(0.0137)
 
0.22 
(0.8856)
 
1.65  
(0.0019)
1403   
O
w
n
e
r
 
% 7.14 1.19 9.52 29.76 14.29 38.10 100.00       0.69 1.15 
Random variance component 0.0098 0.0023 0.0047 0.037 0.039 0.036 0.1288      1114   
% 7.61 1.79 3.65 28.73 30.28 27.95 100.00       1.03 2.36 
Mixed model variance 
component 0.006 0.002 0.005 0.037 0.039 0.036 0.125  
3.96
(0.0474)
0.94 
(0.3318)
1.38 
(0.2497)
1.03 
(0.4265) 1006   
P
r
o
f
e
s
s
i
o
n
a
l
 
% 4.80 1.60 4.00 29.60 31.20 28.80 100.00       1.03 2.36 
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V-4. Comparison with prior studies 
 
Preceding studies are divided into two streams; the IO vs. SM debate and the 
leadership-performance debate. The former is the research stream between industrial 
organization and strategic management. They are categorized ‘variance decomposition 
studies’ by Bowman and Helfat (2001). Table V-5 provides the results of prior 
VARCOMP studies and the current study. The difference between this research stream 
and the current study is whether the model includes CEO effects or not. 
Considering that firm effects in the current model are equivalent to the sum of 
firm effects (corporate effects) and business-unit effects, the amount of firm effects is 
relatively small. Firm effects of this study are 32.8-36 percent with ANOVA, 25.5-26.8 
percent with VARCOMP, while Rumelt (1991) and Roquebert et al. (1996) reported 45 
percent and 54 percent,17 respectively. The difference between the results of past 
studies and current study in terms of firm effects is interpreted as CEO effects I try to 
separate from firm effects.  
Industry effects in this study are also smaller than those of previous studies, in 
particular, the studies of Schmalensee (1985) and McGahan and Porter (1997). With the 
ANOVA method, industry effects are 5.4 percent and 9.9 percent, respectively. Industry 
effects with VARCOMP are 2.7 percent and 7.23 percent, respectively. The relatively 
smaller amount of industry effects in this study stems from the broader definition of 
industry classification. This study classifies industries with 2-digit KSIC, which is 
broader than that of previous studies (Chang and Hong, 2002), and, in turn, causes 
underestimation of the effects (Bowman and Helfat, 2001). 
The greater size of year effects with Tobin’s q sample indicates that firms’ 
market values have been more heavily influenced by year-to-year fluctuations resulting 
from the financial crisis than ROIC accounting data.   
The limitation of the current study is that chaebol effects are not drawn 
completely due to sample size. The data does not contain a sufficient number of 
chaebol-affiliated companies that are not listed, as only publicly listed companies are 
included. In fact, chaebol groups have a number of unlisted affiliated companies. Some 
chaebol groups have only 1-2 listed affiliated companies. Due to this sample constraint, 
this study cannot draw enough on the effects of chaebol.  
The latter research stream is the leadership-performance debate performed by 
Lieberson and O’Connor (1972), and Thomas (1988). The leadership effects of the 
current study are relatively small compared to those of Weiner and Mahoney (43.9 
percent), but are greater than those of Thomas (1988) and Salancik and Pfeffer (1978).   
Table V-6 provides the results of previous studies and this study. The results of 
                                            
17 The figures are the sum of firm effects (corporate effects) and business-unit effects in the studies of 
Rumelt and Roquebert et al. 
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ANOVA in this study also appear similar to those of preceding studies. The industry 
effects of this study are relatively small compared to previous studies because of a 
broadly defined industry classification.   
 
 
 
 
 
 55
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
<Table V-5> Comparison with VARCOMP studies 
 
Study Methodology Firm effects Business unit effects Industry effects Year effects Year*industry 
Schmalensee(1985) 
 
 
Rumelt (1991)  
 
 
Roquebert et al. (1996) 
McGahan and Porter (1997) 
 
 
Chang and Hong (2001) 
Hawawini et al. (2003) 
 
 
Current study  (ROIC) 
 
(Tobin’s q) 
ANOVA(sequential) 
Variance components 
 
ANOVA(sequential) 
Variance components 
 
Variance components 
ANOVA(sequential) 
Variance components 
 
Variance components 
Variance components 
Full sample 
Modified sample 
ANOVA 
Variance components 
 
ANOVA 
Variance components 
Zero 
Not included 
 
10.9-17.6% 
1.6% 
 
17.9% 
9.1-11.9% 
4.3% 
 
9.4% 
Combined with 
business unit 
effects 
Combined with 
business unit 
effects 
0.2-0.6%* 
 
 
33.9-41.4% 
44.2-47.2% 
 
37.1% 
34.9-35.1% 
31.7% 
 
20.8% 
 
35.8% 
16.7% 
32.8% 
23.9% 
 
36% 
26.8% 
18.8-19.3% 
 
 
9.8-17.9% 
4-7.3% 
 
10.1% 
6.8-9.4% 
18.7% 
 
7.6% 
 
8.1% 
16% 
5.4% 
2.7% 
 
9.9% 
7.23% 
Not included 
 
 
Zero 
Zero 
 
0.4% 
Not included 
0.2-1.1% 
 
2.5% 
 
1.0% 
1.1% 
0.9% 
1.0% 
 
8.9% 
8.75% 
Negative 
covariance 
 
7.1_9.8% 
5.3-8.9% 
 
2.3% 
Not included 
 
 
4.4% 
 
3.1% 
4.1% 
Not included 
3.4% 
 
Not included 
1.16% 
* Schmalensee does not distinguish between the business unit and corporate effect in his model. This figure is measured by market share. 
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<Table V-6> Comparison with Leadership-performance debate 
 
Study Dependent var. Methodology CEO effects Firm effects Industry effects Year effects 
Lieberson and 
O’Connor (1972) 
 
Salancik and 
Pfeffer (1977) 
 
Weiner (1978) 
 
 
Weiner and 
Mahoney (1981) 
 
Thomas (1988) 
 
 
Current study 
 
Profit, sales, profit 
margin 
 
City budgets 
 
 
ROS 
 
 
ROA 
 
 
ROS 
 
 
ROIC 
 
 
Tobin’s q 
 
Sequential analysis of 
variance 
 
Sequential analysis of 
variance 
 
Sequential analysis of 
variance 
 
Regression combined with 
ANOVA (sequential) 
 
Sequential analysis of 
variance 
 
ANOVA 
Variance Components 
 
ANOVA 
Variance Components 
6.5%, 7.5%, 
14.5%,  31.7%* 
 
5.6% 
 
 
16.1%, 19.0%, 
8.7% 
 
43.9% 
 
 
5.7% 
 
 
25.5% 
14.7% 
 
21.5% 
25.0% 
22.6% 
 
 
90.8%** 
 
 
45.8% 
 
 
 
 
 
83.2% 
 
 
32.8% 
23.9% 
 
36% 
26.8% 
28.5% 
 
 
 
 
 
20.5% 
 
 
 
Not included 
 
 
 
 
5.4% 
6.1% 
 
9.9% 
7.23% 
1.8% 
 
 
2.5% 
 
 
2.4% 
 
 
 
5.6% 
 
 
 
 
0.9% 
1.0% 
 
8.9% 
8.75% 
* With a three-year lag, leadership accounts for 31.7 percent of the total variance. 
** Salancik and Pfeffer calculate the cities’ effects on the outcome of city budget instead of on corporations’ effects on performance.  
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CHAPTER 6 
Characteristics of Korean CEOs   
 
 
 
 
This section presents a descriptive analysis about 6,373 CEOs selected based 
on the previously mentioned criteria and procedures. Reflecting the characteristics of 
the Korean management system, this paper analyzes the CEOs of Korea’s listed 
companies with a classification of “owner CEO” and “professional CEO.” 
The overall description of the full data is as follows: By broader industry 
classification, CEOs of the manufacturing industry account for 70 percent (4,458), 
CEOs of the transportation, wholesale & retail industries 6.7 percent (425), CEOs of 
the construction industry 11.8 percent (756) and CEOs of the financial industry 11.5 
percent (734). The number of listed companies increased until the financial crisis of 
1997 to 762 from 699 in 1995, and decreased to 667 in 2002. Worth noting is that the 
number of companies in the construction and financial industries sharply decreased.  
By classification of owner and professional CEO, owner and professional 
CEOs account for 62.6 percent (3,992) and 37.4 percent (2,381) of total CEOs, 
respectively. The proportion of professional CEOs increases over time. The proportion 
of professional CEOs in the manufacturing industry increased from 29.9 percent in 
1995 to 35.7 percent, the construction industry from 28 percent to 43.6 percent, and 
transportation, wholesale & retail from 32.5 percent to 48.3 percent. Non-
manufacturing industries such as construction and transportation, and the wholesale & 
retail industries witnessed a significant increase in number of professional CEOs. In 
the case of the financial industry, the proportion of owner CEOs was only 17 percent 
and stayed at that level due to the highly regulated nature of the industry. 
The considerable increase in the number of professional CEOs since the 
financial crisis can be interpreted as a visible tendency on the part of owners turning 
over control to professional CEOs whether or not they were forced to do so. In the 
case of companies that underwent a court receivership program, the owners were 
forced to turn over their control to professional CEOs including court-appointed 
managers. Otherwise, some owners may have voluntarily turned over control to 
professional CEOs to cope with the hard times during the financial crisis.  
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<Table VI-1> Distribution of CEOs by Industry 
 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total
Owner 335 (70.1) 
361 
(72.3)
377 
(72.9)
385 
(75.5)
364 
(72.9)
350 
(70.6)
337 
(68.2)
313 
(65.6) 
314 
(64.3) 
3136
(70.3)
Professional 143 (29.9) 
138 
(27.7)
140 
(27.1)
125 
(24.5)
135 
(27.1)
146 
(29.4)
157 
(31.8)
164 
(34.4) 
174 
(35.7) 
1322
(29.7)
Manufacturing 
Sub total 478 499 517 510 499 496 494 477 488 4458
Owner 36 (72.0) 
38 
(74.5)
40 
(75.5)
37 
(72.5)
30 
61.2)
30 
(62.5)
27 
(62.8)
23 
(56.1) 
22 
(56.4) 
283 
(66.6)
Professional 14 (28.0) 
13 
(25.5)
13 
(24.5)
14 
(27.5)
19 
(38.8)
18 
(37.5)
16 
(37.2)
18 
(43.9) 
17 
(43.6) 
142 
(33.4)
Construction 
Sub total 50 51 53 51 49 48 43 41 39 425 
Owner 52 (67.5) 
56 
(69.1)
54 
(63.5)
55 
(61.8)
43 
(52.4)
41 
(48.8)
43 
(51.2)
45 
(52.9) 
46 
(51.7) 
435 
(57.5)
Professional 25 (32.5) 
25 
(30.9)
31 
(36.5)
34 
(38.2)
39 
(47.6)
43 
(51.2)
41 
(48.8)
40 
(47.1) 
43 
(48.3) 
321 
(42.5)
Transportation, 
wholesale & 
retail∗ 
Sub total 77 81 85 89 82 84 84 85 89 756 
Owner 16 (17.0) 
17 
(17.3)
20 
(18.7)
23 
(25.0)
18 
(23.4)
14 
(18.9)
11 
(16.4)
8 
(12.5) 
11 
(18.0) 
138 
(18.8)
Professional 78 (83.0) 
81 
(82.7)
87 
(81.3)
69 
(75.0)
59 
(76.6)
60 
(81.1)
56 
(83.6)
56 
(87.5) 
50 
(82.0) 
596 
(81.2)
Financial∗∗ 
Sub total 94 98 107 92 77 74 67 64 61 734 
Owner 439 (62.8) 
472 
(64.7)
491 
(64.4)
500 
(67.4)
455 
(64.4)
435 
(62.0)
418 
(60.8)
389 
(58.3) 
393 
(58.1) 
3992
(62.6)
Professional 260 (37.2) 
257 
(35.3)
271 
(35.6)
242 
(32.6)
252 
(35.6)
267 
(38.0)
270 
(39.2)
278 
(41.7) 
284 
(41.9) 
2381
(37.4)
Total 
Total 699 729 762 742 707 702 688 667 677 6373
∗ Includes the transport, wholesale and retail trade industries.  
∗∗ Includes the banking, security, leasing, and venture capital industries.  
 
 
VI-1. Positions of CEOs 
 
Positions of CEOs take various forms such as chairman, vice chairman, 
president, vice president, executive director, and managing director. The most frequent 
position is chairman (50 percent), followed by president (38.5 percent). The reason is 
that most owner CEOs (72.2 percent) hold the position of chairman. On the contrary, 
professional CEOs (61 percent) mainly hold the position of president rather than 
chairman. The proportion of professional chairman accounts for 12.8 percent followed 
by court-appointed manager at 7.5 percent.  
The most frequent position following chairman and president is court-
appointed managers (2.9 percent), reflecting the increasing number of distressed 
companies from the financial crisis. The number of court-appointed managers grew 
from only 2 in 1995 to 18 in 1998, and finally 39 (14.6 percent) and 40 (14.8 percent) 
in 2000 and 2001, respectively.  
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VI-2. Age and Regional Origin of CEOs 
 
CEOs who are in their fifties account for 42.9 percent, followed by the CEOs 
in their sixties (26.4 percent), in their forties (14.7 percent), and in their seventies (10.8 
percent). The average age of CEOs in the period is 57-58, which shows a higher 
bracket than in the study by Kim and Lee (2001).   
The age distribution of owner CEOs is more likely to be spread out rather than 
that of professional CEOs. CEOs in their fifties account for 35.6 percent, followed by 
the sixties (27.2 percent), forties (18.1 percent), seventies (10.4 percent), eighties (6.4 
percent) and thirties (2.3 percent). Owner CEOs are likely to be unconstrained from 
the pressure of departure by corporate boards regardless of the performance they 
achieve. CEOs in their thirties or forties are mainly owner CEOs because they may 
have succeeded their parents. On the other hand, professional CEOs in their fifties 
account for 60.2 percent, followed by sixties (26.5 percent), and forties (9.8 percent).  
CEOs who are from Seoul and Gyeonggi Province account for 36.79 percent 
(2,330) of the total. In particular, the number of CEOs who are from Seoul is 1,902, 
making up more than 30 percent. Furthermore, owner CEOs who are from Seoul make 
up 65 percent of the total CEOs from Seoul. CEOsfrom Yeongnam or Gyeongsang 
Province account for 35.45 percent, followed by Honam or Jeonla Province (10.12 
percent), and Chungcheong Province (8.92 percent).  
Of owner CEOs, those from Seoul account for 31 percent (1,235) of the total, 
followed by Gyeongnam 441 (11.06 percent), Gyeongbuk 402 (10.08 percent), Busan 
320 (8.02 percent), Daegu 235 (5.89 percent), Gyeonggi 204 (5.11 percent), 
Chungnam 191 (4.79 percent), Jeonbuk 130 (3.26 percent), and Jeonnam 128 (3.21 
percent). Owner CEOs from Seoul increased from 33.94 percent in 1995 to 38 percent 
in 1999 and 42 percent in 2003. On the other hand, the proportion of CEOs from 
Yeongnam or Honam region tends to be stable as 35 percent and 8 percent, 
respectively.  
The regions that have a relatively higher proportion of owner CEOs compared 
to that of professional CEOs is Hwanghae Province (91 percent), Pyeongan Province 
(90 percent). The proportion of owner CEOs is 89 percent (Daejeon), 86 percent 
(Incheon), 74 percent (Busan), and 73 percent (Daegu). 
In the case of professional CEOs, the change in proportion looks obvious over 
time. The proportion of CEOs from Seoul decreased from 40 percent in 1995 to 30 
percent in 2003. The proportion of CEOs from Yeongnam Province also decreased 
from 37-38 percent to 30 percent in 2001 and 34 percent in 2003, respectively. On the 
other hand, the proportion of CEOs from Honam Province was 8 percent in 1995, and 
increased to 13 percent in 1998 and 15 percent in 2003.  
Table VI-5 shows the regional origin of CEOs by industry. The proportion of 
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CEOs from Seoul and Gyeonggi Province in the manufacturing industry increased 
from 34 percent to 38 percent. The proportion of CEOs from Yeongnam Province 
gradually decreased from 37 percent in 1995 to 32 percent in 2002, and picked up to 
35 percent in 2003. The proportion of CEOs from Honam Province increased from 9 
percent to 11 percent. The proportion of CEOs from the rest of the region is negligible.  
The proportion of CEOs from Seoul in the construction industry slightly 
increased from 48 percent to 50 percent, the proportion of CEOs from Yeongnam and 
Honam Province increased from 18 percent to 25 percent, from 6 percent to 11 percent 
respectively.  
The proportion of CEOs in the transportation, wholesale and retail industries 
from Seoul and Gyeonggi Province decreased from 40 percent to 33 percent, and 
picked up to 45 percent in 2003. The proportion of CEOs from Yeongnam Province 
remained between 40 and 45 percent of the total. The proportion of CEOs from Seoul 
and Gyeonggi Province in the financial industry decreased from 39 percent to 24 
percent. On the contrary, CEOs from Yeongnam Province increased from 37 percent to 
44 percent, while CEOs from Honam Province changed from 13 percent to 7 percent, 
18 percent in 1999, and 20 percent in 2003. 
 
 
VI-3. Educational Background of CEOs 
 
Table VI-6 shows that most CEOs (96.4 percent) are reported to have earned a 
Bachelor of Arts degree or above. The number who earned a Bachelors degree was 
3,529, accounting for 55.4 percent. The number of CEOs with a Masters degree was 
2,130 (33.4 percent), while CEOs with a PhD degree numbered 483 (7.58 percent) and 
not more than high school were 231 (3.62 percent).  
Owner CEOs tended to have higher educational levels than professional CEOs. 
The number of owner CEOs who earned a Bachelors degree was 1,851 (46.4 percent), 
followed by a Masters degree 1,549 (38.8%), and a PhD degree 345 (8.64 percent). On 
the other hand, the proportion of CEOs with education levels of high school or under 
was larger than that of professional CEOs. The proportion of professional CEOs with a 
Bachelors degree was 70.5 percent, followed by a Masters degree 24.4 percent, and a 
PhD degree 4.12 percent. Only 1 percent of professional CEOs are reported to have an 
educational background of high school or under. 
Table VI-7 shows the distribution of high schools where CEOs graduated. The 
distribution of high schools attaches too much importance to certain high schools with 
a strong reputation before the equalization policy took effect in 1977. As the table 
shows, the proportion of CEOs who graduated from the top 5 high schools and top 30 
high schools is 30.63 percent and 65 percent, respectively.  
Among those who are reported to have graduated from high school, the 
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graduates of Gyeonggi, Seoul and Gyeongbok high schools are 763 (13.12 percent) 
and 344 (5.92 percent), and 311 (5.35 percent), respectively. The graduates of 
Gyeongnam and Joongang, Yongsan, Gyeongbuk high schools are 189 (3.25 percent), 
174 (2.99percent), 160 (2.75 percent), and 156 (2.68 percent).  
The rank of high schools from which owner CEOs graduated is (1) Gyeonggi 
High School 13.07 percent, (2) Seoul 6.9 percent, (3) Gyeongbok 6.7 percent, 
followed by Joongang 3.8 percent, Yongsan 3.4 percent, and Gyeongnam 2.5 percent. 
The proportions of owner CEOs of graduates of these high ranked schools are 
Gyeongbok 78.5 percent, Seoul 73.5 percent, Gyeonggi 62.8 percent, and Gyeongnam 
48 percent. In this context, owner CEOs are likely to be graduates of private high 
schools in Seoul. On the other hand, the proportion of owner CEOs of graduates of 
public prestige schools in the province decrease to around 50 percent.  
Professional CEOs from Gyeonggi High School accounted for the largest 
portion of the total at 13.2 percent (284). The following high schools are Gyeongnam 
4.55 percent (98), and Seoul 3.1 percent (67). In the rank of professional CEO 
graduates, the top private school in Seoul such as Joongang and Yongsan exceed 
public schools in provinces such as Gyeongbuk, Busan, Jeonju, and Gwangjujeil High 
Schools.  
Table VI-8 summarizes the top 10 universities, which CEOs graduated from. 
Graduates of Seoul National University account for 30.27 percent, the largest 
proportion of the total, followed by Yonsei 10.8 percent, Korea 10.07 percent, and 
Hanyang University 7.6 percent. Graduates of universities abroad such as the U.S. and 
Japan account for 6.26 percent and 4.12 percent, respectively. Even though graduates 
of U.S. and Japanese universities are excluded, the proportion of graduates of the top 8 
domestic universities is 70 percent. The proportion of graduates of the top 3 
universities such as Seoul, Yonsei, and Korea University is 51.14 percent.  
As a whole, the proportion of graduates of Seoul University is 30 percent on 
average. As for owner CEOs, however, the proportion of graduates of Seoul National 
University is 22 percent. Professional CEOs from Seoul University account for 42.63 
percent. On the contrary, graduates of Yonsei and Korea University showed a balanced 
distribution of 11 (owner) and 10 (professional) percent, and 10 and 9 percent. On the 
other hand, the proportion of owner graduates of private universities such as Hanyang, 
Joongang, and Dongguk Universities is higher than that of professional graduates. The 
proportion of owner graduates of U.S. and Japanese universities is absolutely higher 
that that of professional graduates. 
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<Table VI-2> Positions of CEOs 
 
 Chairman Vice-chairman President
Vice-
president
Executive 
director
Managing 
director
Bank 
President 
Court-
appointed 
manager 
Director Total
Owner 331 10 94 0 0 0 0 2 2 439
% 75.4 2.3 21.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.5 62.8
Professional 56 7 151 12 6 1 22 2 3 260
% 21.5 2.7 58.1 4.6 2.3 0.4 8.5 0.8 1.2 37.2
Sub total 387 17 245 12 6 1 22 4 5 699
1995 
% 55.4 2.4 35.1 1.7 0.9 0.1 3.1 0.6 0.7 11.0
Owner 354 14 100 0 0 0 2 1 1 472
% 75.0 3.0 21.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.2 0.2 64.7
Professional 40 12 153 14 6 2 23 5 1 257
% 15.6 4.7 59.5 5.4 2.3 0.8 8.9 1.9 0.4 35.3
Sub total 394 26 253 14 6 2 25 6 2 729
1996 
% 54.0 3.6 34.7 1.9 0.8 0.3 3.4 0.8 0.3 11.4
Owner 369 10 110 0 0 0 2 0 0 491
% 75.2 2.0 22.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 64.4
Professional 42 13 156 16 9 4 23 8 0 271
% 15.5 4.8 57.6 5.9 3.3 1.5 8.5 3.0 0.0 35.6
Sub total 411 23 266 16 9 4 25 8 0 762
1997 
% 53.9 3.0 34.9 2.1 1.2 0.5 3.3 1.0 0.0 12.0
Owner 358 12 124 3 0 0 2 0 1 500
% 71.6 2.4 24.8 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.2 67.4
Professional 20 8 139 18 11 5 23 18 0 242
% 8.3 3.3 57.4 7.4 4.5 2.1 9.5 7.4 0.0 32.6
Sub total 378 20 263 21 11 5 25 18 1 742
1998 
% 50.9 2.7 35.4 2.8 1.5 0.7 3.4 2.4 0.1 11.6
Owner 316 10 126 1 0 0 1 1 0 455
% 69.5 2.2 27.7 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.0 64.4
Professional 20 12 149 12 12 5 14 28 0 252
% 7.9 4.8 59.1 4.8 4.8 2.0 5.6 11.1 0.0 35.6
Sub total 336 22 275 13 12 5 15 29 0 707
1999 
% 47.5 3.1 38.9 1.8 1.7 0.7 2.1 4.1 0.0 11.1
Owner 306 10 118 1 0 0 0 0 0 435
% 70.3 2.3 27.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 62.0
Professional 28 8 152 14 7 4 14 39 1 267
% 10.5 3.0 56.9 5.2 2.6 1.5 5.2 14.6 0.4 38.0
Sub total 334 18 270 15 7 4 14 39 1 702
2000 
% 47.6 2.6 38.5 2.1 1.0 0.6 2.0 5.6 0.1 11.0
Owner 296 10 111 1 0 0 0 0 0 418
% 70.8 2.4 26.6 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 60.8
Professional 27 7 157 9 10 3 16 40 1 270
% 10.0 2.6 58.1 3.3 3.7 1.1 5.9 14.8 0.4 39.2
Sub total 323 17 268 10 10 3 16 40 1 688
2001 
% 46.9 2.5 39.0 1.5 1.5 0.4 2.3 5.8 0.1 10.8
Owner 273 10 105 1 0 0 0 0 0 389
% 70.2 2.6 27.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 58.3
2002 
Professional 31 6 192 7 8 0 13 21 0 278
 63
 Chairman Vice-chairman President
Vice-
president
Executive 
director
Managing 
director
Bank 
President 
Court-
appointed 
manager 
Director Total
% 11.2 2.2 69.1 2.5 2.9 0.0 4.7 7.6 0.0 41.7
Sub total 304 16 297 8 8 0 13 21 0 667
% 45.6 2.4 44.5 1.2 1.2 0.0 1.9 3.1 0.0 10.5
Owner 279 15 98 0 1 0 0 0 0 393
% 71.0 3.8 24.9 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 58.1
Professional 39 5 204 5 3 1 10 17 0 284
% 13.7 1.8 71.8 1.8 1.1 0.4 3.5 6.0 0.0 41.9
Sub total 318 20 302 5 4 1 10 17 0 677
2003 
% 47.0 3.0 44.6 0.7 0.6 0.1 1.5 2.5 0.0 10.6
Owner 2882 101 986 7 1 0 7 4 4 3992
% 72.2 2.5 24.7 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.1 62.6
Professional 304 78 1453 107 72 25 158 178 6 2381
% 12.8 3.3 61.0 4.5 3.0 1.0 6.6 7.5 0.3 37.4
Total 3186 179 2439 114 73 25 165 182 10 6373
Total 
% 50.0 2.8 38.3 1.8 1.1 0.4 2.6 2.9 0.2 100.0
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<Table VI-3> Age of CEOs 
 
  30s 40s 50s 60s 70s 80s Total 
Owner 8 78 143 95 102 11 437 
% 1.8 17.8 32.7 21.7 23.3 2.5 62.7 
Professional 2 26 153 70 9 0 260 
% 0.8 10.0 58.8 26.9 3.5 0.0 37.3 
Sub total 10 104 296 165 111 11 697 
1995 
 1.4 14.9 42.5 23.7 15.9 1.6 10.9 
Owner 14 88 148 112 97 13 472 
% 3.0 18.6 31.4 23.7 20.6 2.8 64.7 
Professional 0 26 150 72 9 0 257 
% 0.0 10.1 58.4 28.0 3.5 0.0 35.3 
Sub total 14 114 298 184 106 13 729 
1996 
% 1.9 15.6 40.9 25.2 14.5 1.8 11.4 
Owner  9 89 156 133 90 14 491 
% 1.8 18.1 31.8 27.1 18.3 2.9 64.4 
Professional 3 17 154 86 11 0 271 
% 1.1 6.3 56.8 31.7 4.1 0.0 35.6 
    Sub total 12 106 310 219 101 14 762 
1997 
% 1.6 13.9 40.7 28.7 13.3 1.8 12.0 
Owner 16 77 168 131 85 23 500 
% 3.2 15.4 33.6 26.2 17.0 4.6 67.4 
Professional 3 11 156 68 4 0 242 
% 1.2 4.5 64.5 28.1 1.7 0.0 32.6 
Sub total 19 88 324 199 89 23 742 
1998 
% 2.6 11.9 43.7 26.8 12.0 3.1 11.7 
Owner 17 78 148 117 71 24 455 
% 3.7 17.1 32.5 25.7 15.6 5.3 64.4 
Professional 1 22 163 61 5 0 252 
% 0.4 8.7 64.7 24.2 2.0 0.0 35.6 
Sub total 18 100 311 178 76 24 707 
1999 
% 2.5 14.1 44.0 25.2 10.7 3.4 11.1 
Owner 13 74 148 119 52 29 435 
% 3.0 17.0 34.0 27.4 12.0 6.7 62.1 
Professional 4 25 172 62 3 0 266 
% 1.5 9.4 64.7 23.3 1.1 0.0 37.9 
Sub total 17 99 320 181 55 29 701 
2000 
% 2.4 14.1 45.6 25.8 7.8 4.1 11.0 
Owner 14 74 129 127 53 21 418 
% 3.3 17.7 30.9 30.4 12.7 5.0 60.9 
Professional 3 32 170 61 2 0 268 
% 3.2 13.3 55.4 27.0 1.1 0.0 39.1 
Sub total 17 106 299 188 55 21 686 
2001 
% 2.5 15.5 43.6 27.4 8.0 3.1 10.8 
Owner 9 74 124 113 47 22 389 2002 
% 2.3 19.0 31.9 29.0 12.1 5.7 58.3 
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Professional 9 37 154 75 3 0 278 
% 3.2 13.3 55.4 27.0 1.1 0.0 41.7 
Sub total 18 111 278 188 50 22 667 
% 2.7 16.6 41.7 28.2 7.5 3.3 10.5 
Owner 9 71 140 107 41 25 393 
% 2.3 18.1 35.6 27.2 10.4 6.4 58.1 
Professional 10 37 159 74 4 0 284 
% 3.5 13.0 56.0 26.1 1.4 0.0 41.9 
Sub total 19 108 299 181 45 25 677 
2003 
% 2.8 16.0 44.2 26.7 6.6 3.7 10.6 
Owner 109 703 1304 1054 638 182 3990 
% 2.7 17.6 32.7 26.4 16.0 4.6 62.7 
Professional 35 233 1431 629 50 0 2378 
% 1.5 9.8 60.2 26.5 2.1 0.0 37.3 
Total 144 936 2735 1683 688 182 6368 
Total 
% 2.3 14.7 42.9 26.4 10.8 2.9 100.0 
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<Table VI-4> Regional Origin of CEOs 
 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
 
Owner Professional Sub total Owner Professional Sub total Owner Professional Sub total Owner Professional Sub total Owner Professional Sub total 
Seoul 119 (27.11) 
92 
(35.66) 
211 
(30.27)
133 
(28.18)
92 
(36.22) 
225 
(30.99)
146 
(29.74)
87 
(32.71) 
233 
(30.78)
147 
(29.4) 
74 
(30.96) 
221 
(29.91)
141 
(30.99) 
62 
(24.7) 
203 
(28.75) 
Incheon 9 (2.05) 
1 
(0.39) 
10 
(1.43) 
8 
(1.69) 
1 
(0.39) 
9 
(1.24) 
11 
(2.24) 
3 
(1.13) 
14 
(1.85) 
12 
(2.4) 
1 
(0.42) 
13 
(1.76) 
11 
(2.42) 
3 
(1.2) 
14 
(1.98) 
Gyeonggi 21 (4.78) 
11 
(4.26) 
32 
(4.59) 
23 
(4.87) 
7 
(2.76) 
30 
(4.13) 
26 
(5.3) 
10 
(3.76) 
36 
(4.76) 
25 
(5) 
12 
(5.02) 
37 
(5.01) 
21 
(4.62) 
18 
(7.17) 
39 
(5.52) 
Sub total 149 (33.94) 
104 
(40.31) 
253 
(36.3) 
164 
(34.75)
100 
(39.37) 
264 
(36.36)
183 
(37.27)
100 
(37.59) 
283 
(37.38)
184 
(36.8) 
87 
(36.4) 
271 
(36.67)
173 
(38.02) 
83 
(33.07) 
256 
(36.26) 
Daegu 25 (5.69) 
12 
(4.65) 
37 
(5.31) 
30 
(6.36) 
15 
(5.91) 
45 
(6.2) 
26 
(5.3) 
14 
(5.26) 
40 
(5.28) 
31 
(6.2) 
8 
(3.35) 
39 
(5.28) 
27 
(5.93) 
6 
(2.39) 
33 
(4.67) 
Busan 34 (7.74) 
6 
(2.33) 
40 
(5.74) 
35 
(7.42) 
12 
(4.72) 
47 
(6.47) 
33 
(6.72) 
11 
(4.14) 
44 
(5.81) 
38 
(7.6) 
12 
(5.02) 
50 
(6.77) 
35 
(7.69) 
12 
(4.78) 
47 
(6.66) 
Ulsan 4 (0.91) 
2 
(0.78) 
6 
(0.86) 
3 
(0.64) 
4 
(1.57) 
7 
(0.96) 
4 
(0.81) 
4 
(1.5) 
8 
(1.06) 
5 
(1) 
4 
(1.67) 
9 
(1.22) 
4 
(0.88) 
2 
(0.8) 
6 
(0.85) 
Gyeongnam 46 (10.48) 
43 
(16.67) 
89 
(12.77)
52 
(11.02)
41 
(16.14) 
93 
(12.81)
56 
(11.41)
44 
(16.54) 
100 
(13.21)
58 
(11.6) 
33 
(13.81) 
91 
(12.31)
53 
(11.65) 
37 
(14.74) 
90 
(12.75) 
Yeong
nam
Gyeongbuk 49 (11.16) 
32 
(12.4) 
81 
(11.62)
50 
(10.59)
27 
(10.63) 
77 
(10.61)
49 
(9.98) 
32 
(12.03) 
81 
(10.7) 
51 
(10.2) 
23 
(9.62) 
74 
(10.01)
47 
(10.33) 
28 
(11.16) 
75 
(10.62) 
Sub total 158 (35.99) 
95 
(36.82) 
253 
(36.3) 
170 
(36.02)
99 
(38.98) 
269 
(37.05)
168 
(34.22)
105 
(39.47) 
273 
(36.06)
183 
(36.6) 
80 
(33.47) 
263 
(35.59)
166 
(36.48) 
85 
(33.86) 
251 
(35.55) 
Gwangju 7 (1.59) 
1 
(0.39) 
8 
(1.15) 
6 
(1.27) 
2 
(0.79) 
8 
(1.1) 
6 
(1.22) 
4 
(1.5) 
10 
(1.32) 
7 
(1.4) 
6 
(2.51) 
13 
(1.76) 
7 
(1.54) 
6 
(2.39) 
13 
(1.84) 
Jeonnam 19 (4.33) 
9 
(3.49) 
28 
(4.02) 
20 
(4.24) 
10 
(3.94) 
30 
(4.13) 
20 
(4.07) 
9 
(3.38) 
29 
(3.83) 
17 
(3.4) 
13 
(5.44) 
30 
(4.06) 
15 
(3.3) 
20 
(7.97) 
35 
(4.96) 
Ho
Nam
Jeonbuk 16 (3.64) 
12 
(4.65) 
28 
(4.02) 
16 
(3.39) 
8 
(3.15) 
24 
(3.31) 
17 
(3.46) 
12 
(4.51) 
29 
(3.83) 
15 
(3) 
13 
(5.44) 
28 
(3.79) 
15 
(3.3) 
15 
(5.98) 
30 
(4.25) 
Sub total 42 (9.57) 
22 
(8.53) 
64 
(9.18) 
42 
(8.9) 
20 
(7.87) 
62 
(8.54) 
43 
(8.76) 
25 
(9.4) 
68 
(8.98) 
39 
(7.8) 
32 
(13.39) 
71 
(9.61) 
37 
(8.13) 
41 
(16.33) 
78 
(11.05) 
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1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
 
Owner Professional Sub total Owner Professional Sub total Owner Professional Sub total Owner Professional Sub total Owner Professional Sub total 
Daejeon 6 (1.37) 
0 
(0) 
6 
(0.86) 
6 
(1.27) 
1 
(0.39) 
7 
(0.96) 
6 
(1.22) 
0 
(0) 
6 
(0.79) 
6 
(1.2) 
0 
(0) 
6 
(0.81) 
3 
(0.66) 
1 
(0.4) 
4 
(0.57) 
Chungnam 22 (5.01) 
17 
(6.59) 
39 
(5.6) 
25 
(5.3) 
15 
(5.91) 
40 
(5.51) 
25 
(5.09) 
20 
(7.52) 
45 
(5.94) 
25 
(5) 
19 
(7.95) 
44 
(5.95) 
23 
(5.05) 
17 
(6.77) 
40 
(5.67) 
Chung
Cheong
Chungbuk 7 (1.59) 
7 
(2.71) 
14 
(2.01) 
8 
(1.69) 
7 
(2.76) 
15 
(2.07) 
8 
(1.63) 
8 
(3.01) 
16 
(2.11) 
7 
(1.4) 
11 
(4.6) 
18 
(2.44) 
9 
(1.98) 
12 
(4.78) 
21 
(2.97) 
Sub total 35 (7.97) 
24 
(9.3) 
59 
(8.46) 
39 
(8.26) 
23 
(9.06) 
62 
(8.54) 
39 
(7.94) 
28 
(10.53) 
67 
(8.85) 
38 
(7.6) 
30 
(12.55) 
68 
(9.2) 
35 
(7.69) 
30 
(11.95) 
65 
(9.21) 
Gangwon 15 (3.42) 
4 
(1.55) 
19 
(2.73) 
14 
(2.97) 
5 
(1.97) 
19 
(2.62) 
11 
(2.24) 
3 
(1.13) 
14 
(1.85) 
10 
(2) 
4 
(1.67) 
14 
(1.89) 
8 
(1.76) 
4 
(1.59) 
12 
(1.7) 
Jeju 1 (0.23) 
0 
(0) 
1 
(0.14) 
2 
(0.42) 
0 
(0) 
2 
(0.28) 
2 
(0.41) 
0 
(0) 
2 
(0.26) 
2 
(0.4) 
1 
(0.42) 
3 
(0.41) 
1 
(0.22) 
2 
(0.8) 
3 
(0.42) 
Pyeongan 13 (2.96) 
1 
(0.39) 
14 
(2.01) 
14 
(2.97) 
2 
(0.79) 
16 
(2.2) 
17 
(3.46) 
1 
(0.38) 
18 
(2.38) 
15 
(3) 
3 
(1.26) 
18 
(2.44) 
13 
(2.86) 
2 
(0.8) 
15 
(2.12) 
HamGyeong 8 (1.82) 
6 
(2.33) 
14 
(2.01) 
9 
(1.91) 
2 
(0.79) 
11 
(1.52) 
9 
(1.83) 
2 
(0.75) 
11 
(1.45) 
10 
(2) 
1 
(0.42) 
11 
(1.49) 
4 
(0.88) 
1 
(0.4) 
5 
(0.71) 
Hwanghae 16 (3.64) 
0 
(0) 
16 
(2.3) 
15 
(3.18) 
1 
(0.39) 
16 
(2.2) 
14 
(2.85) 
1 
(0.38) 
15 
(1.98) 
12 
(2.4) 
0 
(0) 
12 
(1.62) 
12 
(2.64) 
2 
(0.8) 
14 
(1.98) 
Others 2 (0.46) 
2 
(0.78) 
4 
(0.57) 
3 
(0.64) 
2 
(0.79) 
5 
(0.69) 
5 
(1.02) 
1 
(0.38) 
6 
(0.79) 
7 
(1.4) 
1 
(0.42) 
8 
(1.08) 
6 
(1.32) 
1 
(0.4) 
7 
(0.99) 
Sub total 40 (9.11) 
9 
(3.49) 
49 
(7.03) 
43 
(9.11) 
7 
(2.76) 
50 
(6.89) 
47 
(9.57) 
5 
(1.88) 
52 
(6.87) 
46 
(9.2) 
6 
(2.51) 
52 
(7.04) 
36 
(7.91) 
8 
(3.19) 
44 
(6.23) 
Total 439 (62.98) 
258 
(37.02) 
697 
(11.01)
472 
(65.01)
254 
(34.99) 
726 
(11.46)
491 
(64.86)
266 
(35.14) 
757 
(11.95)
500 
(67.66)
239 
(32.34) 
739 
(11.67)
455 
(64.45) 
251 
(35.55) 
706 
(11.15) 
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(Table VI-4 continued) 
2000 2001 2002 2003 Total 
 
Owner Professional Sub total Owner Professional Sub total Owner Professional Sub total Owner Professional Sub total Owner Professional Total 
Seoul 138 (31.72) 
60 
(22.73) 
198 
(28.33)
141 
(33.73)
65 
(24.62) 
206 
(30.21)
133 
(34.28)
71 
(25.91) 
204 
(30.82)
137 
(35.04)
64 
(23.36) 
201 
(30.23)
1235 
(30.96)
667 
(28.46) 
1902 
(30.03) 
Incheon 8 (1.84) 
1 
(0.38) 
9 
(1.29) 
8 
(1.91)
1 
(0.38) 
9 
(1.32) 
8 
(2.06) 
1 
(0.36) 
9 
(1.36) 
9 
(2.3) 
2 
(0.73) 
11 
(1.65) 
84 
(2.11) 
14 
(0.6) 
98 
(1.55) 
Gyeonggi 23 (5.29) 
17 
(6.44) 
40 
(5.72) 
22 
(5.26)
16 
(6.06) 
38 
(5.57) 
22 
(5.67) 
19 
(6.93) 
41 
(6.19) 
21 
(5.37) 
16 
(5.84) 
37 
(5.56) 
204 
(5.11) 
126 
(5.38) 
330 
(5.21) 
Sub total 169 (38.85) 
78 
(29.55) 
247 
(35.34)
171 
(40.91)
82 
(31.06) 
253 
(37.1) 
163 
(42.01)
91 
(33.21) 
254 
(38.37)
167 
(42.71)
82 
(29.93) 
249 
(37.44)
1523 
(38.18)
807 
(34.43) 
2330 
(36.79) 
Daegu 28 (6.44) 
7 
(2.65) 
35 
(5.01) 
25 
(5.98)
7 
(2.65) 
32 
(4.69) 
21 
(5.41) 
8 
(2.92) 
29 
(4.38) 
22 
(5.63) 
9 
(3.28) 
31 
(4.66) 
235 
(5.89) 
86 
(3.67) 
321 
(5.07) 
Busan 35 (8.05) 
14 
(5.3) 
49 
(7.01) 
36 
(8.61)
12 
(4.55) 
48 
(7.04) 
36 
(9.28) 
16 
(5.84) 
52 
(7.85) 
38 
(9.72) 
19 
(6.93) 
57 
(8.57) 
320 
(8.02) 
114 
(4.86) 
434 
(6.85) 
Ulsan 4 (0.92) 
2 
(0.76) 
6 
(0.86) 
3 
(0.72)
2 
(0.76) 
5 
(0.73) 
3 
(0.77) 
2 
(0.73) 
5 
(0.76) 
2 
(0.51) 
2 
(0.73) 
4 
(0.6) 
32 
(0.8) 
24 
(1.02) 
56 
(0.88) 
Gyeongnam 47 (10.8) 
41 
(15.53) 
88 
(12.59)
45 
(10.77)
34 
(12.88) 
79 
(11.58)
41 
(10.57)
30 
(10.95) 
71 
(10.73)
43 
(11) 
36 
(13.14) 
79 
(11.88)
441 
(11.06)
339 
(14.46) 
780 
(12.32) 
Yeong
Nam
Gyeongbuk 44 (10.11) 
29 
(10.98) 
73 
(10.44)
39 
(9.33)
25 
(9.47) 
64 
(9.38) 
37 
(9.54) 
29 
(10.58) 
66 
(9.97) 
36 
(9.21) 
27 
(9.85) 
63 
(9.47) 
402 
(10.08)
252 
(10.75) 
654 
(10.33) 
Sub total 158 (36.32) 
93 
(35.23) 
251 
(35.91)
148 
(35.41)
80 
(30.3) 
228 
(33.43)
138 
(35.57)
85 
(31.02) 
223 
(33.69)
141 
(36.06)
93 
(33.94) 
234 
(35.19)
1430 
(35.85)
815 
(34.77) 
2245 
(35.45) 
Gwangju 7 (1.61) 
5 
(1.89) 
12 
(1.72) 
7 
(1.67)
6 
(2.27) 
13 
(1.91) 
7 
(1.8) 
5 
(1.82) 
12 
(1.81) 
8 
(2.05) 
7 
(2.55) 
15 
(2.26) 
62 
(1.55) 
42 
(1.79) 
104 
(1.64) 
 Jeonnam 11 (2.53) 
23 
(8.71) 
34 
(4.86) 
11 
(2.63)
21 
(7.95) 
32 
(4.69) 
8 
(2.06) 
19 
(6.93) 
27 
(4.08) 
7 
(1.79) 
17 
(6.2) 
24 
(3.61) 
128 
(3.21) 
141 
(6.02) 
269 
(4.25) 
Ho
Nam
Jeonbuk 15 (3.45) 
17 
(6.44) 
32 
(4.58) 
15 
(3.59)
19 
(7.2) 
34 
(4.99) 
10 
(2.58) 
23 
(8.39) 
33 
(4.98) 
11 
(2.81) 
19 
(6.93) 
30 
(4.51) 
130 
(3.26) 
138 
(5.89) 
268 
(4.23) 
   Sub total 33 (7.59) 
45 
(17.05) 
78 
(11.16)
33 
(7.89)
46 
(17.42) 
79 
(11.58)
25 
(6.44) 
47 
(17.15) 
72 
(10.88)
26 
(6.65) 
43 
(15.69) 
69 
(10.38)
320 
(8.02) 
321 
(13.69) 
641 
(10.12) 
 69
2000 2001 2002 2003 Total 
 
Owner Professional Sub total Owner Professional Sub total Owner Professional Sub total Owner Professional Sub total Owner Professional Total 
Daejeon 3 (0.69) 
2 
(0.76) 
5 
(0.72) 
3 
(0.72)
1 
(0.38) 
4 
(0.59) 
3 
(0.77) 
0 
(0) 
3 
(0.45) 
3 
(0.77) 
0 
(0) 
3 
(0.45) 
39 
(0.98) 
5 
(0.21) 
44 
(0.69) 
Chungnam 22 (5.06) 
25 
(9.47) 
47 
(6.72) 
18 
(4.31)
24 
(9.09) 
42 
(6.16) 
17 
(4.38) 
24 
(8.76) 
41 
(6.19) 
14 
(3.58) 
22 
(8.03) 
36 
(5.41) 
191 
(4.79) 
183 
(7.81) 
374 
(5.91) 
Chung
Cheong
Chungbuk 6 (1.38) 
8 
(3.03) 
14 
(2) 
5 
(1.2)
12 
(4.55) 
17 
(2.49) 
6 
(1.55) 
8 
(2.92) 
14 
(2.11) 
6 
(1.53) 
12 
(4.38) 
18 
(2.71) 
62 
(1.55) 
85 
(3.63) 
147 
(2.32) 
Sub total 31 (7.13) 
35 
(13.26) 
66 
(9.44) 
26 
(6.22)
37 
(14.02) 
63 
(9.24) 
26 
(6.7) 
32 
(11.68) 
58 
(8.76) 
23 
(5.88) 
34 
(12.41) 
57 
(8.57) 
292 
(7.32) 
273 
(11.65) 
565 
(8.92) 
Gangwon 8 (1.84) 
4 
(1.52) 
12 
(1.72) 
9 
(2.15)
5 
(1.89) 
14 
(2.05) 
10 
(2.58) 
8 
(2.92) 
18 
(2.72) 
12 
(3.07) 
10 
(3.65) 
22 
(3.31) 
97 
(2.43) 
47 
(2.01) 
144 
(2.27) 
Jeju 1 (0.23) 
1 
(0.38) 
2 
(0.29) 
1 
(0.24)
3 
(1.14) 
4 
(0.59) 
1 
(0.26) 
3 
(1.09) 
4 
(0.6) 
1 
(0.26) 
3 
(1.09) 
4 
(0.6) 
12 
(0.3) 
13 
(0.55) 
25 
(0.39) 
Pyeongan 14 (3.22) 
1 
(0.38) 
15 
(2.15) 
12 
(2.87)
2 
(0.76) 
14 
(2.05) 
10 
(2.58) 
1 
(0.36) 
11 
(1.66) 
9 
(2.3) 
0 
(0) 
9 
(1.35) 
117 
(2.93) 
13 
(0.55) 
130 
(2.05) 
Hamgyeong 4 (0.92) 
1 
(0.38) 
5 
(0.72) 
2 
(0.48)
0 
(0) 
2 
(0.29) 
2 
(0.52) 
1 
(0.36) 
3 
(0.45) 
2 
(0.51) 
1 
(0.36) 
3 
(0.45) 
50 
(1.25) 
15 
(0.64) 
65 
(1.03) 
Hwanghae 11 (2.53) 
2 
(0.76) 
13 
(1.86) 
11 
(2.63)
2 
(0.76) 
13 
(1.91) 
9 
(2.32) 
1 
(0.36) 
10 
(1.51) 
6 
(1.53) 
2 
(0.73) 
8 
(1.2) 
106 
(2.66) 
11 
(0.47) 
117 
(1.85) 
Others 6 (1.38) 
4 
(1.52) 
10 
(1.43) 
5 
(1.2)
7 
(2.65) 
12 
(1.76) 
4 
(1.03) 
5 
(1.82) 
9 
(1.36) 
4 
(1.02) 
6 
(2.19) 
10 
(1.5) 
42 
(1.05) 
29 
(1.24) 
71 
(1.12) 
Sub total 36 (8.28) 
9 
(3.41) 
45 
(6.44) 
31 
(7.42)
14 
(5.3) 
45 
(6.6) 
26 
(6.7) 
11 
(4.01) 
37 
(5.59) 
22 
(5.63) 
12 
(4.38) 
34 
(5.11) 
327 
(8.2) 
81 
(3.46) 
408 
(6.44) 
Total 435 (62.23) 
264 
(37.77) 
699 
(11.04)
418 
(61.29)
264 
(38.71) 
682 
(10.77)
388 
(58.61)
274 
(41.39) 
662 
(10.45)
391 
(58.80)
274 
(41.20) 
665 
(10.50)
3989 
(62.99)
2344 
(37.01) 
6333 
(100.00) 
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<Table VI-5> Regional Origin of CEOs by Industry 
 
  Seoul Gyeonggi Yeongnam Honam Chungcheong Gangwon Others Total 
1995 162 (33.96) 
178 
(37.32) 
44 
(9.22) 
38 
(7.97) 
12 
(2.52) 
43 
(9.01) 
477 
(7.54)
1996 169 (34.00) 
190 
(38.23) 
44 
(8.85) 
41 
(8.25) 
11 
(2.21) 
42 
(8.45) 
497 
(7.86)
1997 182 (35.41) 
187 
(36.38) 
52 
(10.12) 
44 
(8.56) 
7 
(1.36) 
42 
(8.17) 
514 
(8.13)
1998 178 (35.04) 
188 
(37.01) 
52 
(10.24) 
43 
(8.46) 
4 
(0.79) 
43 
(8.46) 
508 
(8.03)
1999 180 (36.07) 
175 
(35.07) 
54 
(10.82) 
45 
(9.02) 
6 
(1.20) 
39 
(7.82) 
499 
(7.89)
2000 174 (35.08) 
174 
(35.08) 
52 
(10.48) 
49 
(9.88) 
8 
(1.61) 
39 
(7.86) 
496 
(7.84)
2001 188 (38.37) 
159 
(32.45) 
51 
(10.41) 
46 
(9.39) 
10 
(2.04) 
36 
(7.35) 
490 
(7.75)
2002 183 (38.69) 
152 
(32.14) 
48 
(10.15) 
43 
(9.09) 
15 
(3.17) 
32 
(6.77) 
473 
(7.48)
Manufacturing 
2003 180 (37.58) 
166 
(34.66) 
45 
(9.39) 
40 
(8.35) 
18 
(3.76) 
30 
(6.26) 
479 
(7.58)
1995 24 (48.00) 
9 
(18.00) 
3 
(6.00) 
8 
(16.00) 
2 
(4.00) 
4 
(8.00) 
50 
(0.79)
1996 25 (49.02) 
12 
(23.53) 
2 
(3.92) 
7 
(13.73) 
2 
(3.92) 
3 
(5.88) 
51 
(0.81)
1997 26 (50.00) 
13 
(25.00) 
2 
(3.85) 
6 
(11.54) 
2 
(3.85) 
3 
(5.77) 
52 
(0.82)
1998 25 (49.02) 
11 
(21.57) 
4 
(7.84) 
6 
(11.76) 
3 
(5.88) 
2 
(3.92) 
51 
(0.81)
1999 22 (45.83) 
14 
(29.17) 
4 
(8.33) 
4 
(8.33) 
4 
(8.33) 
0 
0.00 
48 
(0.76)
2000 22 (46.81) 
13 
(27.66) 
5 
(10.64) 
4 
(8.51) 
3 
(6.38) 
0 
0.00 
47 
(0.74)
2001 20 (48.78) 
12 
(29.27) 
4 
(9.76) 
3 
(7.32) 
2 
(4.88) 
0 
0.00 
41 
(0.65)
2002 20 (50.00) 
10 
(25.00) 
4 
(10.00) 
4 
(10.00) 
2 
(5.00) 
0 
0.00 
40 
(0.63)
Construction 
2003 15 (41.67) 
9 
(25.00) 
4 
(11.11) 
5 
(13.89) 
2 
(5.56) 
1 
(2.78) 
36 
(0.57)
1995 31 (40.26) 
32 
(41.56) 
5 
(6.49) 
4 
(5.19) 
3 
(3.90) 
2 
(2.60) 
77 
(1.22)
1996 33 (40.74) 
32 
(39.51) 
5 
(6.17) 
5 
(6.17) 
4 
(4.94) 
2 
(2.47) 
81 
(1.28)
1997 34 (40.96) 
36 
(43.37) 
6 
(7.23) 
3 
(3.61) 
2 
(2.41) 
2 
(2.41) 
83 
(1.31)
1998 31 (35.23) 
36 
(40.91) 
7 
(7.95) 
7 
(7.95) 
5 
(5.68) 
2 
(2.27) 
88 
(1.39)
1999 28 (34.57) 
36 
(44.44) 
6 
(7.41) 
7 
(8.64) 
2 
(2.47) 
2 
(2.47) 
81 
(1.28)
2000 28 (33.73) 
38 
(45.78) 
7 
(8.43) 
8 
(9.64) 
1 
(1.20) 
1 
(1.20) 
83 
(1.31)
Transportation 
Wholesale & 
Retail 
2001 31 (37.35) 
35 
(42.17) 
7 
(8.43) 
8 
(9.64) 
1 
(1.20) 
1 
(1.20) 
83 
(1.31)
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2002 35 (41.67) 
35 
(41.67) 
6 
(7.14) 
6 
(7.14) 
1 
(1.19) 
1 
(1.19) 
84 
(1.33)
2003 40 (44.94) 
34 
(38.20) 
5 
(5.62) 
8 
(8.99) 
2 
(2.25) 
0 
0.00 
89 
(1.41)
1995 36 (38.71) 
34 
(36.56) 
12 
(12.90) 
9 
(9.68) 
2 
(2.15) 
0 
0.00 
93 
(1.47)
1996 37 (38.14) 
35 
(36.08) 
11 
(11.34) 
9 
(9.28) 
2 
(2.06) 
3 
(3.09) 
97 
(1.53)
1997 41 (38.68) 
37 
(34.91) 
7 
(6.60) 
14 
(13.21) 
3 
(2.83) 
4 
(3.77) 
106 
(1.68)
1998 37 (40.22) 
28 
(30.43) 
8 
(8.70) 
12 
(13.04) 
2 
(2.17) 
5 
(5.43) 
92 
(1.46)
1999 26 (33.77) 
26 
(33.77) 
14 
(18.18) 
9 
(11.69) 
0 
0.00 
2 
(2.60) 
77 
(1.22)
2000 23 (31.94) 
26 
(36.11) 
14 
(19.44) 
5 
(6.94) 
0 
0.00 
4 
(5.56) 
72 
(1.14)
2001 14 (20.90) 
22 
(32.84) 
17 
(25.37) 
7 
(10.45) 
1 
(1.49) 
6 
(8.96) 
67 
(1.06)
2002 16 (25.00) 
26 
(40.63) 
14 
(21.88) 
5 
(7.81) 
0 
0.00 
3 
(4.69) 
64 
(1.01)
Financial 
 
2003 14 25 11 4 0 3 57 
   Total  2,330 (36.85) 
2,245 
(35.51) 
636 
(10.06) 
566 
(8.95) 
144 
(2.28) 
402 
(6.36) 
6,323 
(100.00)
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<Table VI-6> Educational Background of CEOs 
 
 Doctorate Masters Bachelors High School or Under Total 
Owner 42 (9.57) 
149 
(33.94) 
195 
(44.42) 
53 
(12.07) 
439 
(62.80) 
1995 
Professional 14  (5.38) 
58 
(22.31) 
185 
(71.15) 
3 
(1.15) 
260 
(37.20) 
Sub total 56 (8.01) 
207 
(29.61) 
380 
(54.36) 
56 
(8.01) 
699 
(10.97) 
Owner 40 (8.47) 
173 
(36.65) 
203 
(43.01) 
56 
(11.86) 
472 
(64.75) 
1996 
Professional 11 (4.28) 
56 
(21.79) 
187 
(72.76) 
3 
(1.17) 
257 
(35.25) 
Sub total 51 (7.68) 
229 
(34.49) 
390 
(58.73) 
59 
(8.89) 
729 
(11.44) 
Owner 40 (8.15) 
185 
(37.68) 
218 
(44.40) 
48 
(9.78) 
491 
(64.44) 
1997 
Professional 15 (5.54) 
67 
(24.72) 
186 
(68.63) 
3 
(1.11) 
271 
(35.56) 
Sub total 55 (7.22) 
252 
(33.07) 
404 
(53.02) 
51 
(6.69) 
762 
(11.96) 
Owner 41 (8.20) 
186 
(37.20) 
233 
(46.60) 
40 
(8.00) 
500 
(67.39) 
1998 
Professional 10 (4.13) 
59 
(24.38) 
170 
(70.25) 
3 
(1.24) 
242 
(32.61) 
Sub total 51 (6.87) 
245 
(33.02) 
403 
(54.31) 
43 
(5.80) 
742 
(11.64) 
Owner 37 (8.13) 
179 
(39.34) 
215 
(47.25) 
24 
(5.27) 
455 
(64.36) 
1999 
Professional 7 (2.78) 
62 
(24.60) 
177 
(70.24) 
6 
(2.38) 
252 
(35.64) 
Sub total 44 (6.22) 
241 
(34.09) 
392 
(55.45) 
30 
(4.24) 
707 
(11.09) 
Owner 35 (8.05) 
178 
(40.92) 
209 
(48.05) 
13 
(2.99) 
435 
(61.97) 
2000 
Professional 9 (3.37) 
66 
(24.72) 
189 
(70.79) 
3 
(1.12) 
267 
(38.03) 
Sub total 44 (6.27) 
244 
(34.76) 
398 
(56.70) 
16 
(2.28) 
702 
(11.02) 
Owner 41 (9.81) 
171 
(40.91) 
201 
(48.09) 
5 
(1.20) 
418 
(60.76) 
2001 
Professional 11 (2.63) 
71 
(16.99) 
185 
(44.26) 
3 
(0.72) 
270 
(39.24) 
Sub total 52 (7.56) 
242 
(35.17) 
386 
(56.10) 
8 
(1.16) 
688 
(10.80) 
Owner 36 (9.25) 
164 
(42.16) 
186 
(47.81) 
3 
(0.77) 
389 
(58.32) 
2002 
Professional 12 (4.32) 
75 
(26.98) 
191 
(68.71) 
0 
0.00 
278 
(41.68) 
Sub total 48 (7.20) 
239 
(35.83) 
377 
(56.52) 
3 
(0.45) 
667 
(10.47) 
 73
Owner 33 (8.40) 
164 
(41.73) 
191 
(48.60) 
5 
(1.27) 
393 
(58.05) 
2003 
Professional 9 (3.17) 
67 
(23.59) 
208 
(73.24) 
0 
0.00 
284 
(41.95) 
Sub total 42 (6.20) 
231 
(34.12) 
399 
(58.94) 
5 
(0.74) 
677 
(10.62) 
Owner 345 (8.64) 
1,549 
(38.80) 
1,851 
(46.37) 
247 
(6.19) 
3,992 
(62.64) 
Total 
Professional 98 (4.12) 
581 
(24.40) 
1,678 
(70.47) 
24 
(1.01) 
2,381 
(37.36) 
Total 443 (6.95) 
2,130 
(33.42) 
3,529 
(55.37) 
271 
(4.25) 
6,373 
(100.00) 
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<Table VI-7> CEOs – High Schools (Graduated) 
 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
 
Owner Professional Subtotal Owner Professional Subtotal Owner Professional Subtotal Owner Professional Subtotal Owner Professional Subtotal 
Gyeonggi 53 (13.7) 
34 
(16.92) 
87 
(14.8) 
55 
(9.35) 
41 
(18.47) 
96 
(14.86)
58 
(12.83) 
41 
(16.02) 
99 
(13.98)
59 
(12.72)
25 
(10.78) 
84 
(12.07) 
52 
(12.35) 
26 
(10.97) 
78 
(11.85) 
Seoul 30 (7.75) 
6 
(2.99) 
36 
(6.12) 
28 
(4.76) 
6 
(2.7) 
34 
(5.26) 
32 
(7.08) 
8 
(3.13) 
40 
(5.65) 
33 
(7.11) 
11 
(4.74) 
44 
(6.32) 
27 
(6.41) 
10 
(4.22) 
37 
(5.62) 
Gyeongbok 23 (5.94) 
6 
(2.99) 
29 
(4.93) 
29 
(4.93) 
9 
(4.05) 
38 
(5.88) 
30 
(6.64) 
7 
(2.73) 
37 
(5.23) 
30 
(6.47) 
4 
(1.72) 
34 
(4.89) 
26 
(6.18) 
5 
(2.11) 
31 
(4.71) 
 Gyeongnam 7 (1.81) 
9 
(4.48) 
16 
(2.72) 
8 
(1.36) 
17 
(7.66) 
25 
(3.87) 
8 
(1.77) 
14 
(5.47) 
22 
(3.11) 
13 
(2.8) 
11 
(4.74) 
24 
(3.45) 
11 
(2.61) 
8 
(3.38) 
19 
(2.89) 
Joongang 12 (3.1) 
3 
(1.49) 
15 
(2.55) 
23 
(3.91) 
4 
(1.8) 
17 
(2.63) 
15 
(3.32) 
6 
(2.34) 
21 
(2.97) 
18 
(3.88) 
5 
(2.16) 
23 
(3.3) 
19 
(4.51) 
2 
(0.84) 
21 
(3.19) 
Yongsan 14 (3.62) 
1 
(0.5) 
15 
(2.55) 
15 
(2.55) 
3 
(1.35) 
18 
(2.79) 
17 
(3.76) 
2 
(0.78) 
19 
(2.68) 
14 
(3.02) 
2 
(0.86) 
16 
(2.3) 
14 
(3.33) 
4 
(1.69) 
18 
(2.74) 
Gyeongbuk 6 (1.55) 
9 
(4.48) 
15 
(2.55) 
8 
(1.36) 
12 
(5.41) 
20 
(3.1) 
9 
(1.99) 
13 
(5.08) 
22 
(3.11) 
12 
(2.59) 
8 
(3.45) 
20 
(2.87) 
11 
(2.61) 
5 
(2.11) 
16 
(2.43) 
Bosung 7 (1.81) 
5 
(2.49) 
12 
(2.04) 
8 
(1.36) 
5 
(2.25) 
13 
(2.01) 
12 
(2.65) 
5 
(1.95) 
17 
(2.4) 
12 
(2.59) 
6 
(2.59) 
18 
(2.59) 
10 
(2.38) 
3 
(1.27) 
13 
(1.98) 
Busan 5 (1.29) 
4 
(1.99) 
9 
(1.53) 
6 
(1.02) 
7 
(3.15) 
13 
(2.01) 
8 
(1.77) 
6 
(2.34) 
14 
(1.98) 
8 
(1.72) 
5 
(2.16) 
13 
(1.87) 
7 
(1.66) 
5 
(2.11) 
12 
(1.82) 
Seoul 
sadaebugo 
4 
(1.03) 
4 
(1.99) 
8 
(1.36) 
8 
(1.36) 
5 
(2.25) 
13 
(2.01) 
7 
(1.55) 
6 
(2.34) 
13 
(1.84) 
6 
(1.29) 
7 
(3.02) 
13 
(1.87) 
6 
(1.43) 
4 
(1.69) 
10 
(1.52) 
Jeonju 2 (0.52) 
2 
(1) 
4 
(0.68) 
2 
(0.34) 
2 
(0.9) 
4 
(0.62) 
3 
(0.66) 
6 
(2.34) 
9 
(1.27) 
5 
(1.08) 
7 
(3.02) 
12 
(1.72) 
4 
(0.95) 
8 
(3.38) 
12 
(1.82) 
Daejeon 5 (1.29) 
2 
(1) 
7 
(1.19) 
5 
(0.85) 
4 
(1.8) 
9 
(1.39) 
5 
(1.11) 
5 
(1.95) 
10 
(1.41) 
5 
(1.08) 
7 
(3.02) 
12 
(1.72) 
5 
(1.19) 
5 
(2.11) 
10 
(1.52) 
Dongsung 9 (2.33) 
1 
(0.5) 
10 
(1.7) 
11 
(1.87) 
0 
(0) 
11 
(1.7) 
9 
(1.99) 
1 
(0.39) 
10 
(1.41) 
9 
(1.94) 
2 
(0.86) 
11 
(1.58) 
8 
(1.9) 
1 
(0.42) 
9 
(1.37) 
Gwangjujeil 2 (0.52) 
2 
(1) 
4 
(0.68) 
1 
(0.17) 
3 
(1.35) 
4 
(0.62) 
1 
(0.22) 
4 
(1.56) 
5 
(0.71) 
2 
(0.43) 
7 
(3.02) 
9 
(1.29) 
2 
(0.48) 
10 
(4.22) 
12 
(1.82) 
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1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
 
Owner Professional Subtotal Owner Professional Subtotal Owner Professional Subtotal Owner Professional Subtotal Owner Professional Subtotal 
Jinju 3 (0.78) 
3 
(1.49) 
6 
(1.02) 
4 
(0.68) 
3 
(1.35) 
7 
(1.08) 
6 
(1.33) 
3 
(1.17) 
9 
(1.27) 
4 
(0.86) 
5 
(2.16) 
9 
(1.29) 
4 
(0.95) 
5 
(2.11) 
9 
(1.37) 
Gyeongdong 1 (0.26) 
5 
(2.49) 
6 
(1.02) 
1 
(0.17) 
5 
(2.25) 
6 
(0.93) 
3 
(0.66) 
5 
(1.95) 
8 
(1.13) 
2 
(0.43) 
3 
(1.29) 
5 
(0.72) 
3 
(0.71) 
10 
(4.22) 
13 
(1.98) 
Gwangju 1 (0.26) 
2 
(1) 
3 
(0.51) 
4 
(0.68) 
2 
(0.9) 
6 
(0.93) 
4 
(0.88) 
3 
(1.17) 
7 
(0.99) 
4 
(0.86) 
4 
(1.72) 
8 
(1.15) 
4 
(0.95) 
7 
(2.95) 
11 
(1.67) 
Daegusango 5 (1.29) 
6 
(2.99) 
11 
(1.87) 
7 
(1.19) 
5 
(2.25) 
12 
(1.86) 
6 
(1.33) 
7 
(2.73) 
13 
(1.84) 
6 
(1.29) 
3 
(1.29) 
9 
(1.29) 
6 
(1.43) 
3 
(1.27) 
9 
(1.37) 
Gyeongbuk 
sadaebugo 
4 
(1.03) 
4 
(1.99) 
8 
(1.36) 
3 
(0.51) 
3 
(1.35) 
6 
(0.93) 
3 
(0.66) 
4 
(1.56) 
7 
(0.99) 
5 
(1.08) 
4 
(1.72) 
9 
(1.29) 
3 
(0.71) 
6 
(2.53) 
9 
(1.37) 
Busansanggo 7 (1.81) 
2 
(1) 
9 
(1.53) 
5 
(0.85) 
2 
(0.9) 
7 
(1.08) 
4 
(0.88) 
4 
(1.56) 
8 
(1.13) 
4 
(0.86) 
6 
(2.59) 
10 
(1.44) 
4 
(0.95) 
5 
(2.11) 
9 
(1.37) 
Masan 3 (0.78) 
2 
(1) 
5 
(0.85) 
3 
(0.51) 
2 
(0.9) 
5 
(0.77) 
3 
(0.66) 
6 
(2.34) 
9 
(1.27) 
3 
(0.65) 
2 
(0.86) 
5 
(0.72) 
5 
(1.19) 
4 
(1.69) 
9 
(1.37) 
Dongrae 2 (0.52) 
1 
(0.5) 
3 
(0.51) 
4 
(0.68) 
2 
(0.9) 
6 
(0.93) 
6 
(1.33) 
3 
(1.17) 
9 
(1.27) 
7 
(1.51) 
1 
(0.43) 
8 
(1.15) 
7 
(1.66) 
1 
(0.42) 
8 
(1.22) 
Joongdong 4 (1.03) 
0 
(0) 
4 
(0.68) 
5 
(0.85) 
0 
(0) 
5 
(0.77) 
4 
(0.88) 
1 
(0.39) 
5 
(0.71) 
5 
(1.08) 
0 
(0) 
5 
(0.72) 
5 
(1.19) 
0 
(0) 
5 
(0.76) 
Baejae 1 (0.26) 
1 
(0.5) 
2 
(0.34) 
2 
(0.34) 
0 
(0) 
2 
(0.31) 
2 
(0.44) 
2 
(0.78) 
4 
(0.56) 
4 
(0.86) 
3 
(1.29) 
7 
(1.01) 
6 
(1.43) 
1 
(0.42) 
7 
(1.06) 
Seonlinsanggo 2 (0.52) 
4 
(1.99) 
6 
(1.02) 
2 
(0.34) 
4 
(1.8) 
6 
(0.93) 
4 
(0.88) 
3 
(1.17) 
7 
(0.99) 
3 
(0.65) 
3 
(1.29) 
6 
(0.86) 
3 
(0.71) 
3 
(1.27) 
6 
(0.91) 
Shinil 1 (0.26) 
0 
(0) 
1 
(0.17) 
5 
(0.85) 
0 
(0) 
5 
(0.77) 
5 
(1.11) 
0 
(0) 
5 
(0.71) 
6 
(1.29) 
0 
(0) 
6 
(0.86) 
5 
(1.19) 
0 
(0) 
5 
(0.76) 
Masansanggo 2 (0.52) 
3 
(1.49) 
5 
(0.85) 
2 
(0.34) 
2 
(0.9) 
4 
(0.62) 
3 
(0.66) 
4 
(1.56) 
7 
(0.99) 
3 
(0.65) 
6 
(2.59) 
9 
(1.29) 
3 
(0.71) 
5 
(2.11) 
8 
(1.22) 
Yangjeong 3 (0.78) 
2 
(1) 
5 
(0.85) 
3 
(0.51) 
3 
(1.35) 
6 
(0.93) 
3 
(0.66) 
3 
(1.17) 
6 
(0.85) 
4 
(0.86) 
1 
(0.43) 
5 
(0.72) 
4 
(0.95) 
1 
(0.42) 
5 
(0.76) 
Gyeonggi 
Gonggo 
5 
(1.29) 
1 
(0.5) 
6 
(1.02) 
4 
(0.68) 
1 
(0.45) 
5 
(0.77) 
3 
(0.66) 
1 
(0.39) 
4 
(0.56) 
3 
(0.65) 
3 
(1.29) 
6 
(0.86) 
3 
(0.71) 
4 
(1.69) 
7 
(1.06) 
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1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
 
Owner Professional Subtotal Owner Professional Subtotal Owner Professional Subtotal Owner Professional Subtotal Owner Professional Subtotal 
Hwimun 2 (0.52) 
2 
(1) 
4 
(0.68) 
2 
(0.34) 
1 
(0.45) 
3 
(0.46) 
2 
(0.44) 
1 
(0.39) 
3 
(0.42) 
3 
(0.65) 
2 
(0.86) 
5 
(0.72) 
4 
(0.95) 
2 
(0.84) 
6 
(0.91) 
Sub total 225 (58.14) 
126 
(62.69) 
351 
(59.69) 
263 
(44.73)
153 
(68.92) 
406 
(62.85)
275 
(60.84) 
174 
(67.97) 
449 
(63.42)
292 
(62.93)
153 
(65.95) 
445 
(63.94) 
271 
(64.37) 
153 
(64.56) 
424 
(64.44) 
Others 162 (41.86) 
75 
(37.31) 
237 
(40.31) 
161 
(27.38)
69 
(31.08) 
240 
(37.15)
177 
(39.16) 
82 
(32.03) 
259 
(36.58)
172 
(37.07)
79 
(34.05) 
251 
(36.06) 
150 
(35.63) 
84 
(35.44) 
234 
(35.56) 
Total 387 (65.82) 
201 
(34.18) 
588 
(10.11) 
424 
(65.63)
222 
(34.37) 
646 
(11.11)
452 
(63.84) 
256 
(36.16) 
708 
(12.18)
464 
(66.67)
232 
(33.33) 
696 
(11.97) 
421 
(63.98) 
237 
(36.02) 
658 
(11.32) 
 
(Table VI-7 continued) 
2000 2001 2002 2003 Total 
 
Owner Professional Subtotal Owner Professional Subtotal Owner Professional Subtotal Owner Professional Subtotal Owner Professional Subtotal 
Gyeonggi 48 
(11.94) 
29 
(11.69) 
77 
(11.85) 
51 
(13.11) 
29 
(11.79) 
80 
(12.6) 
51 
(14.17)
31 
(12.25) 
82 
(13.38) 
52 
(14.29) 
28 
(10.94) 
80 
(12.9) 
479 
(13.08)
284 
(13.2) 
763 
(13.12) 
Seoul 30 
(7.46) 
14 
(5.65) 
44 
(6.77) 
29 
(7.46) 
10 
(4.07) 
39 
(6.14) 
23 
(6.39) 
13 
(5.14) 
36 
(5.87) 
21 
(5.77) 
13 
(5.08) 
34 
(5.48) 
253 
(6.91) 
91 
(4.23) 
344 
(5.92) 
Gyeongbok 25 
(6.22) 
6 
(2.42) 
31 
(4.77) 
26 
(6.68) 
5 
(2.03) 
31 
(4.88) 
26 
(7.22) 
11 
(4.35) 
37 
(6.04) 
29 
(7.97) 
14 
(5.47) 
43 
(6.94) 
244 
(6.66) 
67 
(3.11) 
311 
(5.35) 
Gyeongnam 13 
(3.23) 
10 
(4.03) 
23 
(3.54) 
11 
(2.83) 
11 
(4.47) 
22 
(3.46) 
9 
(2.5) 
8 
(3.16) 
17 
(2.77) 
11 
(3.02) 
10 
(3.91) 
21 
(3.39) 
91 
(2.48) 
98 
(4.56) 
189 
(3.25) 
Joongang 18 
(4.48) 
3 
(1.21) 
21 
(3.23) 
16 
(4.11) 
4 
(1.63) 
20 
(3.15) 
14 
(3.89) 
4 
(1.58) 
18 
(2.94) 
15 
(4.12) 
3 
(1.17) 
18 
(2.9) 
140 
(3.82) 
34 
(1.58) 
174 
(2.99) 
Yongsan 14 
(3.48) 
6 
(2.42) 
20 
(3.08) 
13 
(3.34) 
8 
(3.25) 
21 
(3.31) 
11 
(3.06) 
7 
(2.77) 
18 
(2.94) 
11 
(3.02) 
4 
(1.56) 
15 
(2.42) 
123 
(3.36) 
37 
(1.72) 
160 
(2.75) 
Gyeongbuk 10 
(2.49) 
9 
(3.63) 
19 
(2.92) 
9 
(2.31) 
7 
(2.85) 
16 
(2.52) 
7 
(1.94) 
6 
(2.37) 
13 
(2.12) 
10 
(2.75) 
5 
(1.95) 
15 
(2.42) 
82 
(2.24) 
74 
(3.44) 
156 
(2.68) 
Bosung 11 
(2.74) 
4 
(1.61) 
15 
(2.31) 
9 
(2.31) 
7 
(2.85) 
16 
(2.52) 
10 
(2.78) 
7 
(2.77) 
17 
(2.77) 
9 
(2.47) 
7 
(2.73) 
16 
(2.58) 
88 
(2.4) 
49 
(2.28) 
137 
(2.36) 
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2000 2001 2002 2003 Total 
 
Owner Professional Subtotal Owner Professional Subtotal Owner Professional Subtotal Owner Professional Subtotal Owner Professional Subtotal 
Busan 6 
(1.49) 
8 
(3.23) 
14 
(2.15) 
5 
(1.29) 
13 
(5.28) 
18 
(2.83) 
6 
(1.67) 
10 
(3.95) 
16 
(2.61) 
7 
(1.92) 
12 
(4.69) 
19 
(3.06) 
58 
(1.58) 
70 
(3.25) 
128 
(2.2) 
Seoul 
Sadaebugo 
7 
(1.74) 
4 
(1.61) 
11 
(1.69) 
7 
(1.8) 
2 
(0.81) 
9 
(1.42) 
8 
(2.22) 
1 
(0.4) 
9 
(1.47) 
9 
(2.47) 
2 
(0.78) 
11 
(1.77) 
62 
(1.69) 
35 
(1.63) 
97 
(1.67) 
Jeonju 4 
(1) 
10 
(4.03) 
14 
(2.15) 
4 
(1.03) 
10 
(4.07) 
14 
(2.2) 
2 
(0.56) 
11 
(4.35) 
13 
(2.12) 
1 
(0.27) 
10 
(3.91) 
11 
(1.77) 
27 
(0.74) 
66 
(3.07) 
93 
(1.6) 
Daejeon 5 
(1.24) 
7 
(2.82) 
12 
(1.85) 
5 
(1.29) 
7 
(2.85) 
12 
(1.89) 
4 
(1.11) 
4 
(1.58) 
8 
(1.31) 
4 
(1.1) 
1 
(0.39) 
5 
(0.81) 
43 
(1.17) 
42 
(1.95) 
85 
(1.46) 
Dongsung 8 
(1.99) 
1 
(0.4) 
9 
(1.38) 
6 
(1.54) 
0 
(0) 
6 
(0.94) 
7 
(1.94) 
1 
(0.4) 
8 
(1.31) 
6 
(1.65) 
5 
(1.95) 
11 
(1.77) 
73 
(1.99) 
12 
(0.56) 
85 
(1.46) 
Gwangjujeil 1 
(0.25) 
7 
(2.82) 
8 
(1.23) 
2 
(0.51) 
12 
(4.88) 
14 
(2.2) 
3 
(0.83) 
6 
(2.37) 
9 
(1.47) 
4 
(1.1) 
8 
(3.13) 
12 
(1.94) 
18 
(0.49) 
59 
(2.74) 
77 
(1.32) 
Jinju 5 
(1.24) 
6 
(2.42) 
11 
(1.69) 
4 
(1.03) 
4 
(1.63) 
8 
(1.26) 
2 
(0.56) 
6 
(2.37) 
8 
(1.31) 
2 
(0.55) 
8 
(3.13) 
10 
(1.61) 
34 
(0.93) 
43 
(2) 
77 
(1.32) 
Gyeongdong 3 
(0.75) 
4 
(1.61) 
7 
(1.08) 
3 
(0.77) 
6 
(2.44) 
9 
(1.42) 
3 
(0.83) 
7 
(2.77) 
10 
(1.63) 
3 
(0.82) 
9 
(3.52) 
12 
(1.94) 
22 
(0.6) 
54 
(2.51) 
76 
(1.31) 
Gwangju 5 
(1.24) 
12 
(4.84) 
17 
(2.62) 
4 
(1.03) 
8 
(3.25) 
12 
(1.89) 
3 
(0.83) 
4 
(1.58) 
7 
(1.14) 
2 
(0.55) 
3 
(1.17) 
5 
(0.81) 
31 
(0.85) 
45 
(2.09) 
76 
(1.31) 
Daegusanggo 7 
(1.74) 
1 
(0.4) 
8 
(1.23) 
3 
(0.77) 
1 
(0.41) 
4 
(0.63) 
3 
(0.83) 
1 
(0.4) 
4 
(0.65) 
3 
(0.82) 
2 
(0.78) 
5 
(0.81) 
46 
(1.26) 
29 
(1.35) 
75 
(1.29) 
Gyeongbuk 
Sadaebugo 
4 
(1) 
5 
(2.02) 
9 
(1.38) 
6 
(1.54) 
4 
(1.63) 
10 
(1.57) 
6 
(1.67) 
3 
(1.19) 
9 
(1.47) 
6 
(1.65) 
1 
(0.39) 
7 
(1.13) 
40 
(1.09) 
34 
(1.58) 
74 
(1.27) 
Busansanggo 4 
(1) 
4 
(1.61) 
8 
(1.23) 
4 
(1.03) 
3 
(1.22) 
7 
(1.1) 
3 
(0.83) 
3 
(1.19) 
6 
(0.98) 
2 
(0.55) 
4 
(1.56) 
6 
(0.97) 
37 
(1.01) 
33 
(1.53) 
70 
(1.2) 
Masan 5 
(1.24) 
4 
(1.61) 
9 
(1.38) 
5 
(1.29) 
3 
(1.22) 
8 
(1.26) 
5 
(1.39) 
1 
(0.4) 
6 
(0.98) 
5 
(1.37) 
2 
(0.78) 
7 
(1.13) 
37 
(1.01) 
26 
(1.21) 
63 
(1.08) 
Dongrae 5 
(1.24) 
3 
(1.21) 
8 
(1.23) 
5 
(1.29) 
2 
(0.81) 
7 
(1.1) 
5 
(1.39) 
2 
(0.79) 
7 
(1.14) 
5 
(1.37) 
1 
(0.39) 
6 
(0.97) 
46 
(1.26) 
16 
(0.74) 
62 
(1.07) 
Joongdong 6 
(1.49) 
2 
(0.81) 
8 
(1.23) 
5 
(1.29) 
3 
(1.22) 
8 
(1.26) 
5 
(1.39) 
4 
(1.58) 
9 
(1.47) 
5 
(1.37) 
5 
(1.95) 
10 
(1.61) 
44 
(1.2) 
15 
(0.7) 
59 
(1.01) 
 78
2000 2001 2002 2003 Total 
 
Owner Professional Subtotal Owner Professional Subtotal Owner Professional Subtotal Owner Professional Subtotal Owner Professional Subtotal 
Baejae 5 
(1.24) 
3 
(1.21) 
8 
(1.23) 
5 
(1.29) 
3 
(1.22) 
8 
(1.26) 
5 
(1.39) 
3 
(1.19) 
8 
(1.31) 
4 
(1.1) 
2 
(0.78) 
6 
(0.97) 
34 
(0.93) 
18 
(0.84) 
52 
(0.89) 
Seonlinsanggo 3 
(0.75) 
0 
(0) 
3 
(0.46) 
3 
(0.77) 
2 
(0.81) 
5 
(0.79) 
3 
(0.83) 
4 
(1.58) 
7 
(1.14) 
3 
(0.82) 
2 
(0.78) 
5 
(0.81) 
26 
(0.71) 
25 
(1.16) 
51 
(0.88) 
Shinil 6 
(1.49) 
0 
(0) 
6 
(0.92) 
6 
(1.54) 
0 
(0) 
6 
(0.94) 
7 
(1.94) 
0 
(0) 
7 
(1.14) 
9 
(2.47) 
0 
(0) 
9 
(1.45) 
50 
(1.37) 
0 
(0) 
50 
(0.86) 
Masansanggo 3 
(0.75) 
4 
(1.61) 
7 
(1.08) 
2 
(0.51) 
2 
(0.81) 
4 
(0.63) 
1 
(0.28) 
1 
(0.4) 
2 
(0.33) 
1 
(0.27) 
1 
(0.39) 
2 
(0.32) 
20 
(0.55) 
28 
(1.3) 
48 
(0.83) 
Yangjung 3 
(0.75) 
2 
(0.81) 
5 
(0.77) 
4 
(1.03) 
3 
(1.22) 
7 
(1.1) 
4 
(1.11) 
2 
(0.79) 
6 
(0.98) 
2 
(0.55) 
1 
(0.39) 
3 
(0.48) 
30 
(0.82) 
18 
(0.84) 
48 
(0.83) 
Gyeonggi 
Gonggo 
3 
(0.75) 
4 
(1.61) 
7 
(1.08) 
3 
(0.77) 
2 
(0.81) 
5 
(0.79) 
3 
(0.83) 
1 
(0.4) 
4 
(0.65) 
2 
(0.55) 
1 
(0.39) 
3 
(0.48) 
29 
(0.79) 
18 
(0.84) 
47 
(0.81) 
Hwimun 3 
(0.75) 
2 
(0.81) 
5 
(0.77) 
2 
(0.51) 
3 
(1.22) 
5 
(0.79) 
2 
(0.56) 
4 
(1.58) 
6 
(0.98) 
2 
(0.55) 
4 
(1.56) 
6 
(0.97) 
22 
(0.6) 
21 
(0.98) 
43 
(0.74) 
Subtotal 270 
(67.16) 
174 
(70.16) 
444 
(68.31) 
257 
(66.07) 
174 
(70.73) 
431 
(67.87) 
241 
(66.94)
166 
(65.61) 
407 
(66.39) 
245 
(67.31) 
168 
(65.63) 
413 
(66.61) 
2329 
(63.58)
1441 
(66.99) 
3770 
(64.84) 
Others 132 
(32.84) 
74 
(29.84) 
206 
(31.69) 
132 
(33.93) 
72 
(29.27) 
204 
(32.13) 
119 
(33.06)
87 
(34.39) 
206 
(33.61) 
119 
(32.69) 
88 
(34.38) 
207 
(33.39) 
1334 
(36.42)
710 
(33.01) 
2044 
(35.16) 
Total 402 
(61.85) 
248 
(38.15) 
650 
(11.18) 
389 
(61.26) 
246 
(38.74) 
635 
(10.92) 
360 
(58.73)
253 
(41.27) 
613 
(10.54) 
364 
(58.71) 
256 
(41.29) 
620 
(10.66) 
3663 
(63) 
2151 
(37) 
5814 
(100) 
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<Table VI-8> CEOs – Universities (Graduated) 
 
 Seoul National Yonsei Korea Hanyang U. S. Japan 
Sungkyunkwa
n Joongang Dongguk Busan Sub total Others Total 
Owner 84 (24.42) 
28 
(8.14) 
31 
(9.01) 
29 
(8.43) 
36 
(10.47) 
31 
(9.01) 
10 
(2.91) 
11 
(3.20) 
10 
(2.91) 
7 
(2.03) 
277 
(80.52) 
67 
(19.48) 
344 
(58.60) 1995
Professional 123 (50.62) 
24 
(9.88) 
17 
(7.00) 
14 
(5.76) 
5 
(2.06) 
1 
(0.41) 
6 
(2.47) 
6 
(2.47) 
6 
(2.47) 
1 
(0.41) 
203 
(83.54) 
40 
(16.46) 
243 
(41.40) 
Sub total 207 (35.26) 
52 
(8.86) 
48 
(8.18) 
43 
(7.33) 
41 
(6.98) 
32 
(5.45) 
16 
(2.73) 
17 
(2.90) 
16 
(2.73) 
8 
(1.36) 
480 
(81.77) 
107 
(18.23) 
587 
(10.37) 
Owner 93 (24.73) 
36 
(9.57) 
42 
(11.17) 
30 
(7.98) 
34 
(9.04) 
30 
(7.98) 
10 
(2.66) 
11 
(2.93) 
11 
(2.93) 
7 
(1.86) 
304 
(80.85) 
72 
(19.15) 
376 
(60.74) 1996
Professional 123 (50.62) 
21 
(8.64) 
18 
(7.41) 
16 
(6.58) 
4 
(1.65) 
2 
(0.82) 
7 
(2.88) 
8 
(3.29) 
4 
(1.65) 
3 
(1.23) 
206 
(84.77) 
37 
(15.23) 
243 
(39.26) 
Sub total 216 (34.89) 
57 
(9.21) 
60 
(9.69) 
46 
(7.43) 
38 
(6.14) 
32 
(5.17) 
17 
(2.75) 
19 
(3.07) 
15 
(2.42) 
10 
(1.62) 
510 
(82.39) 
109 
(17.61) 
619 
(10.94) 
Owner 99 (24.57) 
38 
(9.43) 
43 
(10.67) 
34 
(8.44) 
39 
(9.68) 
26 
(6.45) 
11 
(2.73) 
11 
(2.73) 
12 
(2.98) 
8 
(1.99) 
321 
(79.65) 
82 
(20.35) 
403 
(61.43) 
1997
Professional 127 (50.20) 
22 
(8.70) 
21 
(8.30) 
11 
(4.35) 
4 
(1.58) 
2 
(0.79) 
8 
(3.16) 
5 
(1.98) 
4 
(1.58) 
5 
(1.98) 
209 
(82.61) 
44 
(17.39) 
253 
(38.57) 
Sub total 226 (34.45) 
60 
(9.15) 
64 
(9.76) 
45 
(6.86) 
43 
(6.55) 
28 
(4.27) 
19 
(2.90) 
16 
(2.44) 
16 
(2.44) 
13 
(1.98) 
530 
(80.79) 
126 
(19.21) 
656 
(11.59) 
Owner 96 (22.91) 
46 
(10.98) 
40 
(9.55) 
35 
(8.35) 
40 
(9.55) 
32 
(7.64) 
16 
(3.82) 
12 
(2.86) 
14 
(3.34) 
8 
(1.91) 
339 
(80.91) 
80 
(19.09) 
419 
(64.66) 
1998
Professional 105 (45.85) 
18 
(7.86) 
17 
(7.42) 
11 
(4.80) 
5 
(2.18) 
0 
0.00 
14 
(6.11) 
5 
(2.18) 
5 
(2.18) 
8 
(3.49) 
188 
(82.10) 
41 
(17.90) 
229 
(35.34) 
Sub total 201 (31.02) 
64 
(9.88) 
57 
(8.80) 
46 
(7.10) 
45 
(6.94) 
32 
(4.94) 
30 
(4.63) 
17 
(2.62) 
19 
(2.93) 
16 
(2.47) 
527 
(81.33) 
121 
(18.67) 
648 
(11.45) 
Owner 84 (21.32) 
46 
(11.68) 
37 
(9.39) 
31 
(7.87) 
31 
(7.87) 
28 
(7.11) 
14 
(3.55) 
13 
(3.30) 
13 
(3.30) 
8 
(2.03) 
305 
(77.41) 
89 
(22.59) 
394 
(62.24) 
1999
Professional 101 (42.26) 
21 
(8.79) 
21 
(8.79) 
12 
(5.02) 
8 
(3.35) 
0 
0.00 
19 
(7.95) 
5 
(2.09) 
5 
(2.09) 
12 
(5.02) 
204 
(85.36) 
35 
(14.64) 
239 
(37.76) 
Sub total 185 (29.23) 
67 
(10.58) 
58 
(9.16) 
43 
(6.79) 
39 
(6.16) 
28 
(4.42) 
33 
(5.21) 
18 
(2.84) 
18 
(2.84) 
20 
(3.16) 
509 
(80.41) 
124 
(19.59) 
633 
(11.19) 
2000 Owner 79 (20.41) 
48 
(12.40) 
42 
(10.85) 
34 
(8.79) 
29 
(7.49) 
27 
(6.98) 
14 
(3.62) 
14 
(3.62) 
11 
(2.84) 
7 
(1.81) 
305 
(78.81) 
82 
(21.19) 
387 
(60.28) 
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 Seoul National Yonsei Korea Hanyang U. S. Japan 
Sungkyunkwa
n Joongang Dongguk Busan Sub total Others Total 
Professional 105 (41.18) 
28 
(10.98) 
28 
(10.98) 
15 
(5.88) 
11 
(4.31) 
1 
(0.39) 
12 
(4.71) 
6 
(2.35) 
4 
(1.57) 
10 
(3.92) 
220 
(86.27) 
35 
(13.73) 
255 
(39.72) 
Sub total 184 (28.66) 
76 
(11.84) 
70 
(10.90) 
49 
(7.63) 
40 
(6.23) 
28 
(4.36) 
26 
(4.05) 
20 
(3.12) 
15 
(2.34) 
17 
(2.65) 
525 
(81.78) 
117 
(18.22) 
642 
(11.34) 
Owner 81 (21.77) 
46 
(12.37) 
38 
(10.22) 
36 
(9.68) 
29 
(7.80) 
17 
(4.57) 
13 
(3.49) 
15 
(4.03) 
10 
(2.69) 
8 
(2.15) 
293 
(78.76) 
79 
(21.24) 
372 
(59.24) 
2001
Professional 103 (40.23) 
28 
(10.94) 
24 
(9.38) 
14 
(5.47) 
8 
(3.13) 
1 
(0.39) 
11 
(4.30) 
6 
(2.34) 
3 
(1.17) 
9 
(3.52) 
207 
(80.86) 
49 
(19.14) 
256 
(40.76) 
Sub total 184 (29.30) 
74 
(11.78) 
62 
(9.87) 
50 
(7.96) 
37 
(5.89) 
18 
(2.87) 
24 
(3.82) 
21 
(3.34) 
13 
(2.07) 
17 
(2.71) 
500 
(79.62) 
128 
(20.38) 
628 
(11.10) 
Owner 67 (19.14) 
45 
(12.86) 
40 
(11.43) 
36 
(10.29) 
29 
(8.29) 
15 
(4.29) 
14 
(4.00) 
15 
(4.29) 
10 
(2.86) 
7 
(2.00) 
278 
(79.43) 
72 
(20.57) 
350 
(56.82) 
2002
Professional 91 (34.21) 
33 
(12.41) 
35 
(13.16) 
16 
(6.02) 
4 
(1.50) 
2 
(0.75) 
14 
(5.26) 
6 
(2.26) 
3 
(1.13) 
10 
(3.76) 
214 
(80.45) 
52 
(19.55) 
266 
(43.18) 
Sub total 158 (25.65) 
78 
(12.66) 
75 
(12.18) 
52 
(8.44) 
33 
(5.36) 
17 
(2.76) 
28 
(4.55) 
21 
(3.41) 
13 
(2.11) 
17 
(2.76) 
492 
(79.87) 
124 
(20.13) 
616 
(10.89) 
Owner 67 (18.87) 
44 
(12.39) 
43 
(12.11) 
36 
(10.14) 
34 
(9.58) 
15 
(4.23) 
16 
(4.51) 
14 
(3.94) 
11 
(3.10) 
6 
(1.69) 
286 
(80.56) 
69 
(19.44) 
355 
(56.35) 
2003
Professional 85 (30.91) 
39 
(14.18) 
33 
(12.00) 
20 
(7.27) 
4 
(1.45) 
3 
(1.09) 
11 
(4.00) 
7 
(2.55) 
5 
(1.82) 
12 
(4.36) 
219 
(79.64) 
56 
(20.36) 
275 
(43.65) 
Sub total 152 (24.13) 
83 
(13.17) 
76 
(12.06) 
56 
(8.89) 
38 
(6.03) 
18 
(2.86) 
27 
(4.29) 
21 
(3.33) 
16 
(2.54) 
18 
(2.86) 
505 
(80.16) 
125 
(19.84) 
630 
(11.13) 
Owner 750 (22.06) 
377 
(11.09) 
356 
(10.47) 
301 
(8.85) 
301 
(8.85) 
221 
(6.50) 
118 
(3.47) 
116 
(3.41) 
102 
(3.00) 
66 
(1.94) 
2,708 
(79.65) 
692 
(20.35) 
3,400 
(60.08) Total
Professional 963 (42.63) 
234 
(10.36) 
214 
(9.47) 
129 
(5.71) 
53 
(2.35) 
12 
(0.53) 
102 
(4.52) 
54 
(2.39) 
39 
(1.73) 
70 
(3.10) 
1,870 
(82.78) 
389 
(17.22) 
2,259 
(39.92) 
Total 1,713 (30.27) 
611 
(10.80) 
570 
(10.07) 
430 
(7.60) 
354 
(6.26) 
233 
(4.12) 
220 
(3.89) 
170 
(3.00) 
141 
(2.49) 
136 
(2.40) 
4,578 
(80.90) 
1,081 
(19.10) 
5,659 
(100.00) 
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VI-4. Do CEOs’ Characteristics Make a Difference? 
 
 
 Korean CEOs’ demographic characteristics including age, educational 
background, and regional origin have so far been examined. The question that arises 
from this chapter is, “How do CEOs characteristics affect the performance of firms?” 
This section aims to briefly examine the relationship between CEOs’ demographic 
characteristics and performances. 
 As reviewed in chapter II, demographic characteristics of CEOs have been 
investigated as determinants of strategic choice as well as profitability of firms. 
While the impact of some characteristics such as age, educational background on 
performance have not been concluded definitely, experience and tenure of CEOs 
have been widely accepted to have an impact on performance (Hambrick and 
Fukutomi, 1991; Miller, 1991; Barbosa 1985). 
 CEO data for this paper include demographic characteristics such as age, 
educational background (high school, university, and major), and regional origin.  
How much do demographic characteristics represent CEOs management 
capabilities? The model to measure the impact of each characteristic on performance 
is as follows: 
 
Pit=α+ β1 Age+ β2 Regn + β3Owner + β4Maj +β5Turn + β6 MBA + β7 Univ +εit 
 
where pit is performance of firm i in year t, age is categorical dummy from 30s to 80s 
of the CEOs age, reg is the regional origin of the CEO, maj is the major of the CEO 
in university, and turn is dummy to indicate whether the CEO is an incumbent or a 
newcomer. Besides these variables, I include an MBA dummy that indicates whether 
the CEO of the firm earned an MBA degree abroad, and a university dummy that 
defines the university where the CEO graduated.  
 Table VI-37 and VI-38 present the results of a regression analysis of both 
samples, ROIC and Tobin’s q. Two characteristics including age and turnover of 
CEOs turn out to be significant in affecting performance in most ROIC sub-samples. 
In the pooled sample, the characteristics of CEOs that are defined to have an impact 
on performance are ‘age’ and ‘turnover.’ As to the age of CEOs, the performance of 
CEOs in their 30s seems to be significantly lower than for CEOs in their 40s to 70s. 
Among CEOs in this age bracket, the differences are not obvious. New CEOs are 
negatively associated with accounting data. Is this interpreted that new CEOs are 
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likely to have a negative impact on performance? It seems to be proper to interpret 
that underperforming firms are more likely to change their CEOs.  
 By sub-samples, differences among age of CEOs tend to be greater in the 
post-crisis period than the pre-crisis period. R2 of the model of the post-crisis period 
becomes greater than that of the pre-crisis period. It indicates that the CEOs 
characteristics tend to explain firms’ performance in the post-crisis period rather than 
the pre-crisis period. Turnover in CEOs is negatively associated with performance in 
both samples.  
In chaebol sample, a significant difference is seen in the major selected by 
CEOs. Those who majored in engineering at universities are likely to be more 
profitable than CEOs who majored in management and law. Unlike other samples, 
the age of CEOs does not matter. Turnover of CEOs are also negatively related with 
performance. In non-chaebol sample, age, owner, and turnover dummy variables are 
seen as significant. 
The characteristics that are statistically significant in owner sample are age, 
regional origin, university, and turnover of CEO variables. An interesting finding is 
that owner CEOs from Jeolla province are negatively associated with performance 
during the period. Owner CEOs who graduated from Sungkyunkwan University 
registered greater performance during the period. In professional CEO sample, CEOs 
from Chungcheong province and abroad (e.g. the U.S. or Europe) are likely to 
outperform CEOs from Seoul and Gyeonggi province. Turnover of CEOs association 
with performance is similar to that of other samples. 
 In Tobin’s q sample, t values of variables tend to increase compared to those 
in the ROIC sample. In pooled sample, the differences among major variables seem 
to be clear. There are several statistically significant variables including age, 
university, major, regional origin, MBA degree, owner dummy, and turnover of CEO 
dummy. For example, CEOs in their 70s are obviously associated with a low value of 
Tobin’s q. Furthermore, this tendency is seen in all Tobin’s q sub-samples but ‘the 
pre-crisis sample’ and ‘chaebol sample.’ The results are not consistent with those of 
the ROIC pooled sample.  
The results show that CEOs university majors can make a difference in 
terms of Tobin’s q. CEOs majoring in law and social studies tended to outperform 
CEOs with a major in management and economics. This interesting tendency is also 
seen in the non-chaebol and owner samples. However, in the professional sample, 
the major makes no difference. 
Compared to CEOs from Seoul and Gyeonggi province, CEOs from 
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Gyeongsang and Jeolla province tend to under perform in the pooled sample. This 
tendency is also seen in the post-crisis and non-chaebol sample. CEOs from abroad 
are negatively associated with performance in the pooled, pre-crisis, non-chaebol, 
and owner samples.  
Universities where CEOs graduated turn out to be significant in affecting 
performances in the Tobin’s q sample. Interestingly, CEOs from Korea and Yonsei 
University under perform CEOs from Seoul National University in the pooled, the 
post-crisis, non-chaebol, owner, and professional CEO samples. CEOs from local 
universities except the top five under perform CEOs from Seoul National University 
in the pooled, post-crisis, chaebol, non-chaebol, and professional CEO samples. 
The result of turnover of CEOs being positively associated with Tobin’s q is 
inconsistent with those of the ROIC sample. Turnover of CEOs is positive with the 
performance in the pooled, post-crisis, non-chaebol, owner CEO samples. CEOs who 
earned an MBA degree seem to have a negative impact on performance in the pooled, 
chaebol, and non-chaebol samples. The owner dummy also turn out to have a 
negative impact on performance in the pooled, pre-crisis, post-crisis, and non-
chaebol samples. 
The results indicate that the demographic CEO characteristics have 
limitations on representing their management capabilities. Furthermore, the fact that 
Korean CEOs tend to be homogeneous in both educational background and age also 
confines the amount of influence of CEO characteristics. The results of the two 
samples are mixed, and are not easy to properly explain the implications. This is 
consistent with the mixed results of previous studies.  
However, some intriguing findings are seen in this analysis. First, some 
characteristics including age, universities where CEOs graduated from, and regional 
origin are proved to have an important impact on performance. However, the 
directional impact on performance is inconsistent. For example, the age of CEOs 
seems to have a positive impact on performance in the ROIC sample. In the Tobin’s 
q sample, the tendency is conversed. Second, that university CEOs graduated from 
can be a predictor of performance would be interesting. In Tobin’s q sample, 
graduate CEOs from Seoul National University significantly outperform. In 
particular, the CEOs from Seoul National University record significantly better 
performance in the professional CEO sample. Third, turnover of CEOs has different 
impact depending on performance indicators. In terms of accounting data, turnover 
of CEOs has a negative impact on performance, while it has a positive impact on 
Tobin’s q. This result supports the argument of Ahn et al. (2004) that the market is 
 84
likely to immediately respond to CEO change.  
In this context, further information and various research methodologies are 
needed to explore the ‘black box’ of ‘how CEOs influence both the organization 
itself and performance’ such as a cognitive and decision-making process for strategic 
choice. Among demographic characteristics, data on the tenure and functional 
experiences of CEOs should be examined to systematically explore the ‘black box.’   
 
 
<Table VI-9> Results of Regression Analysis (ROIC sample) 
 
Variable Pooled Be-Crisis Af-Crisis Chaebol N-Chaebol Owner Professional 
Age (40s) 
7.5816*** 
(8.57) 
2.3029 
(1.96) 
8.7174*** 
(7.01) 
-0.7701 
(-0.36) 
8.025*** 
(8.09) 
5.7481*** 
(6.04) 
15.71*** 
(7.3) 
Age (50s) 
8.4341*** 
(9.75) 
2.2378 
(1.91) 
10.1624*** 
(8.46) 
-1.2127 
(-0.56) 
8.8042*** 
(9.09) 
5.5356*** 
(5.85) 
19.93*** 
(9.8) 
Age (60s) 
8.8421*** 
(9.78) 
2.9917 * 
(2.49) 
10.2267*** 
(8.34) 
-1.2198 
(-0.56) 
9.2371*** 
(9.29) 
5.9785*** 
(6.19) 
19.9718*** 
(9.64) 
Age (70s) 
8.8793*** 
(8.92) 
2.1279 
(1.62) 
10.7025*** 
(7.68) 
-1.646 
(-0.61) 
9.2646*** 
(8.43) 
6.1698*** 
(5.82) 
- 
Major 1 
8.8793*** 
(5.4) 
1.5297 
(0.7) 
12.2314*** 
(5.22) 
8.0423 
(1.22) 
9.0489*** 
(5.05) 
6.6778*** 
(4.02) 
21.011*** 
(7.94) 
Major 2 
0.384 
(0.89) 
-0.3942 
(-0.78) 
0.5063 
(0.8) 
-0.2565 
(-0.37) 
0.8239 
(1.59) 
2.2706 (0.5) 
0.6627 
(0.93) 
Major 3 
0.5595 
(1.51) 
1.5323*** 
(3.4) 
-0.136 
(-0.26) 
1.2892* 
(2.25) 
0.4868 
(1.08) 
0.5786 
(1.25) 
0.2028 
(0.93) 
Region 1 
0.37782 
(1.08) 
1.1322*** 
(2.68) 
-0.1928 
(-0.38) 
-0.1078 
(-0.18) 
0.7179 
(1.72) 
0.5986 
(1.46) 
-0.0117  
(-0.02) 
Region 2 
0.1277 
(0.41) 
0.2369 
(0.65) 
-0.056 
(-0.13) 
1.85*** 
(3.71) 
-0.3525 
(-0.95) 
-0.2749  
(-0.76) 
0.9365 
(1.64) 
Region 3 
0.9772* 
(2.06) 
1.3961** 
(2.43) 
0.7987 
(1.17) 
0.8711 
(1.21) 
0.9847 
(1.71) 
0.7472 
(1.25) 
1.7616* 
(2.25) 
Region 4 
-0.9787  
(-1.87) 
0.1996 
(0.3) 
-0.8767 
(-1.18) 
-0.3802 
(-0.48) 
-0.8063 
(-1.25) 
-1.5216*  
(-2.04) 
-0.0497  
(-0.07) 
Region 5 
0.4458 
(0.53) 
1.3966 
(1.4) 
-0.564 
(-0.48) 
2.5079** 
(2.61) 
-1.5519 
(-1.16) 
2.1364* 
(2.04) 
-1.9459  
(-1.35) 
Region 6 
1.2511 
(1.67) 
1.343 
(1.67) 
0.9449 
(0.82) 
0.8563 
(0.53) 
1.3908 
(1.64) 
1.1322 
(1.41) 
1.5639 
(0.84) 
Univ 1 
2.0719 
(1.64) 
-0.4692 
(-0.26) 
2.1629 
(1.25) 
-0.699 
(-0.45) 
3.8388* 
(2.3) 
-0.5463  
(-0.38) 
8.0542*** 
(3.14) 
Univ 2 
-0.5365  
(-1.08) 
0.9337 
(1.52) 
-0.5015 
(-0.7) 
-0.1602 
(-0.22) 
-0.9584 
(-1.53) 
-0.765  
(-1.26) 
-1.0637  
(-1.2) 
Univ 3 
-0.0774  
(-0.17) 
0.1605 
(0.27) 
-0.0322 
(-0.05) 
0.2891 
(0.43) 
-0.0575 
(-0.1) 
-0.1427  
(-0.25) 
0.0852 
(0.11) 
Univ 4 
-0.6215  
(-1.18) 
0.0117 
(0.02) 
-0.1631 
(-0.22) 
0.6344 
(0.73) 
-0.8797 
(-1.38) 
-0.4922  
(-0.79) 
-0.4626  
(-0.47) 
Univ 5 
1.2605** 
(1.78) 
2.8824*** 
(3.01) 
0.9091 
(0.92) 
-1.2933 
(-0.76) 
1.935** 
(2.43) 
2.4896*** 
(2.65) 
-0.2855  
(-0.26) 
Univ 6 
0.2913 
(0.59) 
0.7498 
(1.36) 
0.7134 
(0.95) 
0.4296 
(0.54) 
0.3885 
(0.64) 
0.1022 
(0.19) 
2.1322 
(1.51) 
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MBA Degree 
1.2296 
(0.61) 
0.9388* 
(2.09) 
0.4877 
(0.88) 
-0.2353 
(-0.37) 
0.4877 
(1.09) 
0.4187 
(0.88) 
0.0721 
(0.11) 
Owner 
0.4067 
(0.92) 
0.5259 
(0.98) 
0.2162 
(0.34) 
0.38 (0.46)
0.2257 
(0.42) 
0.7022 
(1.41) 
-0.9167  
(-0.82) 
Turnover 
0.4433 
(1.41) 
-0.4703 
(-1.2) 
0.63  
(1.4) 
-0.9897 
(-1.57) 
1.1596*** 
(2.94) 
-3.7207***  
(-6.64) 
-1.5999***  
(-3.17) 
Intercept 
-2.4824*** 
(-6.67) 
-1.6459***
(-3.61) 
-3.0717*** 
(-5.63) 
-1.2354** 
(-2.59) 
-3.0857*** 
(-6.44) 
-0.7412***  
(-0.64) 
-15.956***  
(-6.77) 
N of Obser. 4491 1416 2585 1021 3469 2991 1499 
R2 (Adj R2) 
0.0424 
(0.037) 
0.0555 
(0.0386)
0.0511 
(0.0418)
0.0499 
(0.026) 
0.0577 
(0.0508)
0.0388 
(0.03) 
0.1061 
(0.0922) 
 
 
<Table VI-10> Results of Regression Analysis (Tobin’s q sample) 
 
Variable Pooled Be-Crisis Af-Crisis Chaebol N-Chaebol Owner Professional
Age (40s) 
0.0313 
(0.99) 
0.0396 
(0.85) 
-0.015 
(-0.34) 
0.121  
(1.33) 
-0.013 
(-0.39) 
0.046  
(1.44) 
0 (0) 
Age (50s) 
0.0067 
(0.22) 
0.0091 
(0.2) 
-0.02  
(-0.48) 
0.048  
(0.53) 
-0.0298 
(-0.9) 
0.021  
(0.66) 
-0.0175 
(-0.19) 
Age (60s) 
-0.027  
(-0.88) 
0.0039 
(0.08) 
-0.0577 
(-1.37) 
0.0595 
(0.65) 
-0.077** 
(-2.3) 
-0.029  
(-0.9) 
-0.003 
(-0.04) 
Age (70s) 
-0.1015*** 
(-2.92) 
-0.051 
(-0.99) 
-0.127**  
(-2.65) 
0.1872 
(1.6) 
-0.153*** 
(-4.11) 
-0.0107***  
(-3.04) 
-0.0349 
(-0.31) 
Major 1 
0.0375* 
(2.22) 
0.0455** 
(2.01) 
0.004  
(0.16) 
-0.032 
(-0.98) 
0.0686*** 
(3.47) 
0.0782***  
(3.89) 
-0.029 
(-0.93) 
Major 2 
-0.0333*  
(-2.24) 
0  
(0.03) 
-0.0564***  
(-2.75) 
-0.091*** 
(-3.42) 
-0.001 
(-0.1) 
-0.0226  
(-1.26) 
-0.031 
(-1.15) 
Major 3 
0.0304* 
(2.15) 
0.0177 
(0.89) 
0.0193 
(0.99) 
-0.0191 
(-0.69) 
0.0483*** 
(2.97) 
0.06***  
(3.76) 
-0.0267 
(-0.92) 
Region 1 
-0.0409***  
(-3.32) 
-0.0369*** 
(-2.19) 
-0.0395*  
(-2.28) 
0.0281 
(1.21) 
-0.0605*** 
(-4.22) 
-0.06***   
(-4.3) 
0.0268 
(1.07) 
Region 2 
0  
(0.02) 
-0.0382 
(-1.4) 
0.033  
(1.23) 
0.0158 
(0.46) 
-0.0134 
(-0.58) 
-0.027  
(-1.13) 
0.0547 
(1.59) 
Region 3 
-0.067***  
(-3.07) 
-0.0444 
(-1.43) 
-0.0668*  
(-2.28) 
-0.113 ***
(-3.02) 
-0.0599* 
(-2.31) 
-0.035  
(-1.18) 
-0.0806** 
(-2.46) 
Region 4 
-0.06 
(-1.8) 
-0.0449 
(-0.99) 
-0.0672 
(-1.47) 
-0.0767 
(-1.76) 
-0.141** 
(-2.52) 
0.0389  
(0.96) 
-0.284*** 
(-4.62) 
Region 5 
0.007  
(0.25) 
-0.0239 
(-0.66) 
-0.0128 
(-0.3) 
0.0429 
(0.53) 
0.0164 
(0.53) 
-0.0184  
(-0.62) 
0.1397 
(1.8) 
Region 6 
-0.1168* 
(-2.52) 
-0.221 
(-2.8) 
-0.0696 
(-1.15) 
-0.0126 
(-0.18) 
-0.1676*** 
(-2.83) 
-0.1439***  
(-2.77) 
-0.0265 
(-0.27) 
Univ 1 
0.043* 
(-2.14) 
-0.0491 
(-1.74) 
-0.022 
(-0.79) 
-0.0556 
(-1.59) 
-0.0574** 
(-2.34) 
0.0118  
(0.5) 
-0.1487*** 
(-3.92) 
Univ 2 
-0.077***  
(-4.08) 
-0.006 
(-0.21) 
-0.0757***  
(-2.95) 
0  
(0.02) 
-0.1114*** 
(-4.85) 
-0.07***   
(-3.12) 
-0.0893*** 
(-2.61) 
Univ 3 
0.025  
(1.17) 
0.0318 
(1.04) 
0.062**  
(2.11) 
0.005  
(0.14) 
0.0167** 
(0.66) 
0.0679*** 
(2.76) 
-0.0953* 
(-2.24) 
Univ 4 
-0.0164 
(-0.57) 
0.0147 
(0.31) 
0.002  
(0.04) 
-0.1128 
(-1.5) 
0.0099 
(0.31) 
-0.006  
(-0.16) 
0.0126 
(0.26) 
Univ 5 -0.003  -0.0254 0.014  0.02  -0.0448 0.0363  -0.1578*** 
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(-0.16) (-1.02) (0.51) (0.56) (-1.94) (1.77) (-2.66) 
Univ 6 
-0.0697*** 
(-4.61) 
-0.02  
(-0.97) 
-0.0812***  
(-3.79) 
-0.1251*** 
(-4.16) 
-0.0534*** 
(-3.06) 
-0.0357**  
(-1.96) 
-0.1153*** 
(-4.17) 
MBA Degree 
-0.0479*** 
(-2.77) 
-0.0412 
(-1.7) 
-0.0427 
(-1.78) 
-0.1028** 
(-2.63) 
-0.081*** 
(-4) 
-0.0479**  
(-2.52) 
-0.004 
(-0.1) 
Owner 
-0.0839*** 
(-6.53) 
-0.0442** 
(-2.43) 
-0.1236***  
(-6.95) 
-0.0568 
(-1.93) 
-0.0606*** 
(-3.76) 
0.0754*** 
(3.35) 
0.0389 
(1.77) 
Turnover 
0.0624*** 
(4.03) 
0.0127 
(0.6) 
0.082*** 
(3.63) 
0.002  
(0.08) 
0.0847*** 
(4.27) 
0.0754*** 
(3.35) 
0.0389 
(1.77) 
Intercept 
1.1344*** 
(28.32) 
1.172*** 
(20.13) 
1.111***  
(20.25) 
1.133*** 
(11.75) 
1.165*** 
(24.42) 
1.01***  
(23.83) 
1.1***  
(10.44) 
N of Obser. 3759 1236 2133 922 2836 2619 1139 
R2 (Adj R2) 
0.0559 
(0.0499) 
0.0453 
(0.0264) 
0.075 
(0.0642) 
0.069 
(0.044) 
0.0655 
(0.0575) 
0.0588 
(0.0504) 
0.0706 
(0.0515) 
 
Variables of Regression 
Age dummy: categorized CEOs age into 7 groups from 30s to 80s (in the Tobin’s q sample, CEOs in 80s are excluded 
by screening stages) 
Major dummy; CEOs major in universities are categorized into 4 groups; ‘management and economics,’ 
‘law and administration’ ‘engineering,’ and ‘social science and others’ 
Region dummy; Regional origin of CEOs is categorized into 7 groups; ‘Seoul and Gyeonggi’ ‘Gyeongsang’ 
‘Chungcheong’ ‘Jeolla’ ‘Gangwon and Jeju’ ‘Hwanghae, Hamgyeong, and Pyeongan’ and ‘from abroad (foreign 
countries)’ 
Univ dummy: Universities are categorized into 7 groups; top 5 local universities (Seoul National, Yonsei, Korea, 
Hanyang, and Sungkyunkwan University), overseas universities, and other local universities.  
MBA dummy: when the CEO earned MBA degree from abroad, then dummy=1, otherwise 0. 
Owner dummy; when the CEO is owner dummy =1 otherwise 0 
Turnover dummy; when the CEO is newcomer then dummy=1, otherwise=0 
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VI-5. Performance of Sub-samples  
 
 
VI-5-1. ROIC Sample 
 
Table VI-14-27 demonstrate descriptive results including ROIC and ROA 
averages, the proportion of owner CEOs, and turnover rate of CEOs of full and sub-
samples. Besides ROIC, another accounting data, ROA, which is defined as the rate of 
return on total assets after paying tax and interest payments, is presented in the tables. 
While this paper uses ROIC as accounting profitability for analysis due to its 
consistent tendency compared to ROA, it needs to be complemented by ROA. Despite 
ROA tending to seriously fluctuate particularly during the financial crisis owing to 
excessive leverage of Korean firms, ROA can offer complementary information about 
a firms’ profitability. Thus, ROA is provided to consider the final profitability of firms 
after interest payment.  
The values of Tobin’s q in the tables are not comparable with the values of 
ROIC and ROA. The average values of ROIC and ROA in the tables are calculated by 
all observations available. However, the values of Tobin’s q are calculated by screened 
observations. Thus, ROIC matched data does not completely fit with the “Tobin’s q” 
data in terms of number of observations. The values of Tobin’s q are shown for 
reference.  
The average ROIC and ROA of the pooled sample is 4.18 percent, and –0.59 
percent, respectively. The proportion of owner CEOs is 69.46 percent, and the CEO 
turnover rate is 15.53 percent on average. ROIC values decreased to around 3.7 
percent in 2003 from 5.6 percent in 1995. While ROIC values do not seem to have 
recovered, the values of ROA decreased to 6.88 percent in 1998 and increased to 2.45 
percent in 2003. 
The proportion of owner CEOs decreased from 71 percent in 1995, and 75.6 
percent in 1998, to 63 percent in 2003. The average age of CEOs remained stable. The 
turnover rate of CEOs increased from 13 percent in 1995 to 20 percent in 1998, and to 
18.4 percent in 2003. 
In comparison with chaebol and non-chaebol companies, average ROIC 
values of chaebol-affiliated companies are likely to be higher than those of non-
chaebol companies. However, average ROA values of both samples do not seem to be 
significantly different. The proportion of owner CEOs of chaebol-affiliated companies 
is 49.6 percent on average, decreased from 48 percent in 1996 to 42 percent in 2003. 
On the contrary, the proportion of owner CEOs of non-chaebol companies tended to be 
significantly greater than that of chaebol affiliated companies. It decreased from 80 
percent in 1995 to 67 percent in 2003. 
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The performance differences between the top 5 chaebols and the ensuing 6-30 
chaebol-affiliated companies become apparent. The top 5 show greater ROIC and 
ROA on average than the remaining 25 chaebol-affiliated companies. In this context, 
the inter-performance differences, in particular between the top 5 and the rest is likely 
to be greater than that ‘between the top 30 chaebol and non-chaebol companies.’ The 
turnover rate of the top 5 chaebol companies sample is relatively high, 30 percent on 
average. In particular, the sample turnover rate reaches around 46 percent in 1998. The 
proportion of owner CEOs is the lowest among the samples, at 38 percent on average.  
When divided by owner and professional CEO samples, the ROIC and ROA 
average of owner CEO group are 4.56 percent and –0.37 percent, respectively. Those 
are greater than the professional CEO group. It is natural that the age of owner CEOs 
is higher than that of professional CEOs, on average. The turnover rate of professional 
CEOs is expectedly higher than that of owner CEOs. Table VI-6-7 show the results, 
average age, and turnover rate of both samples.   
How different are the performance and turnover rates of the samples for 
chaebol owner CEOs and non-chaebol owner CEOs? Table VI-8-9 show the 
differences between the two samples. Although the results of the chaebol owner CEOs 
sample are greater than those of non-chaebol owner CEOs sample, the difference is 
largely insignificant. The difference between chaebol owner CEOs and non-chaebol 
owner CEOs is distinguishable in terms of age and turnover rate rather than 
performance. Chaebol owner CEOs are likely to be younger and more likely to turn 
over to a successor during the period than non-chaebol owner CEOs. The sample 
turnover rate of non-chaebol owner CEOs is only 8.94 percent, relatively lower than 
the 16 percent sample of chaebol owner CEOs. 
Professional CEOs in both samples, chaebol affiliated and non-chaebol 
companies, show differences in performances. The average ROIC and ROA values of 
the chaebol professional CEOs sample are greater than those of non-chaebol 
professional CEOs, as seen in table VI-10-11. The differences in results between two 
professional CEO samples (chaebol and non-chaebol samples) are greater than those 
between two owner CEO samples. Chaebol affiliated companies are more likely to 
attract and build up human resources capabilities than non-chaebol companies. 
The comparison between ‘changed’ and ‘unchanged’ samples is demonstrated 
in table VI-25-26. The changed sample contains firms that experience a change in 
CEOs during the period. The unchanged sample contains firms that do not experience 
a change in CEOs during the period. The unchanged sample shows relatively stable 
results than the changed sample. The ROIC and ROA of the ‘changed sample’ are 3.6 
percent and –1.44 percent on average, respectively, while those of the ‘unchanged 
sample’ are 5.22 percent and 0.95 percent, respectively. The age of CEOs of the 
changed sample rapidly decreases to 54 in 2003 from 60 in 1995.  
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Finally, table VI-27 shows the descriptive analysis of two samples, the pre-
crisis and the post-crisis. The financial crisis, as mentioned previously, is expected to 
have an impact on the financial performance of observed companies. The average 
ROIC is 5.06 percent, the proportion of owner CEOs is 72 percent, and the CEO 
turnover rate is 16.1 percent before the financial crisis. However, the average ROIC 
declines to 3.75 percent, the proportion of owner CEOs also decreases to 68 percent 
from 72 percent. The average age of CEOs after the crisis tends to be younger than 
before the crisis period.  
In detail, the average ROIC values of four samples range from 4.8 percent 
(professional) to 5.7 percent (chaebol affiliated), largely similar numbers. After the 
financial crisis, however, performance differences among categories increased 
compared to those of the period prior to the crisis. As for ROA, the average values of 
samples are not consistent with ROIC values.   
The turnover rate of professional CEOs is higher than that of owner CEOs as 
expected. The turnover rate of owner CEOs slightly increased from 8 percent before 
the crisis to 9.4 percent after the crisis. 
 
VI-5-2. Tobin’s q Sample 
 
 The figures in parentheses in table VI-14-27 show the average Tobin’s q, 
ROIC, and ROA, the proportion of owner CEOs, age, and CEO turnover rate of 
Tobin’s q samples. As explained above, Tobin’s q samples have a smaller number of 
observations than ROIC samples. The accounting data in Tobin’s q matched samples 
is higher than that of the ROIC samples, because outliers resulting from financially 
distressed companies are excluded. Considering that the values of ROA are more 
likely to be influenced by ‘financial contraction’ due to the overly leveraged capital 
structure of Korean firms, the ROA values of two samples (ROIC matched and Tobin’s 
q matched data) are expected to be more different than the values of ROIC.              
  The values of Tobin’s q of four categories dropped over time without 
exception. The decrease was more pronounced in the “owner CEO group” and “non-
chaebol group” rather than the “professional CEO group” and “chaebol group.” The 
values of Tobin’s q of non-chaebol groups decreased to 0.78 and 0.75 in 2002 and 
2003 from 1.08, and 1.11 in 1995 and 1996. The values of Tobin’s q of the “owner 
CEO group” also decreased to 0.74 in 2003 from 1.07 in 1995. 
On the other hand, the values of Tobin’s q in the “professional CEO group” 
remained relatively stable from 1.16 in 1995 to 0.9 in 2003. The values of Tobin’s q 
in the chaebol-affiliated companies group also remained steady between 1.13 in 1995 
and 0.98 in 2003. In detail, the values of Tobin’s q of the top 5 chaebol sample 
ranged from 1.15 in 1995 to 1.05 in 2003. The stability of Tobin’s q of chaebol-
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affiliated companies stems mainly from the consistency of the top 5 chaebol 
companies rather than the remaining chaebols. Table VI-19-20 show the differences 
between owner and professional CEOs. 
On the contrary, the values of Tobin’s q of the non-chaebol companies drop 
to 0.75 in 2003 from 1.08 in 1995. In particular, the values of the non-chaebol owner 
CEO sample decrease from 1.06 in 1995 to 0.72 in 2003. The values of the chaebol-
affiliated companies’ professional CEO sample are relatively stable. Table VI-21-24 
show the differences among the sub-samples.   
After the crisis, the average Tobin’s q declined from 1.064 in the pre-crisis 
period to 0.885. As table VI-27 shows, the values of Tobin’s q declined in the post-
crisis period.  
 
 
<Table VI-11> Description of Pooled Sample  
 
  POOLED SAMPLE  
 
N ROIC average (%) 
ROA average 
(%) Tobin's q Family (%)
Average 
age 
Turnover 
(%) 
Total  5,373 (4,533*) 
4.18 
(5.34) 
-0.59 
(1.84) 
0.98 
(0.95) 69.46 58.47   15.53 
1995 582 (510) 
5.57 
(5.91) 
1.17 
(1.9) 
1.1  
(1.09) 71.48 58.79 13.23 
1996 
604 
(531) 
4.91 
(5.34) 
0.22 
(1.06) 
1.13 
(1.12) 
73 58.74 16.23 
1997 602 (526) 
4.71  
(5.5) 
-1.67  
(0.25) 
1.0  
(0.99) 72.76 59.04 18.77 
1998 
594 
(479) 
3.41 
(5.63) 
-6.88 
(0.16) 
1.01 
(0.98) 
75.6 58.76 20 
1999 603 (467) 
3.49  
(4.99) 
-0.99 
(2.15) 
1.08  
(0.98) 70.65 58.36 17.4 
2000 
607 
(485) 
3.87 
(5.56) 
-0.74 
(1.92) 
0.89  
(0.87) 
68.2 58.22 17.96 
2001 598 (491) 
3.72 
(4.97) 
-0.45 
(1.76) 
0.94 
(0.9) 66.72 58.45 18.39 
2002 
592 
(519) 
4.28  
(5.25) 
1.53  
(3.24) 
0.85  
(0.81) 
63.57 57.85 17.53 
2003 591 (525) 
3.72  
(4.79) 
2.45  
(4.05) 
0.8  
(0.8) 63.1 58.05 - 
* Results of Tobin’s q sample are presented in parantheses.  
 
 
<Table VI-12> Description of Chaebol Sample  
 
CHAEBOL SAMPLE  
 
N ROIC average (%) 
ROA average 
(%) Tobin's q Family (%)
Average 
age 
Turnover 
(%) 
Total  1,079 (973) 
5.25  
(5.98) 
-0.6  
(1.0) 
1.07 
(1.05) 46.15 56.76  22.8 
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1995 127 (118) 
6.0  
(6.19) 
0.87  
(1.0) 
1.13  
(1.13) 49.6 56.63 20.47 
1996 
129  
(119) 
5.59  
(5.76) 
0.3  
(0.46) 
1.12  
(1.12) 
46.5 55.4 23.26 
1997 144  (129) 
5.6  
(6.44) 
-2.02  
(-0.6) 
1.08  
(1.08) 48.6 56.4 27.08 
1998 
138 
(115) 
3.62  
(5.44) 
-5.31  
(-0.46) 
1.12 
(1.08) 
47.8 56.99 36.23 
1999 123 (100) 
3.73  
(5.01) 
-2.32  
(2.1) 
1.22  
(1.07) 43.9 57.3 23.58 
2000 
105 
(94) 
5.61  
(6.46) 
1.14  
(1.14) 
0.97  
(0.97) 
44.76 56.73 20.95 
2001 102 (98) 
4.99  
(5.12) 
-0.85  
(-0.06) 
1.0  
(1.0) 47.1 57.42 19.6 
2002 
105 
(101) 
6.21  
(6.52) 
2.14  
(2.9) 
0.91  
(0.91) 
42.86 56.93 28.57 
2003 106 (99) 
6.27  
(6.89) 
2.43  
(3.33) 
0.98  
(0.98) 42.45 57.03 - 
 
 
<Table VI-13> Description of Non-Chaebol Sample  
 
   NON-CHAEBOL SAMPLE  
 
N ROIC average (%) 
ROA average 
(%) Tobin's q Family (%)
Average 
age 
Turnover 
(%) 
Total  4,294 (3,551) 
3.92  
(5.17) 
-0.64  
(2.07) 
0.95  
(0.92) 75.32 58.93  13.71 
1995 455 (391) 
5.45  
(5.82) 
1.26  
(2.17) 
1.09  
(1.08) 77.58 59.4 11.21 
1996 
475  
(412) 
4.72  
(5.21) 
0.2  
(1.24) 
1.14  
(1.11) 
80.21 59.65 14.32 
1997 458 (397) 
4.43  
(5.2) 
-1.56  
(0.53) 
0.97  
(0.95) 80.35 59.88 16.16 
1998 
456 
(363) 
3.35  
(5.69) 
-7.35  
(0.36) 
0.98  
(0.95) 
83.99 59.3 15.13 
1999 480 (367) 
3.43  
(4.99) 
-0.65  
(2.16) 
1.04  
(0.96) 77.5 58.63 15.83 
2000 
502 
(390) 
3.51  
(5.34) 
-1.14  
(2.11) 
0.87  
(0.84) 
73.1 58.53 17.33 
2001 496 (389) 
3.46  
(4.93) 
-0.37  
(2.22) 
0.92  
(0.87) 70.77 58.66 18.15 
2002 
487 
(417) 
3.87  
(5.14) 
1.4  
(3.33) 
0.84  
(0.78) 
68 58.05 15.16 
2003 485 (425) 
3.16  
(4.3) 
2.46  
(4.21) 
0.75  
(0.75) 67.62 58.27 - 
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<Table VI-14> Description of Top 5 Chaebol Sample 
 
  TOP 5 CHAEBOL SAMPLE  
 
N ROIC average (%) 
ROA average 
(%) Tobin's q Family (%)
Average 
age 
Turnover 
(%) 
Total  396 (361) 
6.37  
(6.95) 
1.2  
(2.17) 
1.13  
(1.11) 38.1 57.60  30.1 
1995 37  (35) 
6.97  
(6.95) 
1.78  
(1.75) 
1.15  
(1.15) 35.1 57.51 21.6 
1996 
41  
(38) 
6.04  
(6.35) 
0.41  
(0.74) 
1.15  
(1.15) 
43.9 56 19.5 
1997 48  (50) 
7.36  
(7.96) 
-0,52  
(0.23) 
1.15  
(1.15) 43.7 57.71 39.6 
1998 
57  
(50) 
5.06  
(6.72) 
-1.96  
(0.64) 
1.25  
(1.16) 
38.6 59.07 45.6 
1999 48  (38) 
2.53  
(4.39) 
-4.03  
(1.47) 
1.27 
(1.16) 33.3 57.58 35.4 
2000 
42  
(39) 
7.62  
(7.91) 
1.65  
(2.87) 
1.01  
(1.12) 
40.5 58.36 35.7 
2001 43  (41) 
6.56  
(6.78) 
1.26  
(2.0) 
1.12  
(1.12) 30.2 56.37 20.9 
2002 
40  
(39) 
7.66  
(7.8) 
4.94  
(5.19) 
1.0  
(1.0) 
40 58.57 22.5 
2003 40  (38) 
7.49  
(7.66) 
5.25  
(4.61) 
1.05  
(1.05) 37.5 57.27 - 
 
<Table VI-15> Description of Top 6-30 Chaebol Sample  
 
  TOP 6-30 CHAEBOL SAMPLE  
 
N ROIC average (%) 
ROA average 
(%) Tobin's q Family (%)
Age 
average 
Turnover 
(%) 
Total  683 (612) 
4.64  
(5.37) 
-1.27  
(0.39) 
1.0  
(1.0) 50.7 56.26  21.7 
1995 90  (83) 
5.6  
(5.84) 
0.49  
(0.69) 
1.13  
(1.12) 55.6 56.3 20 
1996 
88  
(81) 
5.38  
(5.48) 
0.24  
(0.32) 
1.11  
(1.11) 47.7 55.1 25 
1997 96  (86) 
4.72  
(5.68) 
-2.77  
(-1.03) 
1.05  
(1.05) 
51 55.7 20.8 
1998 
81  
(65) 
2.61  
(4.46) 
-7.67  
(-1.32) 
1.02  
(1.02) 54.3 55.5 29.6 
1999 75  (62) 
4.5  
(5.39) 
-1.23  
(2.49) 
1.18  
(1.02) 
50.7 57.1 16 
2000 
63  
(55) 
4.27  
(5.43) 
0.8  
(-0.09) 
0.94  
(0.94) 47.6 55.65 11.1 
2001 59  (57) 
3.84  
(3.93) 
-2.39  
(-1.54) 
0.92  
(0.92) 
59.3 58.2 18.6 
2002 
65  
(62) 
5.31  
(5.71) 
0.42  
(1.46) 
0.86  
(0.86) 44.6 55.9 32.3 
 93
2003 66 (61) 
5.53  
(6.42) 
0.72  
(2.54) 
0.94  
(0.94) 45.4 56.88 - 
 
<Table VI-16> Sample-Description of Owner CEOs  
 
OWNER CEO SAMPLE  
 
N ROIC average (%) 
ROA average 
(%) Tobin's q Family (%)
Average 
age 
Turnover 
(%) 
Total  3,733 (3,292) 
4.56  
(5.43) 
-0.37  
(1.74) 
0.94  
(0.92) 100 59.42  8.95 
1995 416 (368) 
5.75  
(5.83) 
1.57  
(1.96) 
1.07  
(1.07) 100 59.66 6.97 
1996 
441 
(391) 
4.85  
(5.32) 
0.42  
(1.16) 
1.12  
(1.11) 
100 59.55 8.16 
1997 438 (392) 
4.87  
(5.4) 
-0.83  
(0.55) 
0.97  
(0.96) 100 59.78 9.13 
1998 
449 
(377) 
4.06  
(5.47) 
-5.24  
(0.09) 
0.97  
(0.96) 
100 59.41 13.8 
1999 426 (355) 
3.71  
(5.18) 
-0.96  
(2.61) 
1.03  
(0.95) 100 59.28 10.8 
2000 
414 
(359) 
4.17  
(5.57) 
-1.38  
(1.95) 
0.83  
(0.83) 
100 59.16 9.18 
2001 399 (353) 
4.11  
(5.32) 
0.12  
(2.17) 
0.88  
(0.84) 100 59.42 11.78 
2002 
377 
(348) 
4.79  
(5.52) 
1.37  
(2.43) 
0.76  
(0.75) 
100 59.11 9.55 
2003 373 (349) 
4.82  
(5.2) 
2.42  
(3.02) 
0.74  
(0.74) 100 59.38 - 
 
<Table VI-17> Sample-Description of Professional CEOs  
 
PROFESSIONAL CEO SAMPLE  
 
N ROIC average (%) 
ROA average 
(%) Tobin's q Family(%)
Average 
age 
Turnover 
(%) 
Total  1,641 (1,232) 
3.32  
(5.13) 
-1.53  
(2.13) 
1.09  
(1.03) 0 56.36  30.53 
1995 166 (141) 
5.11  
(6.1) 
0.19  
(1.76) 
1.17  
(1.16) 0 56.63 28.9 
1996 
163 
(140) 
5.07  
(5.4) 
-0.34  
(0.8) 
1.17  
(1.14) 
0 56.55 38 
1997 164 (134) 
4.3  
(5.78) 
-3.9  
(-0.62) 
1.07  
(1.05) 0 57.04 44.5 
1998 
145 
(101) 
1.4  
(6.23) 
-11.94  
(0.42) 
1.16  
(1.06) 
0 56.74 39.3 
1999 177 (112) 
2.97  
(4.42) 
-1.07  
(0.69) 
1.23  
(1.08) 0 56.14 33.3 
2000 
193 
(125) 
3.22  
(5.52) 
0.62  
(1.84) 
1.05  
(0.97) 
0 56.2 36.8 
2001 199 (134) 
2.94  
(4.04) 
-1.6  
(0.69) 
1.09  
(1.03) 0 56.48 31.7 
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2002 
215 
(170) 
3.4  
(5.17) 
1.81  
(4.9) 
1.04  
(0.92) 
0 55.67 31.5 
2003 218 (175) 
1.83  
(3.95) 
2.5  
(6.09) 
0.91  
(0.9) 0 55.77 - 
 
<Table VI-18> Sample-Description of Chaebol*Owners  
 
CHAEBOL*OWNER CEO SAMPLE  
 
N ROIC average (%) 
ROA average 
(%) Tobin's q Family (%)
Average 
age 
Turnover 
(%) 
Total  498 (458) 
5.17  
(5.7) 
0.02  
(1.03) 
1.04  
(1.04) 100 56.49  16.03 
1995 63  (58) 
5.56  
(5.81) 
0.52  
(0.64) 
1.1  
(1.1) 100 56.44 17.46 
1996 
60  
(54) 
5.43  
(5.6) 
0.27  
(0.24) 
1.12  
(1.12) 
100 54.7 10 
1997 70  (62) 
5.33  
(6.02) 
-0.89  
(-0.01) 
1.08 
(1.08) 100 55.87 14.29 
1998 
66  
(59) 
4.0  
(4.8) 
-2.54  
(-0.83) 
1.08  
(1.08) 
100 56.73 24.24 
1999 54 (46) 
3.82  
(5.64) 
-1.64  
(3.77) 
1.18  
(1.08) 100 57.8 14.81 
2000 
47  
(45) 
5.15  
(5.45) 
-2.38  
(-0.75) 
0.97  
(0.97) 
100 56.64 12.77 
2001 48  (48) 
5.06 
(5.06) 
0.02  
(0.02) 
0.98  
(0.98) 100 57.4 12.5 
2002 
45  
(44) 
5.76  
(6.34) 
2.85  
(3.3) 
0.91  
(0.91) 
100 56.4 22.22 
2003 45  (42) 
6.44  
(6.92) 
3.98  
(4.38) 
0.93  
(0.93) 100 56.4 - 
 
<Table VI-19> Sample-Description of Non-Chaebol*Owner CEOs  
 
NON-CHAEBOL*OWNER CEO SAMPLE  
 
N ROIC average (%) 
ROA average 
(%) Tobin's q Family (%)
Average 
age 
Turnover 
(%) 
Total  3235 (2,838) 
4.49  
(5.38) 
-0.32  
(1.85) 
0.91  
(0.9) 100 59.88  8.94 
1995 353 (311) 
5.79  
(5.84) 
1.75  
(2.2) 
1.07  
(1.06) 100 60.23 5.1 
1996 
381 
(337) 
4.75  
(5.27) 
0.45  
(1.3) 
1.12  
(1.1) 
100 60.31 7.87 
1997 368 (330) 
4.78  
(5.29) 
-0.82  
(0.65) 
0.95 
(0.94) 100 60.53 8.15 
1998 
383 
(318) 
4.07  
(5.59) 
-5.7  
(0.26) 
0.95  
(0.94) 
100 59.87 12 
1999 372 (309) 
3.7 
(5.11) 
-0.86  
(2.44) 
1.01  
(0.93) 100 59.5 10.2 
2000 
367 
(314) 
4.05  
(5.59) 
-1.25  
(2.33) 
0.81  
(0.81) 
100 59.5 8.72 
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2001 351 (306) 
3.98  
(5.36) 
0.14  
(2.51) 
0.86  
(0.82) 100 59.7 11.68 
2002 
332 
(305) 
4.66  
(5.4) 
1.17  
(2.31) 
0.73  
(0.73) 
100 59.5 7.83 
2003 328 (308) 
4.59  
(4.97) 
2.21  
(2.84) 
0.72  
(0.72) 100 59.8 - 
 
<Table VI-20> Sample-Description of Chaebol*Professional CEOs  
 
CHAEBOL*PROFESSIONAL CEO SAMPLE  
 
N ROIC average (%) 
ROA average 
(%) Tobin's q Family (%)
Average 
age 
Turnover 
(%) 
Total  581 (516) 
5.39  
(6.23) 
-0.78  
(0.98) 
1.08  
(1.05) 0 56.99  32.73 
1995 64  (60) 
6.43  
(6.55) 
1.2  
(1.35) 
1.16  
(1.16) 0 56.81 23.4 
1996 
69  
(65) 
5.73  
(5.89) 
0.32  
(0.63) 
1.13  
(1.13) 
0 56 34.78 
1997 74  (67) 
5.86  
(6.83) 
-3.08  
(-1.14) 
1.09 
(1.09) 0 56.82 39.19 
1998 
72  
(57) 
3.27  
(6.12) 
-7.85  
(-0.07) 
1.17  
(1.07) 
0 57.22 47.22 
1999 69  (54) 
3.66  
(4.48) 
-2.85  
(0.68) 
1.24  
(1.06) 0 56.91 30.4 
2000 
58  
(49) 
5.99  
(7.38) 
3.99  
(2.88) 
0.97  
(0.97) 
0 56.81 27.59 
2001 54  (50) 
4.92  
(5.18) 
-1.62  
(-0.13) 
1.02  
(1.02) 0 57.46 25.93 
2002 
60  
(57) 
6.54  
(6.65) 
1.61  
(2.59) 
0.92  
(0.92) 
0 57.33 33.33 
2003 61  (57) 
6.14  
(6.88) 
1.28  
(2.56) 
1.03  
(1.02) 0 57.52 - 
 
<Table VI-21> Sample-Description of Non-Chaebol*Professional CEOs  
 
NON-CHAEBOL*PROFESSIONAL CEO SAMPLE  
 
N ROIC average (%) 
ROA average 
(%) Tobin's q Family (%)
Average 
age 
Turnover 
(%) 
Total  1060  (721) 
2.28  
(4.54) 
-2.15  
(2.32) 
1.11  
(1.02) 0 56.08  36.71 
1995 102 (81) 
4.28  
(5.76) 
-0.44  
(2.07) 
1.18  
(1.16) 0 56.51 32.4 
1996 
94  
(75) 
4.59  
(4.96) 
-0.82  
(1.15) 
1.2 
(1.15) 
0 56.95 40.4 
1997 90  (67) 
3.01  
(4.74) 
-4.58  
(-0.09) 
1.05 
(1.02) 0 57.22 48.9 
1998 
73  
(45) 
-0.45  
(6.36) 
-15.98  
(1.04) 
1.15  
(1.04) 
0 56.26 31.5 
1999 108 (58) 
2.52  
(4.36) 
0.06  
(0.69) 
1.21  
(1.1) 0 55.65 35.2 
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2000 
135 
(77) 
2.04  
(4.32) 
-0.82  
(1.18) 
1.1  
(0.97) 
0 55.93 40.7 
2001 145 (87) 
2.2  
(3.36) 
-1.59  
(1.19) 
1.13  
(1.03) 0 56.12 33.8 
2002 
155 
(113) 
2.19  
(4.42) 
1.89  
(6.07) 
1.1  
(0.91) 
0 55.03 30.8 
2003 157 (118) 
0.16  
(2.54) 
2.97  
(7.79) 
0.85  
(0.84) 0 55.08 - 
 
 
<Table VI-22> Description of Changed Sample  
 
CHANGED CEO SAMPLE  
 
N ROIC average (%) 
ROA average 
(%) Tobin's q Family (%)
Average 
age 
Turnover 
(%) 
Total  3439  (2712) 
3.6  
(5.05) 
-1.44  
(1.55) 
1.02  
(0.98) 55.96 57.31  27.1 
1995 376 (306) 
5.42  
(5.78) 
0.95  
(1.73) 
1.13  
(1.12) 61.2 60.07 20.5 
1996 
387 
(320) 
4.7  
(5.19) 
-0.24  
(0.71) 
1.14  
(1.11) 
62.3 59.26 25.3 
1997 387 (320) 
4.28  
(5.2) 
-2.99  
(-0.44) 
1.01 
(1.0) 61 59.07 29.2 
1998 
389 
(291) 
2.42  
(5.34) 
-9.78  
(-0.44) 
1.06  
(1.0) 
64.5 58.24 30.6 
1999 396 (281) 
2.83  
(4.58) 
-1.4  
(1.67) 
1.14  
(1.02) 57.3 57.13 26.5 
2000 
394 
(285) 
3.37  
(5.5) 
-1.57  
(1.39) 
0.94  
(0.9) 
53 56.48 27.7 
2001 383 (288) 
3.05  
(4.63) 
-1.38  
(1.35) 
1.0  
(0.95) 50.9 56.26 28.7 
2002 
371 
(311) 
3.72  
(5.08) 
1.29  
(3.51) 
0.94  
(0.86) 
46.8 54.72 28 
2003 356 (310) 
2.64  
(4.17) 
2.17  
(4.47) 
0.84  
(0.84) 46.6 54.52 - 
 
 
<Table VI-23> Description of Unchanged Sample  
 
UNCHANGED CEO SAMPLE  
 
N ROIC average (%) 
ROA average 
(%) Tobin's q Family (%)
Average 
age 
Turnover 
(%) 
Total  1934 (1812) 
5.22  
(5.78) 
0.95  
(2.27) 
0.91  
(0.91) 93.37 60.45  0 
1995 206 (203) 
5.84  
(6.1) 
1.58  
(2.16) 
1.05  
(1.06) 90.3 56.47 0 
1996 
217 
(211) 
5.28  
(5.55) 
1.04  
(1.6) 
1.13  
(1.12) 
92.2 57.81 0 
1997 215 (206) 
5.49  
(5.97) 
0.71  
(1.34) 
0.98  
(0.96) 94 59 0 
1998 205 5.29  -1.36  0.95  96.6 59.73 0 
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(187) (6.08) (1.09) (0.94) 
1999 207 (186) 
4.75  
(5.63) 
-0.21  
(2.88) 
0.98  
(0.94) 96.1 60.72 0 
2000 
213 
(199) 
4.8  
(5.63) 
0.79  
(2.68) 
0.81  
(0.93) 
96.2 61.43 0 
2001 215 (199) 
4.91  
(5.45) 
1.21  
(2.36) 
0.85  
(0.81) 94.9 62.33 0 
2002 
221 
(207) 
5.23  
(5.9) 
1.94  
(2.85) 
0.71  
(0.72) 
91.9 63.13 0 
2003 235 (214) 
5.35  
(5.67) 
2.87  
(3.44) 
0.73  
(0.73) 88.1 63.4 - 
 
 
<Table VI-24> Comparison of Pre-and Post-Crisis  
 
ROIC SAMPLE 
 
N ROIC average (%) 
ROA average 
(%) Tobin's q Family (%) Turnover (%) 
Pre-crisis 1,788 5.056 -0.105 1.076 72.42 16.1 
Owner 
Professional 
Chaebol 
Non-chaebol 
1,295 
493 
400 
1,388 
5.143 
4.826 
5.723 
4.864 
0.366 
-1.345 
-0.357 
-0.034 
1.054 
1.137 
1.112 
1.065 
100 
0 
48.25 
79.39 
8.1 
37.12 
23.75 
13.9 
Post-crisis 3,586 3.748 -0.192 0.924 67.98 15.25 
Owner 
Professional 
Chaebol 
Non-chaebol 
2,438 
1,148 
679 
2,907 
4.255 
2.672 
4.968 
3.463 
-0.763 
0.54 
-0.74 
-0.063 
0.87 
1.062 
1.039 
0.894 
100 
0 
44.91 
73.37 
9.39 
27.7 
22.24 
13.62 
 TOBIN’S Q SAMPLE 
Pre-crisis 1,567 1.064 5.577 1.064 73.51 16.02 
Owner 
Professional 
Chaebol 
Non-chaebol 
1,152 
415 
366 
1,201 
1.044 
1.12 
1.112 
1.049 
5.512 
5.758 
6.137 
5.407 
1.206 
0.67 
0.261 
1.309 
100 
0 
47.54 
81.43 
8.42 
37.1 
24.32 
13.49 
Post-crisis 2,966 0.885 5.22 2.254 72.28 13.01 
Owner 
Professional 
Chaebol 
Non-chaebol 
2,144 
822 
608 
2,358 
0.847 
0.981 
1.006 
0.853 
5.378 
4.805 
5.893 
5.046 
2.021 
2.865 
1.451 
2.462 
100 
0 
46.71 
78.88 
8.16 
25.67 
20.07 
11.19 
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VI-6. Analysis by Educational Background 
  
A descriptive analysis based on the universities in which CEOs graduated is 
presented in Table VI-28-34. The top five local universities are Seoul National, 
Yonsei, Korea, Hanyang, and Seongkyunkwan University. There exist differences 
among the samples. However, it is not easy to determine if the differences are 
statistically significant. Further regression analysis on the relationship of CEO 
characteristics and performance is provided in the following part of this chapter.  
The sub-samples that record relatively greater accounting profitability are 
“Seoul National University,” “Studying Abroad CEOs,” and “local universities 
except the top five universities.”  
 
<Table VI-25> Results of Seoul National University Graduates CEO 
 
Seoul National University Graduates 
 
N ROIC average (%)
ROA average 
(%) Tobin's q Family (%)
Average 
age 
Turnover 
(%) 
Total  1327 4.30 -0.55 1.02 52.77 58.54 21.7 
1995 158 5.12 0.35 1.12 51.2 56.9 17.1 
1996 161 4.95 0.31 1.15 54.7 57.4 17.4 
1997 160 4.71 -1.01 1.01 55.6 58.6 26.9 
1998 141 4.91 -6.0 1.08 60.9 58.7 23.4 
1999 143 3.12 0.05 1.11 55.2 58.6 18.9 
2000 147 3.09 -2.54 0.88 51.0 58.8 21.8 
2001 156 3.55 -0.68 1.0 48.1 58.9 26.3 
2002 136 4.79 2.87 0.97 47.8 58.8 22.1 
2003 125 4.47 1.69 0.87 50.4 60.2 - 
 
 
<Table VI-26> Results of Yonsei University Graduates CEO 
 
Yonsei University Graduates 
 
N ROIC average (%)
ROA average 
(%) Tobin's q Family (%)
Average 
age 
Turnover 
(%) 
Total  533 4.15 1.10 0.96 67.91 54.84 14.46 
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1995 41 5.23 1.42 1.1 65.8 53.7 8.3 
1996 48 4.27 0.22 1.2 70.8 53.6 14.6 
1997 52 3.99 -1.63 1.05 71.2 55.1 20.5 
1998 54 4.77 -1.38 0.98 77.8 55.2 28.2 
1999 59 3.98 -1.62 0.99 71.2 56.1 15 
2000 68 3.69 -1.75 0.85 67.6 54.9 6.8 
2001 67 3.74 0.5 0.89 65.7 55.1 8.3 
2002 69 4.42 2.52 0.77 63.8 55.6 14 
2003 75 3.26 11.6 0.83 57.3 54.3 - 
 
<Table VI-27> Results of Korea University Graduates CEO 
 
Korea University Graduates 
 
N ROIC average (%)
ROA average 
(%) Tobin's q Family (%)
Average 
age 
Turnover 
(%) 
Total  462 3.34 -2.76 1.00 71.82 54.24 21.74 
1995 40 5.5 0.01 1.07 75 55.9 22.5 
1996 47 6.1 0.09 1.09 82.9 53.8 19.1 
1997 50 3.5 -6.0 0.95 78 53.2 20 
1998 48 0.6 -8.47 1.06 79.2 54.4 16.7 
1999 45 0.31 -2.3 1.29 73.3 54.1 8.9 
2000 57 3.4 -3.79 1.0 64.9 53.9 21.0 
2001 50 3.72 -2.97 0.91 70 54.7 20 
2002 62 3.8 -0.71 0.85 59.6 53.85 12.9 
2003 63 3.1 -0.66 0.8 63.5 54.3 - 
 
<Table VI-28> Results of Hanyang University Graduates CEO 
 
Hanyang University Graduates 
 
N ROIC average (%)
ROA average 
(%) Tobin's q Family (%)
Average 
age 
Turnover 
(%) 
Total  390 3.95 -0.40 1.04 73.44 54.76 14.46 
1995 36 6.04 0.66 1.2 75 53.5 8.3 
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1996 41 5.1 0.12 1.2 70.7 54 14.6 
1997 39 4.45 -1.42 1.01 76.9 54.7 20.5 
1998 39 1.93 -8.85 1.02 79.5 53.8 28.2 
1999 40 3.62 0.41 1.11 75 54.2 15 
2000 44 3.17 -2.3 0.99 75 54.6 6.8 
2001 48 3.4 -0.11 1.06 72.9 55.9 8.3 
2002 50 4.99 5.63 0.9 70 56.2 14 
2003 53 2.86 2.3 0.84 66 55.9 - 
 
 
<Table VI-29> Results of Sungkyunkwan University Graduates CEO 
 
Seongkyunkwan University Graduates 
 
N ROIC average (%)
ROA average 
(%) Tobin's q Family (%)
Average 
age 
Turnover 
(%) 
Total  199 5.24 -3.52 1.09 59.76 54.93 19.04 
1995 15 7.18 2.4 1.2 66.7 52.4 20 
1996 16 7.4 -2.11 1.48 62.5 54.6 12.5 
1997 17 7.1 -15.1 1.33 64.7 53.5 0 
1998 25 5.8 -17.1 1.23 64 53.6 28 
1999 30 2.94 -5.44 1.2 46.7 54.4 30 
2000 24 4.43 4.42 0.87 58.3 56 29.2 
2001 21 3.95 -0.05 0.89 57.1 56.1 9.5 
2002 26 3.15 -1.23 0.8 53.8 56.4 23.1 
2003 25 5.18 2.54 0.85 64 57.4 - 
 
 
<Table VI-30> Results of Studying Abroad CEO 
 
Korea University Graduates 
 
N ROIC average (%)
ROA average 
(%) Tobin's q Family (%)
Average 
age 
Turnover 
(%) 
Total  595 4.41 -0.81 0.95 89.99 57.46 14.3 
1995 75 6.1 1.06 1.1 89.3 55.7 14.7 
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1996 70 5.28 0.43 1.08 90 59.4 10 
1997 68 5.0 -1.32 0.94 92.6 59.3 16.2 
1998 74 3.62 -6.79 0.95 93.2 57.7 16.2 
1999 71 5.14 -0.25 1.04 90.1 56.9 9.8 
2000 67 4.97 -0.64 0.91 88.1 57.9 20.9 
2001 57 2.1 -3.13 0.95 91.2 56.1 17.54 
2002 54 3.25 1.28 0.84 90.7 56.9 9.3 
2003 59 4.25 2.07 0.78 84.7 57.2 - 
 
 
 
<Table VI-31> Results of Local Universities Graduates CEO* 
 
Korea University Graduates 
 
N ROIC average (%)
ROA average 
(%) Tobin's q Family (%)
Average 
age 
Turnover 
(%) 
Total  1235 4.38 -0.26 0.93 69.84 57.68 15.48 
1995 117 6.1 2.4 1.1 74.4 57.9 9.4 
1996 124 4.9 0.57 1.14 73.4 57.9 19.4 
1997 129 5.4 -0.29 0.98 72.1 58.3 12.4 
1998 135 2.0 -7.9 0.97 71.1 57.8 16.3 
1999 149 3.8 -1.69 1.1 72.5 57.2 17.45 
2000 145 4.2 2.1 0.87 71 57.4 16.5 
2001 143 4.8 1.13 0.93 69.9 58.1 13.9 
2002 146 4.9 0.85 0.78 64.4 57.2 18.5 
2003 147 3.35 0.53 0.53 59.8 57.3 - 
*This sample includes CEOs that graduated from local universities except Seoul, Yonsei, Korea, 
Hanyang, and Sungkyunkwan Universities. 
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VI-7. Analysis by Industry 
 
 After excluding industries that have only one firm, the data contains 27 
industries. The ROIC values by industry range from 0.55 percent (precision & optical) 
to 9.72 percent (publishing and print). Industries that have relatively higher ROIC on 
average are food and beverages (6.58 percent), apparel (7.54 percent), rubber and 
plastics (7.06 percent), fabricated metal products (8.26 percent), retail trade (7.9 
percent), wholesale trade (8.01 percent), and technical services (7.38 percent). As to 
ROA, the industry with the highest record is technical services (6.16 percent), 
followed by wholesale trade (5.65 percent), fabricated metal products (4.99 percent), 
publishing and printing (4.95 percent), and retail trade (4.64 percent). There are three 
industries that record ROA below zero, mining (-1.15 percent), wood products (-2.31), 
and precision and optical (-2.11 percent) during the period.  
The industry with the highest turnover rate is transport equipment (24.5 
percent), followed by electricity, gas, and water (22.2 percent), construction (20.4 
percent), and publishing and printing (20.0 percent). The lowest is wood products (3.0 
percent), followed by mining (6 percent), and leather (7.4 percent).  
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<Table VI-32> Results by Industry 
 
Industry N ROIC ROA Tobin’s q Turnover rate 
Mining 23 2.59 -1.15 0.89 6 
Food & Beverages 135 6.58 1.93 0.92 13.2 
Textiles 91 4.47 1.64 0.82 15.5 
Sewn wearing apparel 67 7.54 3.37 0.86 13.7 
Leather 36 5.98 0.65 0.86 7.4 
Wood products 29 3.09 -2.31 0.93 3.0 
Pulp & paper 73 5.12 1.64 0.87 15.3 
Publishing & printing 9 9.72 4.95 1.12 20.0 
Refined petroleum 10 4.42 2.5 0.68 16.1 
Chemical 348 7.5 2.73 0.87 13.7 
Rubber & plastics 79 7.06 5.0 0.79 8.6 
Non-metallic mineral products 79 6.3 2.46 0.88 15.4 
Basic metals 153 5.47 2.51 0.83 15.0 
Fabricated metal products 32 8.26 4.99 0.87 12.2 
Machinery 82 3.91 1.13 0.96 15.1 
Computers 12 3.32 0.27 1.13 151 
Electrical machinery 45 5.46 1.28 0.98 16.3 
Electronic components 121 3.89 1.82 0.94 18.8 
Precision & optical 22 0.55 -2.11 1.15 18.8 
Transport equipment 135 3.7 2.56 0.91 24.5 
Furniture 12 6.01 2.67 0.97 19.7 
Electricity, gas, & water 9 4.8 3.5 0.71 22.2 
Construction 68 5.3 1.07 1.06 20.4 
Retail trade 80 7.9 4.64 0.89 18.7 
Wholesale trade 11 8.01 5.65 0.94 22.4 
Transport 45 4.39 0.02 1.03 13.8 
Technical services 6 7.38 6.16 0.96 11.1 
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CHAPTER 7 
Conclusion and Limitations 
to the Korea Stock Exchange, the market value of  
 
VII-1. Conclusions 
 
First, CEOs have a significant impact on performance in Korea. The variance 
of firm profitability owing to a change in CEOs during the period explains a 
“significant amount of total variance of the firms.” In the results of ANOVA from 
ROIC data, the CEO effects are 20 percent and 25.5 percent in the pooled and changed 
samples. In the results of Tobin’s q data, the CEO effects are seen as 13.3 percent, and 
21.5 percent in the pooled and changed samples. The CEO effects are statistically 
significant.  
The relative importance of CEO effects compared with other major effects is 
measured by VARCOMP analysis. As for ROIC, the CEO effects account for 14.7 
percent of total variance in the ‘changed’ sample. By sub-samples, CEOs account for 
21.1 percent (pooled sample), 7.9 percent (before the crisis), 20 percent (after the 
crisis), 19.1 percent (chaebol companies), 15.1 percent (non-chaebol companies), 10.5 
percent (owner sample), and 12.3 percent (professional CEO sample).  
In Tobin’s q data, the CEO effects account for 25.5 percent (pooled data), 25 
percent (changed sample), 12.3 percent (before the crisis), 27.3 percent (after the 
crisis), 27.4 percent (chaebol companies), 28.4 percent (non-chaebol companies), 12.6 
percent (owner CEO sample) and 30 percent (professional CEO sample).  
The evidence of significant leadership effects from the Korean data is in line 
with studies of the ‘individualists’ view’ including Thomas (1988), and Day and Lord 
(1988). As in western countries, Korean CEOs account for a significant amount of 
profitability variance.   
From the VARCOMP analysis of both ROIC and Tobin’s q sample, a 
noticeable finding should be mentioned. The finding, is that CEOs tend to have a 
greater impact on market value, Tobin’s q, than accounting data, ROIC. As previously 
presented, the CEO effects make up 14.7 percent of total variance of ROIC and 25 
percent of total variance of Tobin’s q. The results mean that CEO changes in listed 
companies have a greater association with the market’s valuation. This affirms the 
results of the study of Ahn et al. (2003), which reported that Japanese CEO changes 
have an impact on the market’s valuation of firms in spite of an absence of CEO 
effects on performance. 
Second, the CEO effects tend to be more pronounced after the financial crisis 
than the pre-crisis period. The increase in CEO effects through the crisis can be seen in 
both performance samples. From the ROIC sample, CEO effects increase to 20 percent 
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after the crisis from 7.9 percent before the crisis. Firm effects decrease to 38.3 percent 
after the crisis from 46.7 percent before the crisis. The relative importance of CEO to 
the firm effects increases to 0.68 after the crisis from 0.41 before the crisis. From the 
Tobin’s q sample, CEO effects show a sharp increase from 12.3 percent before the 
crisis to 27.3 percent after the crisis. The relative importance of CEO to firm effects 
increases from 0.59 to 0.83.  
In addition, the fixed effects of the financial crisis dummy variable are 
statistically significant in the samples of “changed data,” “non-chaebol companies,” 
and “owner CEO group.”  
The results indicate that: (1) reform of the corporate sector to enhance the 
accountability and transparency of Korean firms since the financial crisis is likely to 
have a strong association with firm performance differences, in turn, (2) the changes in 
business practices and environment make CEOs more influential, and (3) there is 
significant change in performance differences among firms between the periods of pre- 
and post-the crisis.  
Third, considering the characteristics of chaebols or business groups, CEOs 
of chaebol-affiliated companies are more likely to be influenced by group-based 
strategy and culture. Besides, several studies proved that CEO locus of control was 
strongly associated with organizational strategy and structure in small but not in 
large firms. In this context, CEOs in non-chaebol companies are likely to have a 
greater impact on performance differences than professional CEOs. Furthermore, 
non-chaebol companies tend to have more owner CEOs than chaebol-affiliated 
companies, and in turn, they are more likely to wield influence on performance than 
CEOs of chaebol-affiliated companies. 
Expectedly, CEOs of non-chaebol companies have a greater impact on 
performance than those of chaebol-affiliated companies in the ROIC data. The CEO 
effects of chaebol-affiliated companies make up 19.1 percent, and the relative 
importance of CEO to firm effects is roughly 0.77. However, the CEO effects of non-
chaebol companies make up 17.7 percent, the relative importance is around 0.8 in the 
ROIC sample.  
On the contrary, the results of Tobin’s q data do not support the hypothesis 4. 
The proportions of CEO effects of chaebol and non-chaebol samples are 27.4 percent, 
and 28.4 percent, respectively. The relative importance of CEO effects compared to 
firm effects is 1.12 in chaebol sample and 1.06 in non-chaebol sample.  
Fourth, is related with the comparison of CEO effects between owner CEOs 
and professional CEOs. Similar to the results of ‘chaebol and non-chaebol samples,’ 
the results of the two samples are inconsistent. The professional CEOs impact on 
Tobin’s q is greater than that of owner CEOs, while the results are converse in terms of 
ROIC. In the ROIC sample, the CEO effects of owner and professional CEO group are 
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10.5 percent and 12.3 percent of total variance, respectively. The relative importance to 
the firm effect is 0.67 and 0.56, respectively. However, in the Tobin’s q sample, the 
CEO effects in the owner and professional CEO group make up 12.6 percent and 30.1 
percent, respectively. The relative importance to the firm effects is 0.67 and 1.03, 
respectively. The relative importance of the post-crisis period turns to be remarkably 
greater than that of the pre-crisis period. 
From these results, it can be construed that market values, which reflect 
expectations of a firms’ future value, are more likely to associate with the chaebol 
affiliated companies and professional CEO change than non-chaebol companies and 
owner CEO change. The possible reason is that chaebol affiliated companies were 
forced to improve their business practices during the crisis, and in turn, they are more 
market-oriented and predictable due to strengthened transparency than smaller non-
chaebol companies. The explanation for inconsistency of ‘owner and professional 
samples’ is that owner CEO changes mainly occur by ‘blood succession’ except for 
financially distressed or insolvent companies. The market tends to expect blood 
succession as less disruptive than a professional CEO change.  
Additionally, what is noticeable is that the fixed effects of “owner” dummy 
(family), the financial crisis dummy (imf), and chaebol dummy (group) account for a 
different level of significance depending on sub-samples. In summary, companies 
that never experienced a CEO change tend to have insignificant fixed effects of any 
dummy variable. This is likely because companies that never experienced a CEO 
change tend to be less influenced by both internal and external factors such as the 
financial crisis. However, companies that experienced CEO change have a 
significant ‘imf’ dummy fixed effect. By sub-samples, non-chaebol companies tend 
to be more influenced by the financial crisis. 
Finally, the results of regression analysis on CEOs characteristics’ impact on 
performance demonstrate some interesting findings. CEOs demographic 
characteristics including age, educational background, regional origins seem to have a 
significant impact on performance. The CEOs in their 40s~70s are likely to have a 
positive impact on ROIC, while the CEOs in their 70s, sometimes in their 60s seem to 
have a negative impact on Tobin’s q. Universities CEOs graduated from can be a 
predictor of profitability, particularly of Tobin’s q. In the ROIC sample, turnover of 
CEOs has a negative impact on performance, while it has a positive impact on 
performance in the Tobin’s q sample.   
 
 
VII-2. Limitations 
 
This data includes nine years of information from Korea’s listed companies, a 
relatively shorter observed period than the previous studies. The studies of Lieberson 
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and O’Connor (1972) and Thomas (1988) used 20-year data. In addition to the shorter 
period, this data should exclude companies that do not experience “CEO change” 
during the period. Thus, the observations of the data decrease from 8,800 to 5,374 and 
finally to 3,440. Tobin’s q matched data contains 2,754 observations after screening.  
The relatively small amount of data constrains the power of analysis. This 
study should define the industry classification more broadly due to the small number 
of observations, thus unable to fully capture the industry effects and even CEO effects. 
When the data includes KOSDAQ listed companies and statutory audited companies, 
it is possible to capture each effect more accurately.    
For example, a chaebol has more non-listed than listed affiliated companies. If 
the data includes all affiliated companies of chaebols, the chaebol effects are expected 
to be greater than those in this study. This explains the difference between this study 
and that of Chang and Hong.  
If the sample size expands enough to use time-lag, the CEO effects can be 
explored more comprehensively. This paper does not use time-lag, because the CEO 
data was collected in the first half of the year while the accounting data was collected 
in the subsequent year. However, if the sample size expands enough, time-lag can be 
employed for a more accurate investigation.  
The data used for this study lacks very important information for research. For 
example, the most commonly explored demographic characteristics of CEOs are 
tenure and experience. The KLCA data does not contain information on tenure in the 
firm or industry. Neither is the information on career and experiences of CEOs 
included in the data. Thus, this study cannot investigate the relationship between the 
most intensively investigated characteristics of CEOs such as tenure, experience and 
performance.  
Most of all, the limitation of this study is “Korea’s restricted CEO market.” It 
is rare to see CEOs who move from one company to another in Korea. In the U.S., the 
CEO market is well developed, and thus, the mobility of CEOs is relatively high. The 
mobility of CEOs is a pre-requisite condition for researchers to capture the CEO 
effects. CEOs in Korea and Japan are mainly raised as a CEO within the company. The 
sample is hardly established when the data includes only CEOs with experiences in 
different companies. In this context, the data excludes the companies that experienced 
“no CEO change.”   
As mentioned in chapter III, data from Korea does not report the financial 
performance of business units. Their financial performance can be constructed in the 
future, because some companies have reported business unit data since the financial 
crisis. Thus, the firm effects of this data are combining one of the corporate effects and 
business unit effects in the study of Rumelt and Roquebert et al.  
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VII-3. Future Research  
 
Studies on CEOs in Korea are at an initial stage, marking a contrast with the 
rich body of research available in the west. In particular, empirical studies based on 
archival data are difficult to find. The priority should be on the development of 
archival data and suitable methodology. The expansion of data should include 
KOSDAQ listed companies as well. This expansion of data will assist in better 
analyzing industry and chaebol effects by more narrowly defining industry, and by 
including more affiliated companies under the chaebol’s umbrella.  
In addition, it is needed in terms of content analysis. The study confines the 
scope of analysis to the relative importance of industry, firm, and CEO effects due to 
the limitation of methodology. The impact of demographic characteristics including 
tenure, and functional background of CEOs should be examined beyond this study’s 
brief investigation of chapter VI.  
Beyond exploring the direct relationship between CEOs and performance, 
CEO succession followed by strategic change and in turn, changes in performance are 
also important issues worth exploring.  
The management team including top executives and outside directors shall be 
more seriously investigated. The composition of the top management team, their 
decision-making process, and diversification of the team should be the primary focus 
to comprehend the relationship between management and performance.  
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Appendix 1 
t 
 
Following Schmalensee (1985) and Rumelt (1991), this paper relies on Searl’s 
(1971) treatment of the theory and practice of VARCOMP. The basic method draws on 
the fact that any quadratic form in observations is a linear combination of the variance 
components. 
I therefore begin by considering the expected value of the general quadratic 
form y′ QY according to Searle (1971; 422). The general linear model is taken to be 
y=Xb+e 
………………………………………………………………………...……………(1) 
where y is N*1 (N observations) and for the sake of generality, 
 var(y)=V. 
Then, the expected value of the quadratic form y′ QY is  
 E(y′ QY) = tr(QV) + E(y′)QΕ(y). ……………………………………..….(2) 
I look at this in terms of the model (1) being successively a fixed effects model, and a 
mixed model that I used.  
 In every case b represents all the effects in the model, be they fixed, random 
or mixed. Also, in each model I take E(e)=0, sothat var(e) is E(ee′) = σ2ϕI. Furthermore, 
when b is a vector of fixed effects, E(be′) = bE(e′)=0; and when b includes elements 
that are random effects we assume they have zero means, and zero covariance with the 
elements in e; thus at all times E(be′) = bE(e′)=0. 
 
1) Fixed effects models 
In the usual fixed effects model b is a vector of fixed effects with E(y)=Xb and 
V= σ2εIN. Then becomes 
E(y′ QY) = b′X′QXb + σ2εtr(Q) ……………………………………………..(3) 
2) Mixed models 
In a mixed model we partition b′ as 
 b′=[ b′1  b′A b′B  … b′K]  …………………………………………..……..(4) 
where b1 contains all the fixed effects of the model (including the mean µ) and where 
the other b’s each represent a set of random effects for the factors A, B, C….K 
respectively. Although only single subscripts are used, interaction effects and/or 
nested-factor effects are not excluded by this notation. The mixed models that Searle 
suggested with nested factor effects are the models this paper employs. They are 
considered merely as factors, each identified by a single subscript rather than the 
letters of the corresponding main effects. For example, the A B-interactioneffects 
might be in the vector bG. 
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 The model (1) is written in terms of (4) as 
 
y = X1 b1 + XA bA + XB bB + ⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅ +XK bK +e; 
 
i.e., as  y = X1 b1 + θ
θ
θbX
K
A
∑
=
+e ……………………………………………………(5) 
 
where X has been partitioned conformably for the product Xb and where θ in the 
summation takes the values A, B, …, K. For the random effects we make the two 
initial assumptions: that they have zero menas and that the effects of each random 
factor have zero covariance with those of every other factor. Thus I write E (bθ) = 0 
and from (5) obtain 
E(y) = X1 
b1………………………………………………………………………..….(6) 
 
And   V = var(y) = ')var( θθ
θ
θ XbX
K
A
∑
=
+ σ2εIN……………………………………(7) 
 
Where IN is an identity matrix of order N, and var(bθ) is the covariance matrix of the 
random effects of the θ-factor. These effects are usually assumed to be uncorrelated, 
with uniform variance σ2θ, so that 
 
 Var(bθ) = σ2θINθ  for θ = A, B, …., K, …………………………………..(8) 
There being Nθ different effects of the θ-factor in the data, i.e., Nθ levels of that factor. 
Thus in (7) 
 
 V = 2' θθ
θ
θ σXX
K
A
∑
=
 + σ2εIN  …………………………………………..….(9) 
 
Hence from (6) and (9) the expected value of the quadratic form in (2) is  
 
 E(y′ QY) = (X1 b1)′QX1 b1 + tr
K
A
∑
=θ
θσ 2 (QX′θXθ) + σ2ε tr(Q)………….…(10) 
 
In addition to the Searl’s explanation, I would like to define further according 
to the suggestion of Rumelt (1991). Suppose the model has a simple nested structure. 
There are industry effects, firm effects within industries and errors in the observation 
of each firm return over time, omitting the year effects, year and industry interaction, 
and CEO effects. 
 
 rift = µ + αi + ϕif + εift…………………………………………………………….(11) 
 
 Estimates of the unknown variances σα2, σϕ2, and σε2 can be obtained by 
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working with any set of three independent quadratic forms. Defining n ift =1 if industry 
i has a firm f in year t, and 0 otherwise, I adopt the notation that a ‘dot’ represents 
summation over the subscript normally in that position. For example, n if. is the total 
number of observations N=n …. Define the average return yi of industry i as the 
arithmetic average of all observations in industry i. Thus, yi = ri ../ ni .., and using the 
equation 1, 
 
ift
ft i
ift
if
f i
if
i n
n
n
n εϕαµ ∑∑ +++=
....
.
iy …………………………………………….…(12) 
 
That is, the observed average industry return is the sum of µ, the industry 
effects αI, and weighted averages of the firm effects and errors within that industry. 
The variance among industry returns will be σα2 plus σϕ2 and σε2. That means industry 
returns vary from one another because of industry effects and because of the random 
impact of firm-specific effects and errors on computed industry returns. Following 
Rumelt (1991), let  
 
1
2
2
2
−
−
= ∑ •
α
α
l
li i
y
yy
s ………………………………………………………………..(13) 
 
Now consider ∑Ε i iy 2 . The independence assumptions assure that the expectations 
of cross-products are zero, and that within families of effects, expectations of 
products are zero unless the subscripts are identical (e.g., 2)( ασαα =Ε ji  if I=j, and 
0 otherwise.) Squaring (2) and taking the expectation, yields 
 
22
2
2
222 1
εϕα σσσµ
••••
• +++=Ε ∑
if i
if
i nn
n
y ……………………………………………..(14) 
 
 
so that 
 
22
2
2
222 1
εϕααα σσσµ
••••
• ∑∑∑ +++=Ε
iiif i
if
i
i nn
n
y ll .……..………………………(15) 
 
 
Developing the corresponding expression for 2•Εy  and substituting into (13) gives 
 
22
2
2
22 1
ε
α
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α
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••••
•
i iif i
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y nn
n
s ll …..…………………………….……(16)  
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This equation is linear in the three unknown variance components and describes the 
precise relationship between the observed variance among industry returns and 2ασ , 
2
ϕσ , and 2εσ .  
Using steps parallel to those taken above, the variance of firm-specific return is 
calculated. That is, the variance among firm-specific returns is expected to be the 
true variance among firm-specific effects, plus the variance in industry effects, plus 
the error variance. 
On the other hand, ANOVA estimates models of the following form: 
 
iftift εϕϕϕαααα ϕϕαα +Μ+⋅⋅⋅+Μ+Μ+Μ+⋅⋅⋅+Μ+Μ+=Υ llll 222111 221122110  
 
where M11 to M1 αl  are dummy variables corresponding to the αl  classes of the 
industry and M21 and M2 ϕl  are dummy variables corresponding to the ϕl  classes 
of the firm. The error term is assumed to be normally distributed (0, σ2). The 
importance of an explanatory factor is associated with the variance explained by the 
set of dummy variables for that factor. 
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